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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Established approaches to contemporary British literature frequently focus on 
how novelists from the UK have engaged with the complex account of culture 
that was developed on the Left during the 1980s as a response to Thatcherism. 
Freedom and the City shifts the terms of this debate in a new direction by using 
the thought of Hannah Arendt to reappraise the relationship between culture, 
Left politics and the British novel in the contemporary period, and to reveal a 
previously unstudied political and narrative logic I term the “cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement”. This logic grew out of a model of freedom advanced by 
leftist cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy during the 1980s and 
early 1990s, which identified urban subcultures as a substitute for the formal 
freedom associated with established political structures. Through close readings 
of six contemporary authors—Jeanette Winterson, Hanif Kureishi, J.G. Ballard, 
Ian McEwan, Kazuo Ishiguro and Maggie Gee—I uncover the process by which 
British writers working after Thatcher came to believe that one of the 
consequences of this experiment with freedom has been a disastrous 
abandonment of politics in its formal sense: as a clearly delimited and agonistic 
public space in which a plurality of subjects is recognised and their actions 
invested with political meaning. Because of this abandonment, I argue, in less 
than two decades the coexistence of flexible cultural identities and urban space 
has become a virtual narrative impossibility: today, the British novel is 
frequently marked by structures of failed utopianism, frustrated or incomplete 
experiments and even withdrawal and quietism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
WHAT WE NEED NOW: 
Left Culturalism’s Experiment with Freedom 
 
 
 
 
In 1989 the cultural theorist Stuart Hall delivered a lecture entitled “Old and 
New Ethnicities, Old and New Identities” to the Third Annual Symposium on 
Current Debates in Art History and Theory at the State University of New York, 
Binghamton. The substance of this lecture is now well-known: Hall argues that 
Western society has been made vastly more complex by historical processes of 
diaspora and new technologies of capital and community, which altogether have 
conspired to produce what he calls “new globals and new locals” (“Old and New” 
41). Such a transformation poses difficulties for those on the Left who consider 
socialisation to be a fundamental component of subject-formation, since this 
newly heterogeneous society requires them to develop an understanding of 
subjectivity that is correspondingly complex. And he suggests that it is in this 
way that “the question of identity has returned to us”, a question that is deeply 
troubling because the “master concept” of class—hitherto the Left’s principal 
means of explaining the process of subject-formation—looks less and less apt to 
answer it (42, 46). Conventional understandings of class tend to assume that 
identity is forged primarily by economic circumstances, and that there is a point 
at which the subject can be considered complete; when her position in the 
relations of production has been fixed and her role in the battle between 
proletariat and bourgeoisie scripted, blocked and rehearsed. But while in the 
simpler, more homogeneous society of the past this analysis might have been 
sufficient, in a society made complex by gender, race and sexuality—in which a 
subject might be gay, black and transgender, as well as proletarian—the doctrine 
of economic determinism on which it rests appears less and less convincing. It is 
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not so much that class has suddenly become irrelevant; rather, there are other 
axes of determination that challenge its ability to explain subjectivity in toto, and 
which militate against the assumption that, while determined socially, a 
posteriori, the subject is yet, in the last analysis, immutable.  
In reality, Hall counters, “[i]dentity is always in the process of formation” 
(47, emphasis added). And this disarmingly straightforward contention leads 
him to identify a profoundly difficult lesson that he thinks the Left must learn if 
it is to remain relevant in political circumstances marked by pluralism and 
multiplicity: that any attempt to mobilise the dispossessed on the basis of a 
single, shared consciousness is bound to fail, since the “structure of 
identification is [now] always constructed through ambivalence” and the 
concept of a political singularity no longer tenable (47). In this way the Left has 
been placed in the unenviable situation of having to re-evaluate some of its most 
fundamental premises in order to remain germane. However, Hall is worried 
that instead of rising to this challenge, many leftists continue to insist on the 
pre-eminence of antiquated heuristics that are no longer capable of confronting 
reactionary ideologies—namely, Thatcherism—which appear to have a 
stranglehold on the present.1 Reorienting the Left towards a flexible model of 
subjectivity might seem to anticipate a disaggregated array of progressive forces 
incapable of uniting around a common political purpose. But, Hall urges, if the 
Left intends to continue its project of defending the dispossessed against a 
newly invigorated oppressor, it must locate a new kind of oppositional praxis, 
and this requires formulating a “politics of living identity through difference” 
(57). 
 Hall’s lecture at Binghamton represents a kind of apotheosis of the 
intellectual moment whose legacy Freedom and the City seeks to trace. First, it 
captures with genuine urgency the internecine conflict that racked the British 
Left throughout the 1980s, when the unity of the New Right under Margaret 
                                                 
1 Lamenting this tendency, he says: “One is hearing ‘Let us go back to the old constituencies. Line up 
behind us. The old parties will come again’. I do not believe it. I think Thatcherism is more deep-
seated than that; it is actually shaking the ground from underneath the possibility of a return to 
that old form of politics. So if you ask me what the possibilities are, then the first stage of it is in 
our own ranks. It is quarrelling among ourselves about which direction to go [in] before one 
begins to open that out” (Hall “Old and New” 66). 
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Thatcher contrasted starkly with its own recriminatory factionalism. Second, it 
is an important expression of the intellectual milieu surrounding the so-called 
“New Times” group, a collective that emerged from Martin Jacques’s editorship 
of Marxism Today and advocated a new kind of leftist analysis that could better 
explain the historic shift between Fordist and post-Fordist, “middle” and “late” 
capitalism. And third, it is a notable intervention in the evolution of British 
cultural studies, a discipline with which Hall has long been associated due to his 
directorship of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of 
Birmingham during the 1970s. In all these respects, it is a key contribution to a 
body of thought that I will be referring to as “Left culturalism”. This term is both 
expansive and particular: on the one hand, it refers to an entire intellectual 
sensibility that reaches back to the “New Left” of the 1960s; on the other, it 
departs from the latter in methodology and to the extent that it was engaged 
with a political moment—or “conjunction”, to use a term favoured by its 
interlocutors—that was markedly different from the one that preoccupied 
earlier leftist thinkers.2 In short, the figures who contributed to the 1980s 
                                                 
2 It is important to be clear about what I mean by the “second generation” of Left culturalism, for the 
latter’s conceptualisation of culture as a socially contingent site of identification, alignment and 
disjunction differs quite starkly from earlier movements, such as the New Left of the 1960s. One 
way of explaining this difference is to contrast the methodology of the 1980s thinkers with that of 
the New Left. As Andrew Milner has suggested, prior to the New Left, “[i]n Britain […] the 
culturalist tradition had become institutionally organized into the academic discipline of ‘English’, 
rather than that of sociology” (Milner 45). Thus it is hardly surprising that the first generation of 
Left culturalists sought to challenge the Right on this terrain, especially since—unlike sociology—
the study of letters had not already been host to very sophisticated leftist analyses. Indeed, the 
very absence of such analyses—due to orthodox Marxism’s tendency to dismiss culture as 
superstructural and hence unimportant—was a crucial source of inspiration. As Milner goes on to 
note, “British cultural studies has its origins in a very specific theoretical ‘conjunture’, that of the 
1950s, in which cultural debate had appeared deadlocked between the cruder economic 
determinisms of much Communist Marxism and the seemingly endemic political conservatism 
and cultural elitism of the Leavisites. The kind of cultural theory which emerged from that 
deadlock would eventually be represented in post-structuralist retrospect as ‘culturalism’, but is 
more accurately described as ‘left culturalism’” (45). The assimilation of culture into leftist 
analysis was one of the key developments of mid-twentieth century Marxism, as was the friction 
that subsequently emerged between the radically historicist positions of culturalist Marxists and 
the more abstracted analyses of structuralist Marxists such as Louis Althusser and Émile 
Durkheim. In some ways, Hall might be seen to have bridged this divide in begetting the second, 
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iteration of Left culturalism believed that they could not hope to confront 
Thatcherism without first undertaking the difficult project of placing diverse 
ontologies and a complex account of culture at the heart of their analysis.  
It is this second generation of thinkers that Freedom and the City seeks to 
engage, in arguing that particular British fictions of the last twenty-five years 
can be read as political thought experiments which altogether represent a 
sustained interrogation of Left culturalism and its legacy. It suggests that these 
fictions identify a logic I call the cultural politics of disenfranchisement, which 
was implicit to the culturalist understanding of emancipation and considered 
urban culture an adequate substitute for formal freedom. And it argues that 
close reading of key contemporary British novelists reveals how this logic had 
the unexpected effect of elevating exclusion to the status of a political principle, 
which in turn had a disastrous impact on the category of the political itself. My 
aim is to demonstrate how British writers working after Thatcher came to 
believe that one of the consequences of the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement has been a disastrous abandonment of politics in its formal 
or structural sense:3 as a clearly delimited and agonistic public space in which a 
                                                                                                                                          
distinct iteration of Left culturalism that emerged over the course of the 1980s. For while Hall was 
a key member of the first cultural Left—the first editor of the New Left Review when it launched in 
1960—his work at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies during the 1970s sought to build 
on the earlier generation’s disciplinary foundations in history and English through an engagement 
with the semiotic and sociological paradigms favoured by structuralist Marxism. The resulting, 
highly nuanced account of culture is recognisably different to the one developed by the New Left, 
and was articulated by a wholly new generation of thinkers who were quite comfortable bringing 
structuralist—or, by this point, post-structuralist—analyses to bear on texts that would previously 
have been described as “literary”. Hall has in the past attempted to maintain links between the 
Left culturalism of the 1980s and that of 1960s: for instance, he recently identified in both a “long-
standing quarrel with the reductionism and economism of the base-superstructure metaphor”, 
and argued that they held in common a belief that “the discourse of culture seemed fundamentally 
necessary to any language in which socialism could be redescribed” (“Life and Times” 188). 
However, while both schools of Left culturalism do share common ground—as well as being 
internally diverse and sometimes incoherent—there was a discernable methodological shift that 
took place over the course of the 1970s which serves to differentiate them.  
3 In a recent essay Michael Hardt focuses on the distinction Michel Foucault drew between “politics” 
and “the political”: “In one of his many brief asides about contemporary theory, Foucault in the 
midst of [an] analysis of the internal conflicts of Athenian democracy attacks the trend of theorists 
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plurality of subjects is recognised and their actions invested with political 
meaning. It is to this extent that my investigation differs from existing critiques 
of the cultural project written from a leftist perspective. For where the latter 
have tended overwhelmingly to identify the abandonment of class and 
economism as its most nocuous legacy,4 Freedom and the City focuses to a far 
greater extent on its denigration of politics. 
 In keeping with the textual praxis of Left culturalism more broadly, I do 
this not through a direct discussion of “culture” itself—for this is a rather 
detached realm of experience that is not readily accessible to the present5—but 
                                                                                                                                          
today to focus on the political (designated as masculine in French, le politique) rather than politics 
(la politique), a trend that has only increased in the decades since Foucault’s time […] Usage of the 
terms in colloquial French is inexact but gives us a first approximation of how Foucault 
understands the distinction: politics generally refers to the struggles and negotiations of power 
relations, whereas the political denotes a more removed, philosophical view of structures and 
relations of power” (Hardt 28). This investigation  might be said to continue the trend Foucault 
warns against, since one of its key contentions is that political struggles are effectively 
meaningless unless they take place within structures of power that are capable of recognising 
them as political. To some extent I will be suggesting that politics (la politique) requires the 
political (le politique) in order to have any effect by exploring a logic—the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement—which emphasises the former to the detriment of the latter at significant 
cost. 
4 The most scathing of these attacks is voiced by Ambalavaner Sivanandan, who, in an article subtitled 
“The Hokum of New Times” argues that the culturalist approach was little more than 
“Thatcherism in drag” (Sivanandan 1). “New Times”, Sivanandan writes, “was born in the throes of 
political pragmatism under the sign of cultural theory bereft of economic reasoning”; its 
substitution of cultural for economic determinism allowed it to argue that “the agent of change in 
the contemporary [world] was not the working class […] but the new social forces such as women, 
blacks, gays […] who were themselves informed and impelled by the politics of the person” (5, 3). 
However, he contends, “the battle itself is neither about culture nor about the subject, but—still—
about the ownership and control of the means of production and the exploitation of the workers” 
(8). Sivanandan does acknowledge that the question of politics is significant—“[t]he battle”, he 
concedes, “needs to be taken on at the political/ideological level and not at the economic/politics 
level” (8)—however, it is unclear whether by “politics” he means not just ideology but the spaces 
and institutions through which ideology is expressed and which generate political subjectivities. 
5 Raymond Williams writes that a “documentary” approach to cultural activity “can yield specific 
evidence about the whole organization within which it was expressed” (Williams Revolution 62). 
However, this approach is unlikely to provide us with anything resembling a full understanding for 
the simple fact that it remains at a temporal distance from its subject. And, for this reason, 
Williams argues, “[i]t is only in our own time and place that we can expect to know, in any 
13 
by engaging with cultural texts that were written during and after the period in 
which Left culturalism emerged. Initially I will be discussing texts that appear 
highly amenable to Left culturalist politics but on closer inspection yield far 
more ambivalent implications, before going on to explore the legacy of this 
ambivalence in more recent British literature. The reason for this approach can 
also be found in Hall’s lecture, which evidences an unprecedented willingness to 
treat cultural texts as active interlocutors in the debate surrounding the Left’s 
renewal; valuable voices that should be invited up to the table, rather than 
confined to the kitchen. When Hall seeks to outline the thinking behind his 
theory of “new identities” he reaches not for a treatise, tract or textbook, but for 
a film: My Beautiful Laundrette, written by Hanif Kureishi and first shown at the 
Edinburgh Film Festival of 1985. The passage in which he cites this film is well-
known, and will be familiar to anybody with an interest in Kureishi’s work, but it 
is nonetheless worth quoting at length: 
 
This is a text that nobody likes. Everybody hates it. You go to it 
looking for what are called “positive images” and there are none. 
There aren’t any positive images like that with whom one can, in a 
simple way, identify. Because as well as the politics—and there is 
certainly a politics in that and in Kureishi’s other film [Sammy and 
Rosie Get Laid (1987)], but it is not a politics which invites easy 
identification—it has a politics which is grounded on the 
complexity of identification—it has a politics which is grounded 
on the complexity of identifications which are at work […] If there 
is to be a serious attempt to understand present-day Britain with 
its mix of races and colors, its hysteria and despair, then writing 
about it has to be complex. It can’t apologize, or idealize. It can’t 
sentimentalize. It can’t attempt to represent any one group as 
having the total, exclusive, essential monopoly on virtue […] What 
we need now, in this position, at this time, is imaginative writing 
that gives us a sense of the shifts and the difficulties within our 
society as a whole. (60-61) 
                                                                                                                                          
substantial way, the general organization” of a given structure of feeling (63). 
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What we are offered here is, on one level, a cultural reading of a filmic text. 
Today most of us are familiar with this hermeneutic approach, which is usually 
less concerned with a given text’s aesthetic qualities than with using it to make a 
broader point about the culture—what Raymond Wiliams terms the “structure 
of feeling” (Raymond Williams Revolution 64)6—of a particular time, place and 
political milieu. Like many critiques that adopt this approach, Hall’s reading is 
politically didactic, but that is hardly a problem: literary and cultural critics have 
for some time been apt to situate themselves politically when embarking on a 
given project, and even, in some instances, to use texts primarily as a vehicle for 
their own political pronouncements. Moreover, it is worth acknowledging that 
such didacticism does not necessarily produce unsound readings: My Beautiful 
Laundrette’s slippery approach to characterisation does indeed seem to hint at 
an understanding of identity as constantly evolving in response to manifold 
social pressures that reside both within and outside the subject. And many 
audiences—including a significant part of the British south-Asian community—
did object to it, so in that sense at least the film can be argued to circumscribe 
any attempt to treat Kureishi as a mouthpiece for his cultural constituency.  
However, Hall’s reading is also one in which the text is granted an ability 
to contribute, in at least a partially autonomous way, to a conversation that is 
fundamentally political. It is not treated merely as evidence—as a rich but 
basically inert terrain of corroboration—but as a substantial contribution to the 
discussion that deserves to be treated on equal terms with other, more 
conventionally political texts. This limited autonomy allows Hall to move beyond 
the diagnostic approach, but it also provides the basis for his declaration of what 
culture should and should not be, paradoxically enabling him to subordinate the 
text to the demands of political praxis—of “[w]hat we need now”. Thus his 
                                                 
6 Williams coins this term in The Long Revolution (1961), and considers it to describe “a particular 
sense of life, a particular community of experience hardly needing expression, through which the 
characteristics of our way of life that an external analyst could describe are in some way passed, 
giving them a particular and characteristic colour […I]t is as firm and definite as ‘structure’ 
suggests, yet it operates in the most delicate and least tangible parts of our activity. In one sense, 
this structure of feeling is the culture of a period: it is the particular living result of all the 
elements in the general organization” (Raymond Williams Revolution 64). 
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reading is not just didactic in its attempt to analyse the present structure of 
feeling; it is an explicitly political exhortation for texts, their authors and 
readers, to do certain things in order to bring about a shift in culture and society, 
both in Britain and beyond. Williams might have found this approach 
problematic,7 but what is more important to note here is that it allows any given 
text to take on a reflexive and potentially disruptive role, contributing to the 
political conversation in which it participates while simultaneously reflecting 
back on the praxes that are imputed to it. Stated simply, the danger in 
identifying “[w]hat we need now”—and giving the thing needed a voice of its 
own—is that it ends up having as much to say about you as you about it.  
This process of culture frustrating—even turning against—its ideological 
masters, and shedding uncomfortable light on the assumptions of those who 
presume to speak for it, forms the principal focus of this investigation, as well as 
a good part of its methodology. Freedom and the City thus represents a 
continuation of the culturalist approach, since in principle it attempts something 
that cultural materialism has for some time sought to achieve: to appropriate 
Alan Sinfield’s terms, it “seeks to discern the scope for dissident politics […] 
both within texts and in their roles in cultures” (Sinfield Faultlines 9-10). 
However, it departs from previous analyses of this type in one highly significant 
way: while for the most part cultural materialism has historically targeted the 
Right, Freedom and the City focuses on the Left—on the political and cultural 
assumptions of Left culturalism itself. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Williams criticises the tendency of Marxist literary critics to instrumentalise culture, something 
“which has made Marxism notorious: ‘Is this work socialist or not in tendency? is it helping 
forward the most creative movement in society?’ where literature is defined solely in terms of its 
political affiliations. Marxists, more than anyone else, need to repudiate this kind of end-product, 
in practice as firmly as in theory” (Raymond Williams Culture and Society 276). While “the arts of 
a period […] are of major importance” in expressing its structure of feeling, this expression 
functions “not consciously, but by the fact that here, in the only examples we have of recorded 
communication that outlives its bearers, the actual living sense, the deep community that makes 
the communication possible, is naturally drawn upon” (Revolution 64-65). Any attempt at 
instrumentalisation is thus not just politically suspect but also bound to fail, since culture is not 
subject to prescriptions in any straightforward way. 
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1. Freedom and the City as Faultlines 
 
For at least forty years cultural analysis has formed a significant aspect of left-
wing thought in Britain. But while it was first deployed in a systematic way by 
Williams in the late 1950s and early 60s, it was not until the 1980s that it 
reached its highest pitch of political exigency, when many on the Left began to 
recognise a fundamental shift in the organisation of capitalism—the so-called 
“New Times”—which required them to overhaul their critical apparatus. Hall’s 
demand for a new model of subjectivity that moved beyond class is emblematic 
of this recognition, and forms part of a larger, far-reaching call for the Left to 
assimilate culture into its analyses. As he points out elsewhere, “any simple 
correspondence between ‘the political’ and ‘the economic’ is exactly what has 
now disintegrated”, and this “has had the effect of throwing the language of 
politics more over to the cultural side of the equation” (Hall “Meaning” 120-
121). This said, the imperative for the Left to regroup on cultural terrain was not 
merely academic: it was also political in the most naked sense of the term, and 
this goes some way towards explaining why subjectivity came to be identified as 
the new front line. In one crucial way Thatcherism had pre-empted the Left: its 
adoption of Chicago School ideology entailed an understanding of the subject as 
first and foremost a consumer, periodically given to reinventing herself—if only 
by changing her stock portfolio or choosing a different brand of chewing gum at 
the checkout.8 However, even as Thatcherism mobilised itself on this new 
                                                 
8 The thinking underpinning it was, therefore, not so much liberal as neoliberal: the former’s 
hypostatised, a priori account of subjectivity was replaced by one that emphasised the formative 
influence of economic systems residing outside the self, which had the effect of endowing the 
subject with a large degree of flexibility. This said, the political project of Thatcherism cannot be 
reduced to an evangelical enthusiasm for Chicago School economists such as Milton Friedman and 
Friedrich von Hayek. It is vital to recognise that neoliberalism found its footing in the UK not 
among the Liberals, but among the Conservative Party, which was historically inclined towards 
protectionist policies quite inimical to neoliberal macroeconomics. Consequently, as David 
Marquand observes, Thatcherism is riven with paradoxes: it represents neoliberalism write large, 
but alloyed with “a strong element of traditional Toryism” that emphasised “patriotism, pride in 
being British” and “the need to reassert British traditions”. The “rhetoric of Victorian values”, 
which stressed “the virtues of authority, of hierarchy, of discipline, [and] of order” was also 
“clearly central” to this project, and, as Marquand is at pains to point out, “of those virtues, 
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terrain, its flexible model of subjectivity was destabilised by a rigid, 
essentialised understanding of “Britishness” which sought to deny the 
increasing cultural heterogeneity that was a legacy of Britain’s open 
immigration policies of the 1950s and 60s, as well as the various identity 
movements that followed. This contradiction was of foundational importance to 
Left culturalism, because it represented a new and important site of 
contestation where the Left could challenge the Right by exposing its ideological 
fissures and inconsistencies. Where Thatcherism loaded the term “British” with 
white, straight, heterosexual and middle-class connotations, Left culturalism 
countered it by embracing identity as a complex and ever-changing process 
which couldn’t be reduced to national mythologies in this straightforward and 
politically obnoxious way. Where the Right attempted to obscure its 
incongruities with lazy appeals to human nature,9 the cultural approach revelled 
in the possibilities of paradox, and conceptualised the process of subject-
formation as always contingent upon the cultural particularities of our 
interactions with the various collectives—family, community, subculture—that 
together comprise society. 
In short, subjectivity formed what Sinfield calls a “faultline”: a site at 
which a given hegemony’s ideological logic becomes inconsistent and the 
possibility of resistance presents itself. According to Sinfield, one of the key 
strategies of cultural materialism is to locate these faultlines and adopt them as 
sites of political contest: “It is the project of ideology”, he writes, “to represent 
[social] relations as harmonious and coherent, so effacing contradiction and 
conflict; and the project of cultural materialists to draw attention to this” 
(Sinfield Faultlines 9-10). But while, in contrast to Thatcherism, the cultural Left 
may have actively courted conflict and contradiction, it, like any ideological 
movement, possessed faultlines of its own. And it might be useful to consider 
the titular terms of this investigation—freedom and the city—in this way: as 
                                                                                                                                          
liberalism, even economic liberalism, is inherently subversive” (Marquand 164). 
9 The 1979 Tory manifesto is a perfect example of this strategy: “We in the Conservative Party […] 
want to work with the grain of human nature, helping people to help themselves […] This is the 
way to restore that self-reliance and self-confidence which are the basis of personal responsibility 
and national success” (Manifesto 7). 
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faultlines wherein a hidden logic of Left culturalism becomes visible and 
vulnerable to critique. 
The city has for a long time been considered a natural zone of operation 
for the British Left. In the nineteenth century it was where the oppressive 
dynamics of industrial capitalism were visible in their barest form, and so it is 
hardly surprising that when Friedrich Engels sought to study them in detail he 
trained his eye not on the Derwent Valley, where Richard Arkwright pioneered 
the mill system, but on Manchester, the world’s first industrial city. The city is 
fundamental to Engels’s analysis, however, not just because it gives material 
form to capitalism on a grand scale, but also because the conditions it produces 
enable the collective self-consciousness and empowerment of those whom it 
oppresses. Only in the city, he writes, do the latter “begin to feel as a class, as a 
whole; they begin to perceive that, though feeble as individuals, they form a 
power united […] the consciousness of oppression awakes, and the workers 
attain social and political importance” (Engels 122). Thus it was in the city that 
the Trades Union Congress was formed, at Sheffield in 1866, and it was out of 
the difficulties of urban living that various forms of municipal socialism arose 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. When, after 1922, the Labour Party 
started to develop into a considerable force in British politics, it was largely due 
to the concentration of support in and around Leeds, Manchester, Newcastle and 
Sheffield. And while in the post-war period Labour became a party of national 
government, the metropolises of the industrial North and Midlands, Scotland 
and South Wales, continued to represent its heartlands.  
However, despite this close and longstanding relationship with the city, 
the Left struggled to advance a meaningful urban response to the New Right 
when the latter began to assert itself in the early 1980s—even though the 
ravages of Thatcherism were most visible in urban areas. As Geoff Mulgan, 
another figure connected to the New Times group, wrote in 1989: 
 
It is no coincidence that it is in the cities that the laws of 
Thatcherism have been most apparent, as riots simmer and erupt 
and as transport systems collapse; nor is it any coincidence that 
despite the prime minister’s repeated call for a dynamic new 
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approach to the inner city, no vision has been forthcoming beyond 
a vague and scarcely inspiring promise of new shopping and 
leisure centres and orbital ring roads. 
The Right’s historic unease [with the city] makes it all the 
more remarkable that the Left has so clearly failed to sustain a 
coherent city politics. Although the Left in Britain evolved out of 
the cities, first implemented its ideas in municipal politics and still 
controls nearly all the major cities of Britain, it too has no real 
vision of city life in the 21st century: of how cities can be good 
places to live, and of how a balance can be struck between 
collective consumption and diverse identities. In other countries 
the Left has often used cities as long-term showcases, models of 
planning, redistribution and civic responsibility. In Britain the Left 
of the 1980s has often seemed more interested in using control of 
cities as a quick stepping-stone to national power, a means rather 
than an end. (Mulgan 262) 
 
On a practical level, Mulgan is quite right: the British Left did indeed fail to 
formulate a coherent city politics in the 1980s.10 However, on a theoretical level 
the city became quite important to the Left’s response to Thatcherism, and the 
cultural agenda played a significant role in this. For, as Paul Gilroy—a student of 
Hall—argued in There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (1987), if the Left wished 
to engage fully with the faultline of subjectivity, and to use the resulting insights 
as a way of militating against Thatcherism, it was imperative that “the role of 
distinctively urban processes and experiences [were] recognized” (Gilroy, Union 
Jack 228). Crucially, a fundamental component of this project as he 
conceptualised it was a “disassociation from the corporate structures of formal 
politics”, a necessary step if the Left wanted to reorient its critical purview 
towards “expressive cultures which prize non-work time and space” (228, 235). 
                                                 
10 Although some metropolitan authorities attempted to advance something resembling this—
Liverpool under the (de facto) leadership of Derek Hatton, for instance, or Sheffield under David 
Blunkett—they quickly became bogged down in standoffs with Westminster before their power 
was curtailed by the Local Government Act of 1985. 
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And the city presented itself as exactly the kind of location in which this could be 
achieved: a place where formal politics could be renounced in favour of cultural 
propinquity, subversive pleasures and complex identities that were—like the 
city itself—never fixed, but always in the process of becoming. 
 In this way Gilroy invested the city with radically emancipatory potential. 
However, we should note that what is offered here is not so much a coherent city 
politics but a compelling model of urban culture. The distinction is significant, as 
is the subtle implication that formal politics are not simply irrelevant to the task 
of reading these cultures—they deserve no place in the political praxis that 
undergirds Gilroy’s analysis. This point plays a key role in the discussion that 
takes place in chapter one of Freedom and the City, which focuses on Jeanette 
Winterson’s 1987 novel The Passion. Winterson locates much of her narrative in 
Venice, in the early nineteenth century, after it has been annexed by the First 
French Republic. However, I argue that the novel’s representation of the former 
city-state bears an uncanny resemblance to the British inner cities that were so 
important to the model of urban culture celebrated by Hall, Gilroy and Left 
culturalism in general. On the one hand, both are considered to be carceral 
places under the boot of an invading power—respectively, Napoleonic 
imperialism and Thatcherite urbanism. On the other, they are ungovernable, 
uniquely able to resist outside control: zones of untrammelled freedom whose 
denizens are at liberty to indulge their most ardent passions and transgressive 
whims. What is most compelling about this contradiction is that the former lack 
of autonomy is represented as a condition of the latter freedom; that the novel 
endorses a model of freedom that is predicated on its opposite. Critics have 
tended to ignore this political paradox and focus instead on the emancipatory 
aspects of Winterson’s ludic approach to sexuality. The Passion’s Venice is often 
read as a purely liberatory space in which ontological binaries are challenged 
and indeterminacy valorised. But while certainly true, this approach fails to 
recognise that the city’s emancipatory potential ultimately relies on its 
residents’ indeterminate political status as exiles of the French Empire. I argue 
that this celebration of exile is also characteristic of Left culturalism, and in this 
way begin to flesh out what I mean by the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement: a logic which dictates that, in urban contexts where 
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cultural diversity and propinquity might substitute for polity, an act of collective, 
voluntary self-exile might be politically fruitful when a hegemon’s power 
appears too great to resist through the mechanisms of formal politics.  
We might be tempted to extrapolate from this that in certain respects 
cultural politics represented nothing less than a renunciation of a longstanding 
commitment to enfranchisement by means of a political logic that located 
emancipatory promise in the very abandonment of freedom. The danger with 
this approach, however, is that it risks being overly reductive in its definition of 
freedom and insufficiently sensitive to the historical context to which Left 
culturalism was reacting. A better way of understanding the emancipatory 
project of the cultural Left might be through what Aiwa Ong has called 
“experiments with freedom”. Ong argues that throughout modern history, 
moments of rapid capitalist expansion have often been accompanied by 
“[e]xperimentations with freedoms […] at the political, social and individual 
levels”. The last thirty years—which have seen neoliberalism rise to a position of 
global hegemony—are no exception, and this development has “greatly 
complicated the meaning of freedom and obscured our understanding of the 
various forms it can take” (Ong “Experiments with Freedom” 229). The 
relationship between political authorities that guarantee different kinds of 
freedom and the spaces or ontologies through which the latter operates is now 
highly unstable,11 and one of the principal reasons for this confusion at both the 
global and the local level is the gradual erosion of spatially delimited political 
entities such as the nation-state—for many a historic guarantor of personal 
freedom—by a deterritorialising neoliberal agenda that is predicated on a 
universalised, economistic understanding of individual liberty. The Passion 
encourages us to think of Left culturalism’s engagement with the city as a 
response to this situation: as an experiment with freedom that rejected both the 
neoliberal model of liberty and the national/statist alternative in favour of 
another which conceived of freedom not as something the subject has—that she 
is recognised by some local or universal power as possessing—but as something 
                                                 
11As Ong puts it, “What is citizenship if not the institutionalisation of human rights as political 
membership in a nation-state? What are human rights if not the freedom from basic human want 
promised by a global community?” (Ong “Experiments with  Freedom” 229). 
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she does, performs, in concert with other people. It implicitly rejected the idea of 
freedom as a personal possession guaranteed by a sovereign, whether expressed 
spatially (the nation/state) or ontologically (the human/individual/consumer) 
and conceptualised it instead as an emancipatory praxis that must be enacted 
through cultural processes like subject-formation in spaces marked by 
pluralism, such as the city. And it is by imagining how emancipation can emerge 
in these circumstances even—or especially—when the latter are characterised 
by a lack of freedom, defined possessively, that The Passion reveals a logic 
inherent to Left culturalism which considered urban culture to be an adequate 
substitute for formal politics. 
 
 
2. Neoliberalism and the Depredation of Politics 
 
Winterson’s novel is in no way a critique of the culturalist project: it merely 
directs our attention to a logic inherent to Left culturalism that has not received 
the attention it deserves. Subsequent texts have demonstrated a great deal more 
ambivalence, however, and after analysing Winterson, Freedom and the City goes 
on to explore how this ambivalence emerged by discussing Hanif Kureishi’s 
second novel, The Black Album (1995). In this text, it argues, an author who has 
often been treated as a kind of poster-boy for the cultural Left comes to an 
abrupt and disturbing realisation about the latter’s limitations. It charts much 
the same journey as Kureishi’s first novel, The Buddha of Suburbia (1990), with a 
second-generation south-Asian immigrant moving to the city to take advantage 
of the generous opportunities—sexual, political and intellectual—that exist 
there. While studying at a third-rate college in the late 1980s, Shahid is taught 
by a lecturer who embodies exactly the kind of politics espoused by Left 
culturalism: who takes him to all-night raves in disused warehouses, dresses 
him in women’s clothes and make-up, and encourages him to write essays on the 
ethnic and sexual indeterminacy of the artist who at this point is still known as 
Prince. However, he also falls in with a group of disenfranchised Islamic 
nationalists who explicitly seek empowerment on the basis of an essentialised 
Muslim identity. And in this way, Kureishi organises his novel around two 
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competing liberatory strategies: one which is predicated on political recognition 
and enfranchisement, and another which eschews such commitments in favour 
of expressive urban culture.  
That he sees fit to contrive such a narrative strategy hints at a perceived 
need to “test” culturalist praxis against other emancipatory agendas in order to 
vouchsafe its continued tenability. However, far from alleviating the anxiety that 
is implicit in this need, an incipient discomfiture with culturalist praxis becomes 
increasingly apparent as the reader observes Kureishi struggling to resolve the 
narrative and political conflict he establishes at the novel’s outset. While the 
acid house subculture might at first appear amenable to the culturalist project, 
Kureishi represents it as overwhelmingly white, middle-class and even 
suburban, its politics more an exercise in consumer sloganeering than genuinely 
provocative. Meanwhile, though plainly troubled by the ontological certainties of 
Islamic nationalism, he understands how the latter might be viewed as a viable 
model of resistance for a particularly disenfranchised community of Thatcher’s 
Britain. Consequently, he is forced to pathologise nationalism as a way of 
neutralising its genuine appeal because—while unwilling to vindicate it—he 
does not feel that the cultural model is capable of defusing it in political terms. 
And because of this the novel feels poorly-resolved; characterised not so much 
by the kind of strategic irresolution celebrated by Left culturalism as by political 
impasse. Crucially, however, it is Kureishi’s abandonment of the city in the 
novel’s closing pages that allows the reader to understand the true political 
import of this failure. When Shahid and Deedee decide to leave London—even 
though it is only for a weekend on the coast—the reader’s suspicion that what 
she is witnessing is an abandonment of the cultural politics espoused by Hall 
and Gilroy is confirmed: for what kind of multiple selves, multiple ways of being, 
are on offer at the seaside?  
In this way, The Black Album represents a key moment when the 
liberatory potential of the inner city was brought into question—along with the 
viability of the culturalist project as a whole—by one of the latter’s most earnest 
interlocutors. I argue that the novel seems to recognise that one of the 
consequences of celebrating the inner city as a site of cultural indeterminacy 
was an unquestioning embrace of spatial indeterminacy, which key figures 
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connected to Marxism’s “spatial turn”—such as David Harvey and Edward 
Soja—had identified as an important aspect of the New Right’s urban strategy 
during the 1980s and early 90s. Far from resisting capital’s saturation of urban 
communities, the analyses of the spatial turn revealed that flexible space was in 
fact the means by which capital advanced itself, and I suggest that, to Kureishi, 
this revelation raises the possibility that the cultural Left—which implicitly 
attached resistant potential to flexible space—was at best unequipped to 
combat the disaggregating strategies of Thatcherite urbanism, and at worst in 
cahoots with them. More importantly, linked to this spatial critique is another, 
more devastating one, which goes some way towards explaining why Kureishi 
came to feel that Left culturalism had nothing to offer disenfranchised subjects 
who demanded explicitly political recognition along communitarian lines. This 
second critique is deeply concerned with what Left culturalism did with the 
concept of the political in the name of freedom; with what key culturalist 
thinkers risked when they identified the collapse of politics and culture as a 
cornerstone of their emancipatory project.12 For as Hannah Arendt argues in 
“What is Freedom?”—one of the eight “exercises in political thought” collected 
in Between Past and Future (1961)—without politics, freedom itself is rendered 
meaningless: 
 
                                                 
12 Culturalist orthodoxy would dictate that this process represented expansion rather than collapse, 
and that, as Hall puts it, any “expanded definition of the political also entail[s] a recognition of the 
proliferation of potential sites of social conflict and constituencies for change”. Hall argues that the 
process of expanding the political was, in fact, begun by the culturalists of the 1960s, and was 
merely continued by those of the 1980s: the former, he writes, “launched an assault on the narrow 
definition of ‘politics’ and tried to project in its place an ‘expanded concept of the political’. If it did 
not move so far as the feminist principle that ‘the personal is political’, it certainly opened itself up 
to the critical dialectic between ‘private troubles’ and ‘public issues’, which blew the conventional 
conception of politics apart. The logic implied by our position was that these ‘hidden dimensions’ 
had to be represented within the discourses of ‘the political’, and that ordinary people could and 
should organize where they were, around issues of immediate experience” (Hall “Life and Times” 
188). Whether this entails that the New Left must answer a charge similar to one I level at the 
culturalism of the 1980s is beyond the scope of this investigation, but the possibility is implied 
again in the third chapter, which discusses a “rudimentary” form of the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement which emerged out of the turmoil of the 1960s. 
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The field where freedom has always been known, not as a 
problem, to be sure, but as a fact of everyday life, is the political 
realm. And even today, whether we know it or not, the question of 
politics and the fact that man is a being endowed with the gift of 
action must always be present to our mind when we speak of the 
problem of freedom; for action and politics, among all the 
capabilities and potentialities of human life, are the only things of 
which we could not even conceive without at least assuming that 
freedom exists, and we can hardly touch a single political issue 
without, implicitly or explicitly, touching upon an issue of man’s 
liberty. Freedom […] is actually the reason that men live together 
in political organization at all. Without it, political life as such 
would be meaningless. The raison d’être of politics is freedom, and 
its field of experience is action. (Arendt Between 146). 
 
In all her writings, Arendt never articulates the profound connection she 
perceives between politics and freedom more eloquently than she does here. 
And perhaps this is why it is so tempting to read this passage—wrongly—as 
optimistic. Because, to the extent that her political philosophy can be 
understood as a single body of thought at all, it insists over and over, and often 
in the starkest terms, that freedom is not merely the raison d’être of politics: 
without the latter, it cannot exist at all. Thus while her insights predate the 
political narrative this investigation seeks to trace, Arendt represents a key voice 
that will be heard repeatedly throughout Freedom and the City.13 Because the 
                                                 
13 It is worth acknowledging early on that some readers may have doubts about situating an 
Arendtian model of freedom alongside the broadly post/Marxist framework already established. 
However, while Arendt herself was quite hostile towards the Hegelian dimensions of Marxist 
historiography, it is important to emphasise that much of her work is characterised by strategies 
and concepts that are by no means anathema to leftist critique, such as historical materialism. The 
Human Condition (1958) is, at least in the first analysis, a notable exception, and perhaps the fact 
that this text is often mistakenly identified as the foundational expression of Arendt’s thought 
explains why so few critics are willing to recognise that one of her principal achievements was to 
synthesise phenomenological and materialist paradigms in her analysis of political action. This 
synthesis tends to produce rather clumsy descriptions of her methodology: for instance, Patrick 
Williams and Laura Chrisman have described her as “[o]ffering what might be termed an eclectic 
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way she conceptualises politics entails an understanding of freedom as both 
praxis and possession; as action—and so performative—but action that takes 
place within a delimited space in which acts are recognised as possessing 
political meaning. There is nothing essential about this model of freedom: it is 
always contingent because human action is always capricious, and it is always 
the act rather than the executor that is recognised; however, it does dictate that, 
since an act must be exercised within political space in order to be free, the 
limits of this space are also the limits of freedom. As Arendt puts it in The 
Promise of Politics, published posthumously in 2005: “The crucial thing about 
this kind of political freedom is that it is a spatial construct. Whoever leaves his 
polis or is banished from it loses […] the only space in which he can be free” 
(Promise 119, emphasis added).14  
Thus where inside the polis, freedom is necessarily enacted in public 
participation, association and conflict, outside, it cannot exist at all. And it is this 
spatially delimited model of politics-as-freedom that allows us to read the 
abandonment of London at the end of The Black Album as an acknowledgement 
that the inner city will not achieve what the cultural project wants it to achieve. 
Because the way it has been conceptualised—as an indeterminate space of exile 
in which the emancipatory potential of expressive culture in all its colourful 
plurality can be realised—places it outside the political realm in which freedom 
                                                                                                                                          
and singular Heideggerian-informed left-leaning cultural materialism” (Williams and Chrisman 7). 
Unwieldy as descriptions like this might be, they are highly suggestive of the versatility of Arendt’s 
ideas. I also happen to think that this one is quite close to the truth. 
14 We see just how crucial space is to Arendt’s understanding of freedom in On Revolution (1963), in 
which she argues that “wherever it existed as a tangible reality, [freedom] has always been 
spatially limited. This is especially clear for the greatest and most elementary of all negative 
liberties, the freedom of movement; the borders of national territory or the walls of the city-state 
comprehended and protected a space in which men could move freely […] What is true for 
freedom of movement is, to a large extent, valid for freedom in general. Freedom in a positive 
sense is possible only among equals, and equality itself is by no means a universal valid principle 
but, again, applicable only with limitations and even within spatial limits. If we equate these 
spaces of freedom […] with the political realm itself, we shall be inclined to think of them as 
islands in a sea of oases in a desert. This image, I believe, is suggested to us not merely by the 
consistency of a metaphor but by the record of history as well” (Arendt Revolution 275, emphasis 
added). 
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bears any meaning whatsoever.15 In short, Kureishi seems to fear that since 
urban culture has been adopted as a substitute for formal politics, the Left has 
effectively nullified its own emancipatory project by surrendering the realm that 
gives freedom meaning. And to make matters worse, undergirding the spatial-
political aspect of Kureishi’s chagrin is an incipient sense that expressive 
cultures are not, in fact, capable of delivering on the emancipatory potential they 
were believed to possess in the first place. To be sure, the “second summer of 
love” represents an almighty cultural ferment, but it is one largely devoid of 
political significance: acid house might be a fascinating expression of 
contemporary youth culture, but it hardly represents a vehicle for political 
resistance. Thus not only did Left culturalism permit the New Right to 
instrument its political project virtually unopposed, it overestimated the 
potential of its own cultural project, too. 
It is with this cultural and political impasse that the first half of Freedom 
and the City concludes. Its legacy forms the basis for the second half, which 
begins with a discussion of the “terminal zones” of J.G. Ballard’s late novels 
Cocaine Nights (1996) and Super-Cannes (2000). Chapter three initially steps 
back to suggest that large parts of Ballard’s oeuvre from 1962 on deserve 
attention because his early work is oddly prescient of the cultural narrative this 
investigation seeks to trace, and because this equips his later work with an 
historical insight that younger generations of British novelists lack. In his early 
disaster fiction—which is often read in the light of the political upheavals of the 
1960s—Ballard develops what might be called a “rudimentary” form of the 
cultural politics of disenfranchisement that rehearses the emancipatory strategy 
adopted by Left culturalism during the 1980s. Like Winterson, in these texts 
Ballard formulates a disruptive praxis that rejects formal politics as a bourgeois 
myth by embracing the transformational potential of morbidity and exile, 
specifically through his utopian representation of environmental cataclysm. The 
                                                 
15 The stinging irony here is that Arendt’s recognition of the intimate relationship between politics 
and freedom is predicated on an understanding of political community as necessary due to the 
inescapably plural nature of human society. In Bonnie Honig’s words, “[w]hen Arendt calls for the 
protection of political space, she does so largely out of the conviction that plurality and difference 
[…] are the first casualties of the displacement of politics and the closure of political space” (Honig 
Displacement 10). 
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later novels diverge from this morbid utopianism, however, in focusing 
relentlessly on a totalised but disaggregated neoliberal dystopia whose spatial 
and ontological logics are at once highly elastic and oppressively deterministic, 
and in which every conceivable act of resistance—particularly those based on 
aesthetic/cultural self-realisation—has been co-opted by late capitalism. What 
is so compelling about these dystopian texts is that, in pointed contrast to the 
earlier fictions, they lament the eclipse of the political. Cocaine Nights and Super-
Cannes recognise first that, while the key battleground of postmodernity has 
usually been identified as either culture or economics (depending on which is 
deemed to determine social reality), politics undergirds and cuts across both, 
and second that the abandonment of this particular battleground has allowed a 
set of chillingly totalitarian circumstances to emerge. To this extent, I argue, 
Ballard’s late fiction can be seen to dramatise the legacy of the Right’s attack on 
politics, as well as the latter’s abandonment by the Left, and implies that in 
combination these two phenomena have permitted the complete depredation of 
the political by late capital. 
The late novels also pursue Kureishi’s nascent anxiety in The Black Album 
that, rather than providing a politically fruitful expression of conflict and 
contradiction, culture now represents a site of capitulation. Indeed, Ballard 
takes this gloomy thesis farther by suggesting that today culture serves 
explicitly to maintain the neoliberal hegemony it was once supposed to resist. 
Cocaine Nights and Super-Cannes form part of a polyptych of novels that explores 
the idea that, in realising its end of history, neoliberalism has given birth to a 
form of capitalism so highly calibrated, so totalised, and so devoid of the 
progressivism that spurred its development over the last two centuries, that it is 
at risk of eclipsing its own productivist imperative. This situation is expressed 
not just in the lassitude and pococurantism of the communities the novels 
represent, but also in the urban spaces these communities inhabit. The coastal 
resorts of southern Europe are depicted as simultaneously streamlined and 
sclerotic, totalised and fragmented, and function as explicitly spatial 
manifestations of Ballard’s thesis that, in destroying the political as part of its 
hegemonic project, neoliberalism has generated the conditions of its own 
demise; that, in order to function, capitalism requires the kind of disorder once 
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represented by politics, which gives the lie to economism by reintroducing the 
unavoidable fact of the contingency of all social relations. In short, the late 
novels suggest that capitalism’s end of history might also have been its de facto 
end unless it had found a substitute for the disruptiveness of politics. And they 
imply that the complex, contradictory and performative account of culture 
celebrated by the Left has come to serve neoliberalism in exactly this way. Hence 
the residents of these terminal zones engage in subversive acts of sex and 
violence which seem spontaneous but are in fact highly-coordinated by 
community figureheads who are keen to vindicate them as personal liberation in 
the service of civic culture. And in this way, Ballard’s late fiction can be seen to 
use freedom and the city as a way of concatenating the three threads of this 
investigation—the enervation of the political in postmodernity, the 
paradoxically totalising and disaggregating spatial logic of neoliberalism, and 
late capitalism’s steady co-optation of culture.16 
To differing degrees, then, both Kureishi and Ballard suggest that the 
continued viability of culture—especially urban culture—as a vehicle for 
resistance now appears to be increasingly in doubt. And this depressing truth 
seems to have had a significant impact on contemporary British literature, for 
where once upon a time writers such as Winterson and Kureishi considered 
urban culture to bear emancipatory potential, today a progressive alignment of 
the city with a politically-engaged understanding of culture seems more difficult 
to imagine. It is this challenge that forms the basis of Freedom and the City’s final 
chapter, which focuses on two well-known novels from 2005: Saturday by Ian 
McEwan and Never Let Me Go by Kazuo Ishiguro. I argue that Saturday 
represents a genuine attempt to rehabilitate the urban experience as a valuable 
                                                 
16 The latter in particular represents a commonplace anxiety in recent Marxist criticism; however, 
while cultural critics have frequently noted the connection between the Left’s adoption of culture 
as a site of political praxis and its capitulation to one or another of the logics listed above,  not all 
have mapped out the relationship in a systematic way. (Two thinkers who do are David Harvey 
and Fredric Jameson, and they come closest to connecting all three rubrics—culture, politics and 
space—systematically in their signature texts on postmodernity: respectively, The Condition of 
Postmodernity (1989) and Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991).) 
Moreover, few have used this relationship to read Ballard’s late work, and none has done so by 
deploying the heuristic of freedom and the city.  
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site of pluralism and contingency, but that the novel fails to achieve this because 
of the way it interpolates its representation of a vibrant and polymorphous—if 
anxious—London with an anachronistic account of culture predicated on liberal 
humanism. By contrast, the representation of culture in Never Let Me Go exposes 
the way in which humanist aesthetics often serve to mask various forms of 
bureaucratised violence. However, even as the novel embraces an anti-humanist 
understanding of culture, the latter’s role is limited to exposing oppressive 
logics rather than combatting them, and so we are confronted with a situation in 
which cultural activity will no longer suffice as a vehicle for emancipation. 
Ishiguro seems to suggest that a more explicitly political engagement is 
necessary, and yet it is no coincidence that the latter’s absence is concomitant 
with a conspicuous eschewal of urban environments. For while he is aware that 
the city is a prerequisite for any engagement of this kind, he struggles to imagine 
what such a politicised spatiality would look like. Thus Saturday and Never Let 
Me Go represent two sides of the same problematic: in the former we are offered 
an optimistic rehabilitation of the city as a site of contingency and political 
pluralism which is compromised by the way it imagines culture operating within 
that site; whereas in the latter we are offered a far more progressive account of 
culture that is nonetheless profoundly pessimistic due to its political limitations, 
which are articulated via the very absence of any kind of plural spatiality. 
  
* * * 
 
For those seeking a way forward for Hall’s project of renewal it cannot be said 
that Freedom and the City is a particularly happy read. The investigation begins 
in the mid-1980s, with a moment in which the Left endowed urban culture with 
significant emancipatory possibility. It concludes nearly twenty years later, 
when all sense of this potential has been lost and a progressive account of urban 
culture appears virtually impossible. In between is an extended discussion of 
recent British literature that demonstrates how the way in which urban culture 
came to be privileged in leftist discourse has profoundly undermined 
contemporary attempts to insist on culture or politics as meaningful sites of 
emancipation. But the purpose of this critique is not simply to dismiss 
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culturalist praxes, whether textual or political; rather, it is to advance a new 
reading of post-Thatcher fiction which recognises the latter’s unique insights 
into a difficult moment in the history of the British Left. The question of whether 
Left culturalism will be able to move forward with the two distinct components 
of its project—a demand for radical political change on the one hand and a 
sophisticated analysis of culture on the other—intact is still open to debate, and 
will not be answered in a definitive way here. But recent pronouncements by 
Lawrence Grossberg, one of the figures responsible for introducing Hall’s work 
to the United States, imply that the task is going to be difficult. In an essay 
entitled “Does Cultural Studies Have Futures? Should It?” Grossberg recognises 
that “it is not so clear—and it certainly cannot be assumed—that culture 
continues to be dominant in the current conjuncture” when compared with 
other broad disciplinary rubrics, such as politics and economics (Grossberg 17). 
While it remains an important aspect of everyday life—and thus surely worthy 
of continued study—we might ask whether culture still deserves to be treated as 
the singular determinant of social experience in the way it was a few decades 
ago. At the same time, Grossberg argues passionately (and rightly) that we must 
“never agree with those who would argue that questions of culture and identity 
were—and continue to be—somehow unnecessary distractions from the real 
work of understanding and transforming the contemporary context” (23). What 
is clear, however, is that some of the most foundational terms of cultural studies 
will need re-evaluating as it “revisit[s] the question of how one theorizes the 
social totality”; indeed, this process may even demand that practitioners set 
about formulating “a post-cultural (or, at least, a post-culturalist) cultural 
studies” (24).  
That may well be the case. But Freedom and the City is ultimately less 
concerned with the status of the cultural within cultural studies than with how 
the latter conceived of the political. As such—if for a moment I can be permitted 
to rigidify a notoriously permeable disciplinary boundary—it is worth paying 
attention to what political theorists have to say about culture as well as what 
cultural theorists have to say about the political. The result of this shift need not 
be dispiriting: for one, Chantal Mouffe seems to think that culture can still play a 
significant role in political discourse. As she suggested in a recent lecture at the 
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Kunst-Werk Institute for Contemporary Art in Berlin: 
 
I am convinced that cultural and artistic practices could play an 
important role in the agonistic [political] struggle because they 
are a privileged terrain for the mobilisation of affects and the 
construction of new subjectivities. To revitalise democracy in our 
post-political societies what is urgently needed, I think, is to foster 
the multiplication of agonistic public spaces where everything that 
the dominant consensus tends to obscure or obliterate can be 
brought to light and challenged […] To be sure, artists cannot 
pretend any more to constitute an avant-gard, offering a radical 
critique, but this is not reason to proclaim that their political role 
has ended. They still can play an important role in the hegemonic 
struggle by subverting the dominant hegemony and by 
contributing to the construction of new subjectivities. I would say 
in fact that this has always been their role and that it is only the 
modernist illusion of the privileged position of the artist that has 
made us believe otherwise. Once this illusion is abandoned, jointly 
with the revolutionary conception of politics accompanying it, we 
can see that artistic critical practices represent an important 
dimension of democratic politics. (Mouffe “New Patrons”) 
 
Freedom and the City echoes this optimism in principle, though it is similarly 
sceptical of the idea that culture is capable of functioning as an agent of radical 
change in its own right. “Cultural politics” serves adequately as a shorthand, a 
broad indicator of ideological and hermeneutic sensibility. But one of the 
keenest lessons British fiction of the last twenty-five years has to teach us is 
that, however close the relationship between the two terms might be, culture 
and politics still refer to different things, and to conflate the two in such a way 
that the boundary between them becomes not just obscure but virtually 
impossible to determine is quite hazardous. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
THE PASSION IN EXILE: 
Jeanette Winterson’s Venice and the British Inner City 
 
 
 
 
The 1980s was a period when considerable political and economic upheaval 
coincided with significant urban redevelopment in Britain. It was also a decade 
when civil disobedience, rioting and violence became more common than ever 
and took on a distinctly inner-city flavour. Of course, the London boroughs 
received the majority of media attention at the time; however, the best 
expression of the crumbling British city was to be found elsewhere, in Liverpool, 
in the darkest north. As Richard J. Williams points out in The Anxious City 
(2004), Liverpool was “a city whose entire existence seemed to be in doubt by 
the middle of the 1980s”; whose decline was made “all the more disturbing 
because of the grandeur of [its] context”. It is a city that at its apogee boasted 
more wealth than anywhere in the UK outside London, whose streets are lined 
with innumerable listed buildings, and which is designated in large part a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site—a status that “value[s] it equally with Stonehenge, 
the Great Pyramids of Giza and the Taj Mahal” (Richard J. Williams 107-108). Yet 
by the 1980s it was widely thought to be in terminal decline, with rampant 
unemployment and a growing and increasingly angry urban working class. 
Nothing demonstrated this precarious situation more than the events of 3 July 
1981, when the Toxteth riots earned the city another, more dubious accolade: 
the site of the first use of CS gas by police on the British mainland. But, as 
Williams points out, despite this troubled history Liverpool’s decline has 
 
produced a special fascination for outsiders. The travel writings of 
expatriate Americans Paul Theroux and Bill Bryson have 
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popularised its ruinous qualities. A local councillor, Keith Hackett, 
complained that one of the city’s problems was the entertainment 
value of its decline, as if its purpose had become the production of 
morbid thrills for tourists. And yet, the city has willingly 
collaborated in this process. The standard architectural reference 
book on the city, Seaport by Quentin Hughes […] presented an 
image of an entropic city, all soot, decay, moss, rotten wood and 
steam trains, the whole lot crumbling into the Mersey […] Above 
all, Derek Hatton, the de facto leader of the city council between 
1983 and 1986, presents an apocalyptic scenario, in which 
Liverpool becomes the true fount of resistance to global capital. 
(108) 
 
So if decline and blight were affecting every large British city during the 1980s, 
it crystallised into a particularly awe-inspiring kind of thanatos in Liverpool, 
whose “continued existence was both rhetorically and actually in doubt” 
(108)—and yet this zone of decline, of extinction and morbidity, was perceived 
as both titillating and ripe for political exploitation.  
In this sense, at least, Liverpool could count itself among good company. 
Venice, as Judith Seaboyer notes, has long been “a theater for narratives of death, 
fragmentation, and decay”. Indeed, the appeal of Venice to the Anglo-American 
mind has been connected to its “crumbling reality” since at least the Romantic 
period, and is as much a part of the city’s mythology as is its grandeur (Seaboyer 
484). As Tristram Hunt has pointed out, John Ruskin’s Stones of Venice (1851-
53) is shot through with anxiety about its titular city crumbling into the murky 
waters of the Laguna Veneta, never to rise again. And to this extent—that is, the 
extent to which it has come to serve as “an allegory of ruin” (Hunt 119)—we 
might say that its place in the popular imagination is not dissimilar to that of the 
inner cities during the 1980s. Indeed, this is perhaps why Venice’s morbid 
magnetism became more powerful than ever towards the end of the twentieth 
century, when the political challenge represented by the latter was most acute. 
In this period, Seaboyer writes, “The idea of Venice [came] to serve a wider 
purpose than it did for the Romantics”, as a space in which “concepts of reality, 
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truth, and meaning [were] thrown into question by the idea of difference” 
(Seaboyer 484, emphasis in original). It is no coincidence that areas such as 
Toxteth, Brixton, Moss Side and Handsworth functioned in precisely the same 
way. 
Seaboyer’s characterisation of Venice as “an allegory for the world-in-
crisis and for the subject-in-crisis, each on the verge of a catastrophic collapse” 
(507) is articulated as part of a discussion of Jeanette Winterson’s second novel, 
The Passion (1987),17 much of whose action takes place in the city. Set during 
the European wars of the early nineteenth century, The Passion tells the stories 
of Henri, a young, provincial Frenchman who works as Napoleon’s cook, and 
Villanelle, a web-footed Venetian croupier who is sold by her husband as a 
vivandière to the officers of the Grande Armée. The two characters meet during 
Napoleon’s disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812, when they desert the army 
and walk across Europe to Villanelle’s home city. This Winterson characterises 
as a decrepit but fabulous place: ruinous, impossible to map and brimming with 
excessive and subversive pleasures. It is where people come if they want to lose 
themselves in sex and gambling—and above all if they wish to escape the 
Napoleonic regime, for if the city is nominally subject to French control it seems 
to exist entirely on its own terms. Try as he might to settle in, however, Venice 
remains a maddening mystery to Henri, and when at the end of the novel he is 
committed to an asylum for murdering Villanelle’s husband in gruesome 
circumstances, he makes no attempt to escape because the madhouse is so much 
easier to understand than the city outside. 
Given Winterson’s critical constituency of queer theorists, it is not 
surprising that much analysis of the novel has focused on its representation of 
gender and sexuality.18 Seaboyer’s appraisal takes a novel approach, however, in 
                                                 
17 In fact, The Passion is Winterson’s third published novel, but 1985’s Boating for Beginners does not 
always appears on official bibliographies. 
18 Villanelle has been the focus of much of this criticism, which often notes how her supposed 
masculinity—her “phallic” webbed feet (a masculine attribute passed from boatmen to their sons, 
not to their daughters), as well as her proclivity for cross-dressing and ambiguous sexuality—
provides a deliberate counterpoint to Henri’s effeminate parochialism. Lisa Moore goes even 
further and argues that, while she never treats sexuality unproblematically, Winterson 
nonetheless “represents lesbianism simply as central, rather than ‘opposed’ to anything”, in so 
36 
foregrounding the significance of The Passion’s physical and historical setting 
during what she calls the “Romantic dreaming into existence of the modern 
nation-state”: 
 
The choice of this historiographic ground of empire and 
expansionist warfare over that of revolution is not arbitrary; 
rather, it is constitutive of a text whose political focus, while 
manifestly gender and sexuality rather than politics in the national 
sense, addresses contemporary as well as historical sources of war 
and violence […] The narrative operates at the level of the 
individual, but its implications are broader. The novel is set within 
the zone of the Romantic dreaming into existence of the modern 
nation-state, and while a concept so fraught with historical 
complexity cannot be traced to any kind of simple root cause, it 
has become a modern excuse for the compulsively repetitive 
European “tradition of senseless nationalist warfare”. (Seaboyer 
486) 
                                                                                                                                          
doing forging a poetics of “lesbian postmodernism” (Moore 108, 110). She argues that in The 
Passion and Sexing the Cherry (1989) Winterson “collapses the distinction between modern and 
postmodern” (116), ultimately “resist[ing] the idea that postmodernity displaces modernity 
historically by insisting on the coterminousness of both experiences of subjectivity and the body” 
(122). A large minority of critics, however, have chosen to concentrate on Henri’s character, and 
have drawn attention to the significance of psychoanalytic paradigms to the text’s bildungsroman 
mode. A recent appraisal by Susana Onega, for example, argues that considering the novel’s 
“baroque economy of repetition and excess” it is no surprise that “Henri’s maturation process is 
simultaneously expressed by means of Jungian, Freudian, Lacanian, mythical and Tarot imagery” 
(Onega 60). She explores Venetian space as a projection of Henri’s futile attempt to piece together 
“his fragmentation of the self” and reconcile the je of his own identity with the je-idéal he 
perceives in Napoleon (60-62). She also uses Jung’s account of the individuation process, together 
with his emphasis in Memories, Dreams, Reflections (1963) on the importance of recollection as a 
therapeutic strategy, to explore both the fragmentary nature of Henri’s identity and how he 
attempts to rationalise his experiences through writing (69-70, 74-75). In a similar fashion, 
Seaboyer provides a perspicacious psychoanalytic investigation of the novel’s representation of 
the death drive (Seaboyer 491-499), doubling (503-505—both Napoleon and Villanelle’s husband, 
she argues, function as doubles for Henri’s proto-modern identity), and of the return of the 
repressed as a metaphor for posttraumatic stress disorder (505). 
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The apparent connection between subjectivity, the narrative’s historical 
situation during the development of the modern nation-state, and the idea of the 
city as what Jamie Skye Bianco might term a “zone of morbidity”—a space 
whose exceptional status in relation to sovereignty means that the people who 
occupy it possess lives stripped of all political significance19—is something I 
intend to investigate in detail in this chapter. Specifically, given the harrowing 
circumstances that typically prevail in zones of morbidity, I am interested in 
establishing why The Passion represents Venice as politically fecund. As Helena 
Grice and Tim Woods note, “Winterson’s Venice represents a promise of 
possibility lying untapped in the history of space”; however, while their reading 
suggests that this promise “has been displaced from the contemporary world”, I 
want to argue that The Passion considers it to apply to the inner city of the 
1980s as well (Grice and Woods 33). This chapter will argue that, through its 
representation of early nineteenth-century Venice, The Passion considers the 
inner city to be a spatiality that is capable of resisting both the deterritorialising 
power of capital and the enervating processes of social and cultural normativity 
that together constituted the Thatcherite project. It will argue that this 
specifically spatial potentiality is built upon on a privileged understanding of 
urban culture that embeds the novel in the political milieu of Left culturalism in 
a very particular way. And it will suggest that the way in which the novel 
connects the city to an emancipatory narrative that eschews formal political 
                                                 
19 Bianco coins this term when discussing areas of South American land over which sovereignty has 
been partially relinquished by the states in which they are situated so that more developed states 
may engage in military and industrial activities that are not permitted in their own territories. 
These activities often have catastrophic effects on indigenous peoples, who are, as a consequence 
of the uncertain operations of sovereignty in these areas, typically afforded no opportunity for 
redress. “Morbidity” refers not only to the “vast complex of irradiation sicknesses, cancer clusters, 
and death through uranium mining, nuclear weapons testing and radioactive waste disposal 
facilities found across and adjacent to the traditional territories and current reservation lands of 
most Western states tribes” but also to the “exceptional” political and juridical circumstances that 
permit these activities to continue (Bianco par. 8). The reason for deploying this term, as will 
become clear, is that, owing to the period of its composition in the mid-1980s, The Passion 
perceives in such uncertain political and juridical circumstances a certain potential for resisting 
the hegemon—specifically, Thatcherism. 
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freedom in favour of urban culture in turn reflects back on Left culturalism itself, 
exposing a logic inherent to the latter which I call the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement. As we will see in subsequent chapters, this logic has had a 
significant impact on British literature of the post-Thatcher period; indeed, I 
think it can be thought of as an enduring preoccupation of British fiction over 
the last twenty years. 
 
 
1. Thatcher, Napoleon and Urban Space 
 
For all the The Passion’s historical specificity, it is clearly not the case that 
Winterson’s political concerns are limited to the period she represents. While 
Jago Morrison argues that “The Passion presents itself very much as a historical 
novel” (Morrison 101, emphasis in original), it might be better to identify it as a 
historiographic one instead, since, as Paulina Palmer points out, it “recounts a 
sequence of events set in the past—but does so with an eye on their relevance to 
the present” (Palmer 103). Time and again Winterson subverts the standard of 
factual verisimilitude traditionally demanded of the historical novel and 
foregrounds her text as text rather than as history. The repeated assurance “I’m 
telling you stories. Trust me” (Winterson Passion 5, 13, 69, 160) self-consciously 
draws attention to the politics inherent in the creation and maintenance of 
historical narratives, thereby characterising these narratives as ongoing rather 
than complete and eliding the temporal distinction between the novel’s setting 
and the present day.20 Of course, there is no simplistic equivalence linking the 
                                                 
20 This attitude towards history has been prevalent in British fiction at least since John Fowles’s The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969), but it was explored with increased frequency in the 1980s by 
the likes of Salman Rushdie (Midnight’s Children (1981), among others), Graham Swift (Waterland 
(1983)), Julian Barnes (Flaubert’s Parrot (1984)), and Peter Ackroyd (Hawksmoor (1985)). Linda 
Hutcheon was among the first to explore this tendency—which she calls historiographic 
metafiction—in her Poetics of Postmodernism (1988), and it can readily be argued that two of 
Winterson’s novels—The Passion and Sexing the Cherry (1989)—qualify for the label. Significantly, 
it can also be argued that the development of this tendency was connected to theoretical 
developments in the British academy of the 1980s. While Onega may be broadly correct to 
recognise a similarity between the historico-political interests of The Passion and those of new 
historicism, which was prevalent in North America during the late 1980s, it might be more correct 
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novel and the events of the mid-1980s; however, I want to suggest that there are 
some intriguing parallels between the two that need to be acknowledged if we 
are to understand why the novel imagines Venetian space to be saturated with 
resistant potential. 
In order to understand how Winterson does this, we must first explore 
what it is that she wants to resist. This is baldly communicated in a striking 
image that appears towards the beginning of The Passion, when Henri describes 
the storeroom he is shown upon being inducted into the French army: 
 
The space from the ground to the dome of the canvas was racked 
with rough wooden cages about a foot square with tiny corridors 
running in between, hardly the width of a man. In each cage there 
were two or three birds, beaks and claws cut off, staring through 
the slats with dumb identical eyes. I am no coward and I’ve seen 
plenty of convenient mutilation on our farms but I was not 
prepared for the silence. Not even a rustle. They could have been 
dead, should have been dead, but for the eyes. (P 6) 
 
This unsettling image works in two ways. First, it represents Napoleonic space 
in microcosm, implying the Emperor’s desire to arrogate and reorganise space 
on the most minute, apparently arbitrary level, while also reflecting and 
anticipating his desire to do the same on a massive scale.21 Second, it anticipates 
the fortunes of the European peoples who will come under Napoleon’s rule: like 
the birds, they await assimilation into the French imperial machine with mute 
                                                                                                                                          
to identify the novel’s interests with those of cultural materialism, which was more prevalent in 
Britain. The latter, as John Brannigan comments, “explore[s] literary texts within the context of 
contemporary power relations” where “new historicis[m] dealt with the power relations of past 
societies” (Brannigan 9—though it should be added that this is something of a simplification). 
Through this political strategy, “literary texts become an important focus for contemporary 
attempts to resist power”, providing “an impetus for political struggle in the present” and making 
it clear that “literary studies is not removed from the sphere of politics” (6). The interstices of 
culture, text and power is, as we have seen, a key concern of cultural materialism, and of the 
present investigation. 
21 And well beyond the national boundaries of France: most notably in “Poland, or the Duchy of 
Warsaw as Napoleon had designated it” (Winterson Passion 100) 
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fatalism, their beaks—their ability to object—and their claws—their capacity to 
resist—removed. Together these implications establish two critical concerns of 
the novel: the permeation of space with the power of sovereignty, and the 
latter’s investment in an imperialist agenda designed to replicate this process ad 
infinitum by realising the potential of what Hannah Arendt calls “expansion as a 
political device” (Origins 149). In short, from the chicken coops of the nouveau 
régime right up to its loftiest levels, Winterson perceives everywhere in this 
organisation of space and people the extension of sovereign power.  
Napoleon is identified as the embodiment of this power right from the 
outset of the novel: the opening paragraph—in a chapter entitled “The 
Emperor”—establishes him thematically and structurally as not simply the 
motivation for the members of the Grande Armée, but as the animus of the entire 
narrative. As Winterson writes, “It was Napoleon who had such a passion for 
chicken that he kept his chefs working around the clock. What a kitchen that 
was, with birds in every state of undress; some still cold and slung over hooks, 
some turning slowly on the spit, but most in wasted piles because the Emperor 
was too busy” (Winterson Passion 3). No longer an intimate space in which 
meals are prepared by artisans, the kitchen has become, at Napoleon’s behest, a 
vast, brutish machine with raw materials in various stages of transformation 
into finished product.22 The Emperor himself is “repulsive and fascinating by 
turns”, completely “in love with himself”, and his vanity and voracity wreak 
“devastation, rape, slaughter, carnage, starvation” (13). And yet Henri is 
infatuated with him: while his fellow soldiers “went out whoring most nights”, 
he recalls, “I was waiting for Bonaparte”. Here as elsewhere in The Passion, Henri 
                                                 
22 And while the image of the kitchen represents the arrogation and rationalisation of space and the 
people who occupy it, it also functions to attribute patriarchal discourses to the Napoleonic 
regime. When Henri serves him his evening meal, he finds the Emperor “sitting alone […] turning 
the globe round and round, holding it tenderly with both hands as if were a breast” (Winterson 
Passion 4). Leaving the chicken on the floor, Henri knows that as soon as he has left the tent 
Napoleon will “pick it up and push it into his mouth. He wishes his whole face were a mouth [in 
which] to cram a whole bird” (4). There is no doubting the triple signification of “bird” here: 
simultaneously chicken, woman and world, all of them subject to Napoleon’s total power. As Henri 
notes, Napoleon likes “no one except Joséphine and he liked her the way he liked chicken” (3); that 
is, “in every state of undress”, plucked and cooked and ready for him to consume. 
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is feminised in relation to Napoleon: now he is dreaming, impressionable, with 
an almost sexual adoration for his idealised hero; there he is the doting 
housewife who spends his time confined to the kitchen, “learning how to stuff a 
chicken and slow down the cooking process” so that he might better please his 
emperor (15). But he is not unique in adoring Napoleon: it is an infatuation that 
afflicts all of France, because “[g]reatness like his is hard to be sensible about” 
and because the country “wanted a ruler and […] wanted him to rule the world” 
(8, 30). Thus when he amasses an army at Boulogne in preparation for an 
invasion of Britain which ultimately never takes place, every one of the soldiers 
is prepared unquestioningly to die for his emperor. When two thousand men are 
drowned because the barges Napoleon has ordered built for the invasion prove 
disastrously unsuitable for crossing the Channel, “[n]o one said, Let’s leave him, 
let’s hate him”, because the nationalist agenda he represents is so powerful. The 
day after the disaster on the Channel “2,000 new recruits marched into 
Boulogne”, and, as Henri writes, “[a]ll France will be recruited if necessary. 
Bonaparte will snatch up his country like a sponge and wring out every last 
drop” (25, 8).23 
This rigid account of fixed identities for fixed national purposes, and its 
implicit measurement of human value in instrumental terms relative to the 
sovereign, sheds some light on Henri’s depressingly pithy outline of subjectivity 
under the Napoleonic regime: “Soldiers and women. That’s how the world is. 
Any other role is temporary. Any other role is a gesture” (45). The confusion of 
the national her- and himself with the national interest implicit but everywhere 
apparent in the novel’s characterisation of Napoleonic France is of crucial 
                                                 
23 This is a clear reference to levée en masse—often considered the first example of modern 
conscription—which was introduced by the National Convention on 23 August 1793 and 
ultimately allowed for the creation of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. The first article of the declaration 
reads: “From this moment until that in which the enemy shall have been driven from the soil of 
the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. The young 
men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women 
shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into 
lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to arouse the courage of the 
warriors and preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic” (qtd. in F.M. Anderson 184-
185). 
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importance to the development of the nation-state and to the nationalism of 
Napoleon’s regime as represented in The Passion. At one point Henri writes, 
“Napoleon said war was in our blood” (108), explicitly linking the nation, the 
citizen and expansionism; at another he provides an account of the process of 
becoming a soldier, wherein the new recruit must substitute for the bonds of 
human compassion represented in family and friends the bellicose agenda of the 
nation; must forget “what it is about home that holds their hearts; not sentiment 
or show but faces they love” and replace this with “lust and rage” (28). The 
achievement of this end is aided in no small part by what is represented as a 
wartime propaganda machine: Henri notes that the soldiers who are about to 
invade Britain are convinced that the English “ate their children” and 
“committed suicide with unseemly cheerfulness” (8). Indeed this nationalist 
propaganda has become so deeply embedded in the French consciousness that, 
even to Henri’s gentle, unjaded mind, nobody who opposes Imperial France’s 
right to rule over Europe can be counted as human. When, leaving home to join 
the Grande Armée, a little girl asks “Will you kill people, Henri?”, he replies, “Not 
people, Louise, just the enemy” (8). 
The Passion, then, hardly minces its words when it comes to totalising 
logic of the Napoleonic regime: it occupies, annexes and assimilates, rationalises 
and mechanises, and as it expands it flattens spaces and reduces their occupants 
to a status similar to the chickens in their wooden cages. And while there are 
considerable differences between Napoleon and Thatcher, significant 
similarities present themselves when we consider the spatial logic of the 
Napoleonic regime alongside strategies for urban renewal under the New Right. 
Following her third electoral victory in 1987, Thatcher delivered a celebratory 
speech to her colleagues at Conservative Central Office in which she announced, 
“You can have a party tonight, you will have a marvellous party tonight, and you 
can clear up tomorrow, but on Monday, you know, we’ve got a big job to do in 
some of those inner cities” (qtd. in Walsh 182). The speech is more than a little 
disingenuous coming eight years after her accession, not simply because the 
“big job” of the inner cities had been left to fester for so long, but also because 
ultimately, in the words of Michael Walsh, “the cities were to remain the 
unfinished business of Thatcherism”: 
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[T]he “two nations” Toryism which abandoned the 
deindustrialized North in favor of the commercial and consumer 
South was reproduced within the capital, with Thatcher’s 
suburban/Westminster axis set against the bohemian, immigrant, 
and redevelopment enclaves of inner London. Further yet, the “job 
to do” which the naive auditor might take to be the solution of 
social problems turns out to be redevelopment; Thatcher’s voice 
sets the gentrification agenda. (Walsh 182-183) 
 
Walsh’s point—that for much of the 1980s the complex political and social 
processes of urban renewal were abandoned in favour of market-driven 
gentrification and suburbanisation—is more than evidenced by newspaper 
cuttings of the time, many of which simply refused to characterise the problems 
of the inner cities in anything but economic terms. In 1981, in the wake of a 
summer of rioting in Liverpool, London and Manchester, the Economist 
repeatedly identified the origins of the unrest in ideologically-driven post-war 
planning and spendthrift, left-wing councils with large, publicly administered 
housing programmes. The solution, it claimed, was to abolish rent control and 
permit tenants to sub-let while massively reducing the quantity of council stock. 
This would create jobs and facilitate the construction of new dwellings by the 
private sector, arranged within a comprehensible urban fabric that placed a 
premium on defensible space and enabled the “true policemen of any close 
community”—“the publican, the shopkeeper, the teacher, parents, housewives 
chatting on the doorstep”—to return to their proper positions of authority. The 
free market would reign, and a “traditional” model of community would be 
reinstated; local government would be neutered and inner-city areas could be 
governed like their proper equivalents, “rural villages” (“Apocalypse Then?” 
35).24 
                                                 
24 The Economist made similar calls throughout the second half of 1981, for example in “Brixton 
Burns”, “The Tops of the Volcanoes”, “Fire Over England” and “Walkabout in Darkest Liverpool”. It 
was this thinking which led to the Housing Act 1980, which enshrined the right of council tenants 
to buy their homes for less than 70% the market value, and the Local Government Act 1985, which 
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 In this sense, Thatcherism’s urban agenda appears not dissimilar to 
Winterson’s representation of the Napoleonic regime, as both work by 
occupying space and eliding difference by mobilising total power—irrespective 
of whether the latter is ideologically closer to nationalism or neoliberalism.25 
However, there is a second, connected, and equally significant characteristic that 
the Napoleonic and Thatcherite regimes have in common: a fundamentally anti-
urban provincialism. In 1988 Hanif Kureishi reported on the Conservative Party 
Conference for the New Statesman. In order to soften the disconnect between 
inner London, where he was living at the time, and the universe of the 
conference delegates, his friends recommended that “there should be a 
                                                                                                                                          
scalped the most powerful tiers of local government, the Greater London Council and the mostly 
Labour-controlled Metropolitan County Councils, and can be seen as one of the grossest acts of 
political vandalism in recent times. But it should be noted that the Thatcher administrations’ 
attempts to reorganise the cities were hardly restricted to limiting local government and looking 
for market-oriented solutions: when the free market juggernaut found its path blocked by citizens 
unwilling to have their communities pulled apart, the government was perfectly happy to deploy 
state power in the form of law-and-order to clear the way forward. This subject is engaged with in 
more detail below, so it will suffice here to quote a bitter observation by Stuart Hall after the 
Broadwater Farm Riot of 1985: “Here is a recipe for Norman Tebbit showing how to get the alien 
wedge moving. Cut off the lifeline of government spending to the inner cities and destroy the 
fragile community groups and activities which provided these areas with the faint possibility of 
self-activity. Punish the local authorities who could be pressured into doing something and starve 
the networks of material support by ratecapping. Then, widen the powers of the police, virtually 
setting them up as an alternative source of moral and social authority in these areas, and start to 
penetrate into the community, into people’s homes, in relentless pursuit of ‘the criminals’” (Hall 
“Cold Comfort Farm” 78-79). 
25 As far as expansionism is concerned these two ostensibly conflicting ideologies need not be thought 
of as opposites. As Arendt writes, the principal rationale for imperial expansion, was not in the 
first instance nationalistic—which is to say, cultural—or even political; it was economic. 
“Imperialism”, Arendt argues, “was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up 
against national limitations to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned to politics out of 
economic necessity; for if it did not want to give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is 
constant economic growth, it had to impose this law upon its home governments and proclaim 
expansion to be an ultimate political goal of foreign policy” (Arendt Origins 126). This is an 
important point, because it reminds us that the deterritorialising strategies of neoliberalism only 
succeed because sovereign governments allow them to. As such, it could be argued that to assume 
that Thatcherism’s insistence of the strong state and its advocacy of neoliberal policies represent a 
contradiction is mistaken: they are, in this crucial sense, mutually necessary. 
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decompression chamber”, as “the shock of arriving directly amongst them would 
jar”. Accordingly, he decamped to suburban Bromley, where he was brought up, 
and which he characterises as “quintessential Thatcher-land. Perched between 
London and Kent it was affluent, white, Jew-free, lower middle-class England. If 
Margaret Thatcher had supporters this was where they lived and shopped” 
(Kureishi Dreaming 87). After the decompression was complete he went on to 
the conference where, one night, he had dinner with a Tory MP who spent the 
evening declaring Enoch Powell a prophet and a hero and, Kureishi claims, 
proclaimed himself 
 
proud to be racist. The woman sitting opposite the MP intervened. 
“By the way, I’m Jewish”, she said. “Ah”, he said. “Well, then, as a 
Jewess you should acknowledge that there are many races and 
your race is different to mine. The English are a provincial people 
uninterested in culture. And you Jews are a metropolitan people 
obsessed with it”. (97) 
 
What is important here is not so much that the MP is racist but that he 
characterises the English people—“his” people—as provincial, that he opposes 
this provincialism to metropolitan life and that Kureishi connects the former 
both with the suburbs and with Thatcherism. And because Henri’s enthrallment 
with Napoleon approximates quite closely this sketch of provincialism, 
Kureishi’s account helps us to understand the former as to some extent a 
projection of Thatcher’s suburban constituency.  
Hailing from a small village in the French hinterland, Henri’s upbringing 
is sheltered, his character chaste and his preoccupations mostly domestic. 
Arriving at Boulogne—hardly a metropolis, but a more populous settlement 
than he is used to—he is “homesick from the start” and misses “all the everyday 
things [he] had hated” (Winterson Passion 6). Throughout his brief sojourn in 
Paris during the preparations for Napoleon’s coronation he appears discomfited 
by metropolitan life: his court dress is “[i]mpossibly tight”; he is so nervous in 
the company of the imperial great and good that he refuses to draw attention to 
himself—even when serving the future Empress a snack—and he is thankful 
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whenever he is discharged and can retreat to the “little room of [his] own” (34, 
35, 36). Vitally, however, this provincialism doesn’t preclude bellicosity: in fact, 
Henri hints that the former might be a condition of the latter when he observes 
the French to be “a lukewarm people […] Not much touches us, but we long to be 
touched” (7). This combination of tepid parochialism with a keen desire for 
national greatness finds a clear correlative in Thatcherism, which David 
Marquand aptly characterises as “a sort of British Gaullism”, born equally of “a 
desire to reverse “a growing sense of despair, reflecting the experience of a 
generation of apparent national decline” (Marquant 60), and what Shirley Robin 
Letwin in her Anatomy of Thatcherism calls Thatcher’s “Little Englandism” 
(Letwin 21-22). In this context, the parallels between the allure of Napoleon to 
the French and of Thatcher to the English become even more apparent: they and 
their respective constituencies share, in addition to provincialism, a certain 
jingoism, a similar desire to make their countries great once more.26 
 Thus while Napoleon is not Thatcher, Winterson’s characterisation of his 
regime in The Passion—its provincialism and jingoism, its spatial imperialism—
nonetheless reflects a particular anxiety concerning the effects—political, 
spatial, subjective—of Thatcherism. However, if the first half of the novel 
concerns itself with the dangers of this spatial imperialism, the second half 
commits itself to exploring a space which appears to resist annexation and defy 
the normalising project of the Napoleonic regime altogether. And it is in its 
representation of resistant space that the novel’s setting becomes much more 
than an imaginative flourish. In fact, in its setting during the “Romantic 
dreaming into existence of the modern nation-state”, The Passion concerns itself 
intimately with the processes by which political subjectivity is generated and 
political structures come to ascribe meaning to actions. It is important, however, 
that it approaches this subject by first asking what happens when the subject 
places herself outside of those structures—in short, when she becomes an 
                                                 
26 The resurgence of British nationalism around the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 was 
exploited to its fullest potential by a struggling Thatcher administration and is widely perceived as 
having secured the Tory victory of 1983. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the first 
Conservative party political broadcast of the 1987 general election campaign featured the slogan 
“It’s Great to be Great Again”, the hymn “I Vow to Thee, My Country” and a Union flag puttering 
patriotically in the wind. 
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exile—and it is to this slippery political status that we turn now. 
 
 
2. Freedom and Exile 
 
There is a significant moment in The Passion when Henri finally falls out with 
the Emperor; when, during the fateful Russian campaign of 1812, he grows tired 
of watching his comrades freeze to death and teams up with a vivandière named 
Villanelle and a disgraced Irish priest named Patrick and chooses to desert. The 
reason this moment is notable is because it represents a rupture with the 
sovereign in a clear bid for freedom. For, in addition to pronouncing his 
disillusionment with Napoleon’s imperial ambitions, Henri justifies his 
desertion with a commonly articulated—even clichéd—desire for self-
determination: “I don’t want to worship him any more”, he says; “I want to make 
my own mistakes. I want to die in my own time” (Winterson Passion 86). And 
this is exactly what he gets when he leaves the French camp: in negative 
libertarian terms—that is, as Isaiah Berlin puts it, “to the degree to which no 
man or body of men interferes with [their] activity” (Berlin 122)—Henri, 
Villanelle and Patrick sever themselves from a repressive political community 
and locate a space characterised by far less of the “interference” than they were 
subject to under Napoleon’s regime. Accordingly, they become free to develop 
those “natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to 
conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred” (124). Berlin 
notes that negative freedom “is principally concerned with the area of control, 
not with its source” (129), and the vast empty vistas of the European Plain 
appear to represent just such an “area”, just such a “free” space: as Henri tells us, 
the Russians “didn’t even bother to fight the Grande Armée in any serious way, 
they kept on marching, burning villages behind them, leaving nothing to eat, 
nowhere to sleep” (Passion 80), surrendering the Plain to a tiny, peripatetic 
population.27 And while it is true that this space is not a comfortable one—it is 
                                                 
27 This may appear to be a perversion of Berlin’s argument, as his “area of control” is not material but 
abstractly political; however, as noted by most critical appraisals, the boundaries of physical, 
psychic and political space in The Passion are not at all fixed and any one may serve as a projection 
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barren and frozen, the deserters are “afraid to stop in case [their] legs buckled 
under [them]” and Patrick ultimately dies (Winterson Passion 88, 106)—Berlin 
reminds us that freedom isn’t “equality, or fairness or justice or culture, or 
human happiness or a quiet conscience” (Berlin 125). It is just what it is: 
freedom.  
Thus it seems that in deserting the French army Henri makes an 
astonishingly successful bid for freedom where the latter is interpreted in 
negative libertarian terms. But we might still wonder whether, even in this 
empty space, it is really the case that the three deserters are free of external 
impediments. Winterson furnishes us with little doubt that simply because the 
deserters have left the Grande Armée does not mean that they are no longer 
connected to France: they cannot fall into the hands of the French, as French law 
remains applicable to them, and they face the firing squad if caught. Hence if 
they really are to be considered free in the negative sense of the term, it is 
freedom only of the most abject kind; a kind that allows them to do little, is of 
value to few and to which only the most misanthropic survivalist might aspire. 
Because even living outside the law they are not impervious to the effects of 
power: in absenting themselves they no longer belong to any particular place, to 
any particular polity, and yet somehow remain subject to the power of French 
sovereignty. In short, their freedom—that most celebrated of political 
concepts—looks uncannily close to what Arendt would describe as 
worldlessness.  
In book two of The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), Arendt provides a 
lengthy analysis of the development of human rights as a political concept 
during and after the French Revolution. At the heart of this concept, she claims, 
is a peculiarly charged paradox that owes its existence to an irreconcilable 
disarticulation between, on the one hand, an ahistorical commitment to 
universalist humanism and, on the other, a historically specific appeal for the 
                                                                                                                                          
of an/its Other—hence the novel’s amenability to psychoanalytic readings. Additionally, it is 
worth noting here just how problematic the central location of a radically de-politicised space is 
to Berlin’s conception (and valorisation) of negative freedom. For if, as he implies, freedom is a 
“political ideal” (Berlin 129) then it is, to say the least, paradoxical to claim that it exists in its 
purest form in a space devoid of the operations of power and of the presence of all other human 
beings—that is, of politics. 
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legitimacy of the nation-state as a political institution. Human rights, according 
to Arendt, are at the core of a “secret conflict between state and nation [which] 
came to light at the very birth of the modern nation-state, when the French 
Revolution combined the declaration of the Rights of Man with the demand for 
national sovereignty” (Arendt Origins 230). It was due to this conflict that the 
citizen’s position in the realm of the human would eventually come to be 
secured and legitimised by the sovereign and, consequently, that the latter 
would eventually become a kind of administrator in humanity. In essence this 
was because the tension between the universal and local claims of the nation-
state for legitimacy entailed that the difference between human rights and 
national rights was elided: rights that were deemed universal (“human”) on a 
constitutional level became effectively national on a practical level. And this 
meant that, rather than being a political and legal body charged with protecting 
the individual’s rights as citizen, the state was capable of being “interpreted [...] 
as the nebulous representative of a ‘national soul’ which through the very fact of 
its existence was supposed to be beyond or above the law” (230). Rights became 
a marker of humanity ordained by the state and bestowed on its citizens, those 
citizens were agglomerated into a “national soul” and the end result, Arendt 
charges, was nationalism: “essentially the expression of this perversion of the 
state into an instrument of the nation and the identification of the citizen with 
the member of the nation” (231). 
 Implicit in this analysis are the beginnings of what would eventually 
come to be challenged as Arendt’s fetishisation of the polis by the likes of Seyla 
Benhabib, and her stigmatisation of “the social” by Hanna Pitkin.28 For Arendt it 
                                                 
28  For instance in their contributions to Honig’s Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt; 
respectively, “The Pariah and Her Shadow” and “Conformism, Housekeeping and the Attack of the 
Blob”. Feminist critics have been particularly vocal on these two counts, owing in part to Arendt’s 
suspicion that the various feminisms of the post-war period were attempting to elevate onto 
political ground concerns which she saw as belonging properly to the social. See, most 
notoriously, Adrienne Rich’s dismissal of The Human Condition in On Lies, Secrets and Silence (Rich 
211-12). In a similar vein, the rigid distinction Arendt draws between public and private realms 
was often perceived as intractably problematic by many earlier feminist scholars, and only in the 
1990s were attempts made to rehabilitate her. Dietz and Honig deal with this difficulty to a 
greater or lesser extent in Feminist Interpretations. 
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becomes impossible to emphasise enough the significance of an expressly 
political spatiality, from which all claims to the existence of political ideals must 
be made—and the most crucial of these ideals is freedom. Answering the 
question “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future she argues from the 
offing that “[t]he field where freedom has always been known […] as a fact of 
everyday life, is the political realm”; that it is “actually the reason that men live 
together in political organization at all. Without it, political life as such would be 
meaningless” (Arendt Between 146). We might assume, then, that exile from 
“political organization” is equivalent to dispossession of any claim to freedom, 
something Arendt explores in Origins. She subjugates those foundational 
freedoms of movement, opinion and so on constitutionally enshrined in the likes 
of the Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du citoyen to the necessity of 
belonging to a polity: “There is no question”, she argues, that someone “outside 
the pale of the law” can be seen as possessing more freedom of movement and 
opinion “than a lawfully imprisoned criminal”, but this does not alter such a 
person’s “fundamental situation of rightlessness”. In fact, the freedom of opinion 
possessed by a person without a polity “is a fool’s freedom, for nothing they 
think matters anyhow” because a “fundamental deprivation of human rights is 
manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world which 
makes opinions significant and actions effective” (Origins 296). Consequently, 
Arendt argues, it is “[n]ot the loss of specific rights” which has precipitated the 
most murderous acts of state violence in modernity “but the loss of a 
community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever”. Humankind 
“since Aristotle, has been defined as a being commanding the power of speech 
and thought”, has been identified as “the ‘political animal’, that is one who by 
definition lives in a community”; hence a citizen can be stripped of her rights 
and remain human, but when she has her citizenship revoked, freedom loses all 
valence because “the loss of a polity itself expels [her] from humanity”. (297) 
 The paradox, then, involves not just “reckon[ing] with an ‘abstract’ 
human being who seem[s] to exist nowhere” (291), the “human” in “human 
rights”; it also entails that the power to determine the situation of this human 
being—that is, the power to bestow humanity—resides entirely with the 
sovereign. Giorgio Agamben pursues this idea in Homo Sacer (1995), in which he 
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seeks to shed light on the relationship between sovereignty and “rightless” 
human beings. Taking forward Arendt’s thoughts on the muddled inauguration 
of the nation-state and the constitutional aporia which seems to provide it with 
the ability to define the limits of the human, Agamben argues that “sovereignty 
is not an exclusively political concept, an exclusively juridical category”; in fact, 
he claims, “it is the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it 
in itself by suspending it” (Agamben Homo Sacer 28). Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s 
Political Theology (1922), he identifies what he terms the “paradox of 
sovereignty”, wherein 
 
the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical 
order. If the sovereign is truly the one to whom the juridical order 
grants the power of proclaiming a state of exception and, 
therefore, of suspending the order’s own validity, “the sovereign 
stands outside the juridical order and, nevertheless, belongs to it, 
since it is up to him to decide if the constitution is to be suspended 
in toto” […] This means that the paradox can also be formulated 
this way: “the law is outside itself”, or: “I, the sovereign, who am 
outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law”. 
(Agamben Homo Sacer 15) 
 
From here he argues that when the sovereign proclaims a state of exception—a 
state in which the juridical order is suspended—it is not the case, as we might 
expect, that the state of rule simply vanishes; rather, “what is excluded [from the 
juridical order] in the exception maintains itself to the rule in the form of the 
rule’s suspension. The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in 
withdrawing from it” (17-18, emphasis in original). Thus in this scenario the two 
realms—rule and exception—are connected to one another in ambiguity, and 
the threshold between them represents “a crisis of every possibility of clearly 
distinguishing between membership and inclusion, between what is outside and 
what is inside, between exception and rule” (25).  
Agamben declares life in the state of exception—similar to Arendt’s 
“fundamental situation of rightlessness”— to be “bare life”, and the kind of life 
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possessed by the Roman legal figure homo sacer. The latter represents “one 
whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to 
sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide” 
(71). Homo sacer is no longer considered politically alive within the polity, and 
so the rights customarily accorded citizens, such as the right to life, are 
suspended. As such, the injunction against murder—defined juridically—no 
longer applies, since, for a person to be murdered, she must first be recognised 
as possessing a life that is capable of being taken away illegally, and homo sacer 
does not possess such a life. The same logic applies to execution: should the 
sovereign extinguish this person’s life it could not be described as an execution, 
since for a person to be executed she must first be recognised—again, 
juridically—as possessing a life that is capable of being taken away in 
accordance with the sovereign’s fiat.29 These two concepts combined—homo 
sacer and the “paradox of sovereignty”—are brought to bear on the idea of 
banishment, or exile. “He who has been banned”, Agamben argues, 
 
is not, in fact, simply outside the law and made indifferent to it but 
                                                 
29 Agamben’s failure properly to historicise his theories relating to sovereignty, the state of exception 
and homo sacer, has become an established target for detractors. The line he traces from concepts 
of bare and political life in classical democracy to those under modern democracy is, undeniably, 
problematic. His rigidly dyadic interpretation of Aristotle’s use of the terms zoē—which Agamben 
understands as “the simple fact of living common to all living beings”—and bios—“the form or 
way of living proper to an individual or a group” (Agamben Homo Sacer 1), that is, political life—
has come in for particular criticism. Moreover, irrespective of specifically how he interprets these 
millennia-old concepts, in applying them unproblematically to the twentieth century and never 
accounting for their apparently miraculous survival through the years, Agamben was certain to 
come in for criticism. This methodological departure from Foucault—to whom Agamben’s thought 
owes a great deal—is something that has been noted by Alison Ross as significant and potentially 
purposeful: “The extent of Agamben’s departure from Foucault’s ascending model of analysis—
which builds its tentative general picture by systematic reference to the analysis of how particular 
institutional practices operate rather than the ontological question of what they are—is 
instructive” (Alison Ross 5). In fact, Ross writes, “[t]he status of Agamben’s thought qua political 
philosophy may be interrogated [specifically] from this perspective. In his focus on bare life, 
Agamben provides a set of normative terms from which it becomes possible to interrogate diverse 
sets of institutional practices from the perspective of the direction they take. It is precisely this 
normative dimension whose absence in Foucault’s work critics often had cause to lament and 
which Agamben’s work may be seen to provide” (6). 
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rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the 
threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become 
indistinguishable. It is literally not possible to say whether the one 
who has been banned is outside or inside the juridical order. (This 
is why in Romance languages, to be “banned” originally means 
both to be “at the mercy of” and “at one’s own will, freely”, to be 
“excluded” and also “open to all, free”). (28-29, emphasis in 
original) 
 
And this, I think, is the kind of political position that Henri, Villanelle and Patrick 
occupy on their trek across Eastern Europe. In absconding from the Grande 
Armée and entering into the wilderness of the European Plain they take on roles 
that are far more redolent of homines sacri existing in the state of exception than 
of individuals occupying a libertarian space of negative freedom. Indeed, the 
only freedom they possess is—as Arendt would no doubt argue—also the most 
abject kind of unfreedom. For their lives are now politically worthless, and, as 
Henri points out, they can expect nothing but a voiceless and summary death if 
they fall into French hands: “Mutineers, or traitors as they were more usually 
called, found no leniency and were given no opportunity to make their excuses” 
(Winterson Passion 89). 
 
 
3. Venice and the Cultural Politics of Disenfranchisement 
 
It is thus in relation to the related concepts of freedom and exile that many of 
the ideas outlined by Arendt and Agamben can be brought to bear most 
fruitfully on The Passion.30 However, contrary to the negative characterisations 
                                                 
30 Not least because Agamben situates the origins of the state of exception in the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic regimes. These origins, he writes in State of Exception (2005), were legally formalised 
in the French Constituent Assembly decree of 8 July 1791, which declared an état de siege; this 
decree was built upon by the Napoleonic decree of 24 December 1811, which “provided for the 
possibility of a state of siege that the emperor could declare whether or not a city was actually 
under attack or directly threatened by enemy forces” (Agamben Exception 4). “The subsequent 
history of the state of siege”, Agamben writes, “is the history of its gradual emancipation from the 
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of worldlessness that these two thinkers provide, Winterson seems to perceive 
considerable potential in exile when the latter becomes the condition of a 
diverse group of people living together in a particular kind of expressive space. 
And this is because the latter frustrates the static ontological categories which, 
in the state of rule, are legitimated by the sovereign. We witness the beginnings 
of this when the cold of the “Zero Winter” forces the exiles to seek shelter in the 
home of some Russian peasants. Wary of being associated with the French 
invaders, Villanelle recommends that they pretend to be Poles (Winterson 
Passion 101); similarly, when their travels take them through Poland and 
Austria, she urges them to play Italians (103, 105). We can see that already, in 
their “polity-less”—read apolitical—status, the exiles’ identities have become 
more mutable than they were under the Napoleonic regime, where there were 
merely “[s]oliders and women”.31 Indeed the implication seems to be that exile 
necessitates performativity and effectively forces the subject to assume multiple 
identities, an implication only becomes clearer when Henri and Villanelle reach 
their destination, since there it functions as the premise for emancipatory 
endeavour. 
                                                                                                                                          
wartime situation to which it was originally bound in order to be used as an extraordinary police 
measure to cope with internal sedition and disorder, thus changing from a real, or military, state of 
siege to a fictitious, or political, one. In any case, it is important not to forget that the modern state 
of exception is a creation of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one” (5). 
This extrication of absolutism from la Terreur and the Napoleonic regime, together with the 
bifurcation of absolutism and the “democratic-revolutionary” tradition, is somewhat problematic 
and to a certain extent the latter seems contrary to Agamben’s thesis that the two are indivisible. 
Nonetheless, we are able to accept his point that the state of exception occupies a privileged 
position in political modernity not simply under totalitarian regimes such as Nazism and 
Stalinism, but also under apparently democratic systems of government—both of which, he 
argues in Homo Sacer, are derived from the same political lineage. 
31 Even though Henri works in the Grande Armée as the Emperor’s chef, Napoleon realises on the eve 
of his coronation—when his sovereign status will be constitutionally enshrined—that Henri 
“would serve him better when [he] could handle a musket as well as a carving knife” and promptly 
orders him back to Boulogne for “a real soldier’s training” (Winterson Passion 37). Patrick, the 
disgraced priest, is charged not with clergy work but with keeping watch over the Channel in 
order to “report on the whereabouts of Nelson’s blockading fleet and warn practising [French] 
troops of any English threat” (22). And while it is true that Villanelle, as a vivandière, is at the 
service of the military, her status as a prostitute clearly functions to mark her as a woman under 
the patriarchal logic of the Napoleonic regime. 
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 Winterson explicitly and repeatedly characterises Venice as a mercurial 
space populated by capricious characters; indeed, in Jago Morrison’s terms, it is 
“a Mecca of provocative indeterminacy” (Morrison 101). Villanelle is our guide 
to this city, which she describes as “surrounded by water with watery alleys that 
do for streets and roads and silted up back ways that only the rats can cross” 
(Winterson Passion 49). Water is, of course, often a signifier of flux and 
mutability, and its use in characterising Venice is no exception: in Villanelle’s 
words, the latter is a “changeable city […] Streets appear and disappear 
overnight, new waterways force themselves over dry land” (97): 
 
You may set off from the same place to the same place every day 
and never go by the same route. If you do so, it will be by mistake. 
Your bloodhound nose will not serve you here. Your course in 
compass reading will fail you. Your confident instructions to 
passers-by will send them to squares they have never heard of, 
over canals not listed in the notes. 
 Although wherever you are going is always in front of you, 
there is no such thing as straight ahead. No as the crow flies short 
cut will help you reach the café just over the water. The short cuts 
are where the cats go, through the impossible gaps, round corners 
that seem to take you the opposite way. (49) 
 
Villanelle’s claim that “there is no such thing as straight ahead” is a little 
bemusing, since she later announces, “I come from the city of mazes […] but if 
you ask me a direction I will tell you straight ahead” (109). “Straight ahead”, 
then, is a term just as slippery as Venice and Villanelle, whose own 
indeterminacy is communicated relentlessly and emphatically. She has “taken 
[her] pleasure with both men and women” (59-60) and enjoys dressing as a boy; 
however, when she does this the result is not entirely artifice, since her physical 
attributes situate her at the threshold between male and female anyway. Cross-
dressing comes naturally to her because, as she says, “my breasts are small, so 
there is no cleavage to give me away, and I am tall for a girl, especially a 
Venetian” (56). However, her indeterminacy does not extend merely to her 
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gender, sex and sexuality. For reasons that are never elaborated upon beyond 
the supernatural, Villanelle was born with webbed feet—despite the fact that 
“[t]here never was a girl whose feet were webbed in the entire history of the 
boatmen” (51). Clearly these are intended to function as a phallic signifier; a 
great deal has been made of this from any number of theoretical perspectives, 
and Villanelle’s sexual indeterminacy is plainly relevant to the current 
discussion. However, it is worth emphasising the other, more obvious—though 
less commented on—threshold that they straddle: that between the human and 
animal. After her mother gave birth, the midwife attempted to “cut off the 
offending parts straight away”, but “her knife sprang back from the skin leaving 
no mark. She tried again and again in between all the toes on each foot. She bent 
the point of the knife, but that was all” (52). This scene can readily be read as 
satirising sex reassignment surgery in newborn intersexed infants, among the 
most intrusive procedures aimed at producing a body that conforms to 
culturally determined norms. But the fact that Villanelle’s feet are not amenable 
to this kind of intervention is important—especially in light of her fondness for 
cross-dressing—as it has the effect of a paradox, positioning her in a situation 
simultaneously of absolute immanence and radical indeterminacy, and coding 
her as essentially inessential, always and inevitably located at the threshold 
where male becomes female, masculinity femininity—and human animal. 
Indeed, her status as “precisely neither man nor beast”, in Agamben’s words 
might be read as placing her in a similar situation to the werewolf, a figure he 
claims to symbolise the exiled or, in his terms, “banished” individual in many 
European societies (Agamben Homo Sacer 104-105).32 
 Thus we might read Villanelle as a highly-determined embodiment of the 
                                                 
32 For example, the wargus of Germanic lands and vargr of Scandinavia, the Latin garulphus and 
French loup garou, all of which, Agamben claims, are permeated with the notion of the ban. He 
cites as further evidence Edward the Confessor’s characterisation of the banned person as 
wulfesheud, a figure who “bears a wolf ’s head from the day of his expulsion” (qtd. in Homo Sacer 
105). However, he urges that expulsion in this lupine figuration does not nullify all bonds with the 
polity: “Werewolf” status, he writes, represents “a threshold of indistinction and of passage 
between animal and man, physis and nomos” (that is, between natural life and life under the 
sovereign), and, in relation to the sovereign exception, is located at the threshold between 
“exclusion and inclusion”. (Agamben Homo Sacer 104-105, emphases in original). 
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ban, and radically different to Henri, who—though now in exile—remains a 
product of the rigid ontological boundaries of the Napoleonic regime. This is 
something Winterson gestures at when, sitting by a fire on their walk from 
Moscow to Venice, Henri and Patrick take off their boots to warm their feet on 
the fire and Villanelle, “seeing [Henri’s] surprise at forgoing this unexpected 
luxury said, ‘My father was a boatman. Boatmen do not take off their boots’” 
(Winterson Passion 89). The moment is plainly intended to establish Villanelle’s 
fundamental difference from Henri and Patrick, and the “soldiers and women” 
logic of the Napoleonic regime. And this otherness rests on the fact that, as 
Manfred Pfister writes, “her self and her gender identity enact and define 
themselves in her performances: they are not stable essences but essentially and 
passionately performative” (Pfister 25). The contradiction here—“not stable 
essences but essentially […] performative”—is instructive, because it renders 
performativity immanent in a way that the concept ostensibly challenges. But 
what is more important is that Pfister does not limit this characteristic of 
essentialised indeterminacy to Villanelle; indeed, she claims that it is 
characteristic of Venice’s spaces and population in toto. In contrast to the 
hypostatising rubrics of the Napoleonic regime, Pfister argues that Venetian 
space enables “a perform[ance of] subjectivity beyond binary divisions” and 
functions as a “stage” on which to “act out and explore the indeterminacies of in-
betweeness”. She goes on to provide a list of binaries which she perceives as 
being elided by Venetian space: 
 
water and land > amphibiousness 
East and West > inner-European orientalism 
past, present and future > metamorphosis 
freedom and destiny > gambling 
structure and chaos > labyrinth 
contradictory opposites > paradox 
reality and dream > fantasy 
male and female > androgyny 
religion and sexuality > passion (Pfister 25, emphases in original) 
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All of these elisions are relevant to the current discussion, but the breakdown of 
the freedom/destiny binary is of particular interest, for two reasons: first, 
because—as we have seen—even before we reach Venice freedom is a peculiarly 
charged concept in The Passion; and second, because Villanelle explicitly locates 
Venice’s indeterminacy in the city’s politically compromised status relative to 
the Napoleonic regime. “Since Bonaparte captured our city of mazes in 1797”, 
she writes, “we’ve more or less abandoned ourselves to pleasure”. Indeed, under 
occupation Venice quickly “became an enchanted island for the mad, the rich, 
the bored, the perverted”, for “[w]hat else is there to do when you’ve lived a 
proud and free life and suddenly you’re not proud and free any more?” 
(Winterson Passion 52). We are thus in no doubt that Venice has been stripped 
of a quondam and abiding autonomy, a history of political self-determination 
which ended abruptly when it was occupied by the French.33 And yet there is a 
clear implication here that it is the loss of its political structures that has 
facilitated the city’s abandonment to pleasure.  
Apropos of this, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that the 
Venetians’ commitment to pleasure is described as an “abandonment”, since this 
can also be seen to describe the city’s political situation, which is not, to quote 
Agamben, “simply outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather 
abandoned by it”. The city might thus be considered to rest at that ambivalent 
threshold “in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable”. 
More importantly, while the Napoleonic regime is deeply implicated in this 
abandonment, it has not been successful in taming the mercurial spaces of 
Venice. As Villanelle notes, the Emperor has made his rationalising presence felt 
in the city by “demolish[ing] our churches on a whim and loot[ing] our 
treasures” (52), as well as constructing the Giardinetti Reali and Giardini 
Publicci. But despite remaining theoretically subject to French imperial power, 
the city remains untamed and is left largely to its own devices. Thus we might 
say that, unlike Agamben, Winterson ascribes a kind of resistant potential to the 
                                                 
33 In 1797 the Republic of Venice—which had been in existence since 697—was conquered by 
Napoleon. Sovereignty over the former city-state passed between France and Austria until a brief 
spell of independence between 1848 and 1866, when it was finally assimilated into the Kingdom 
of Italy. 
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state of exception. And it is perhaps for this reason that Venice attracts to its 
Rabelaisian situation of excess “the mad, the rich, the bored, the perverted” 
and—most importantly—the banned and the exiled. For as Winterson writes, 
“[t]here are exiles too. Men and women driven out of their gleaming palaces that 
open so elegantly on to shining canals. Men and women who are officially dead 
according to the registers of Paris” (53). We can detect more than a hint of homo 
sacer in this description of the characters who make Venice their home: to 
“Paris”—metonymically, the Napoleonic regime—they are “officially dead”, yet 
they live happily, pleasurably in a Venice that has become the state of exception 
writ large.  
In this way Venice can be described not just as “a city of disguises” (92)—
polymorphous, multifaceted and essentially indeterminate—but as a city which, 
as a consequence of its uncertain political situation, attracts yet more exiled and 
excluded figures to join those who already live there. And it is in relation to the 
idea of exclusion that the connection between The Passion’s Venice and political 
scenario in which it was written becomes apparent once more. Late in the novel 
Villanelle takes Henri around the tawdry Venetian back streets—the “cities of 
the interior” as she calls them—where they pass “ransacked palaces, their 
curtains swinging from shutterless windows”. Pointing to “a lean figure on a 
broken balcony” she says, “These are the exiles, the people the French drove out. 
These people are dead but they do not disappear” (114). In its decrepitude and 
political powerlessness, Venetian space recalls the fragile and fractious spaces of 
the inner cities, which in the 1980s often appeared just as impervious to 
control—much to the chagrin of the Thatcherite press. A week after the 
Handsworth riots of September 1985, The Economist published a pithy account 
of the unrest, during which parts of the inner-city area’s south Asian community 
were attacked by members of its Afro-Caribbean population, leading to violent 
skirmishes between the communities and police which left two dead and thirty-
five injured. It lamented: “Thus Durban comes to Britain. The have-nothings set 
upon the have-a-littles who sell to them across the counter. The have-enoughs 
live and work elsewhere”. Fearing that this pattern was likely to be imitated in 
other cities “where quite small concentrations of aimless blacks are serviced and 
supplied by entrepreneurial browns”, it concluded with a weary resignation—
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also a startling capitulation—that contravened its usually libertarian line on 
political and economic matters, calling for limited positive discrimination as a 
means to ameliorate the pitiful state of Britain’s black urban impoverished 
(“Now Handsworth Burns” 14).  
Elsewhere, however, it stuck to its Thatcherite guns, calling for the 
system-built housing of the 1960s to be razed and maintaining its belief in 
saturating urban space with market forces. Most importantly, though, by this 
point in the 1980s a not-so-subtle shift of emphasis had appeared on its pages 
as it argued that since the problem of the inner cities could no longer be 
understood in solely economic terms, it begged to be appraised in criminal ones, 
too.34 In this respect the newspaper was echoing the police and many on the 
political right, whose first instinct was to situate the debate firmly on law and 
order terrain. Although many in Labour’s ranks emphasised the economic 
factors instrumental in bringing about the unrest—little and poorly-directed 
investment combined with soaring unemployment—the Association of Chief 
Police Officers and many conservative pundits and Tory MPs characterised the 
riots as orgies of wanton vandalism.35 In the four years after the last major bout 
                                                 
34 “London’s high-density housing blocks”, it opined, “now house, among respectable folk, semi-
criminal communities almost as vicious as those of Dickens’s private rookeries”; faced with riots 
like those in Brixton, Handsworth and Tottenham, “[a]ll members of Britain’s political 
community—not just conferencing Tories ready to bellow—need to start relearning how to call a 
crime a crime” (“Blacks’ Future” 13). It is worth noting that earlier in 1985 The Economist had 
cited Handsworth as a model for the inner cities. Despite the area’s economic lassitude, the news 
magazine drew particular attention to political measures, such as its well-integrated ethnic 
groups and successful community policing, which had made life more bearable (“Mixing in the 
Midlands” 40). All pretence to political egalitarianism was cast aside after the violence, however, 
when it carried the headline, “Poor Handsworth’s Asians Pay the Price of Prosperity”. 
35 Some claimed they demonstrated a tendency towards criminality arising from the waning of 
traditional models of authority in the post-war period: responding to MPs’ questions on 9 July 
1981 Margaret Thatcher argued that “[a] large part of the problem that we are having now has 
come from a weakening of authority in many respects of life over many, many years” (qtd. in 
Kettle and Hodges 183). Others—not least the inner-city communities themselves—considered 
the police to be at fault, and the “sus” and “sas” laws deployed in places with large minority 
populations antagonistic and often implemented after a racist fashion. The “sus” law refers to the 
Vagrancy Act of 1824 which empowered police officers to arrest anyone occupying public space 
who was suspected of planning a criminal act.  Although this law was abolished after the Scarman 
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of rioting, any attempt by the liberal establishment to understand and remedy 
the problems of the inner cities in social and political terms had dissolved into a 
mixture of bewilderment and jingoism. Now the need for the police to intervene 
in areas where community relations were often so strained as to be practically 
non-existent was articulated with more vitriol than ever before. After the 1981 
riots the Times had adopted a surprising—though not unproblematic—
communitarian perspective, characterising Britain as “a patchwork of different 
races and cultures” and emphasising pluralism over integration: “Tolerance”, it 
argued, “does not require that every Englishman should have a black man for his 
neighbour or that every Asian should forget his cultural identity” (“The Soiled 
Coin” 13). By September 1985, however, this optimism had given way to the law-
and-order line, and what was a patchwork of cultures had become a series of 
“ghetto[es, which] must be policed, sensitively but with strength and firmness, 
to ensure that public order is upheld” (“Brixton Again” 17). In the wake of the 
Broadwater Farm riot a month later, the tone became somewhat balder: “This 
must stop; this must be stopped […] Without support, direct, unequivocal for the 
maintenance of order on Britain’s streets, on all Britain’s streets, democratic 
politics itself is threatened” (“To Stop a Riot” 15). Thus a sense of the inner cities 
as dangerous, ungovernable and intractably destitute was established in the 
minds of Thatcher’s core constituency—the white, suburban, middle class. 
Everywhere the word “crumbling” was placed in relation to the inner cities; 
everywhere was their decrepitude further evidence of their moral collapse, their 
resistance to rationalisation, their fundamental otherness. To the political 
orthodoxy of the day, these areas became zones of criminal indulgence in drink, 
                                                                                                                                          
Inquiry into the 1981 riots, the “sas”—stop and search—powers of the police codified in the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 were widely deemed to be similarly insensitive in their 
implementation. In response to this persecution, the desire of inner-city communities to police 
themselves became increasingly evident. The police came to be spoken of as an army of 
occupation—an analogy Thatcher condemned—and chief police officers had to work hard to 
reassure the Times-reading public that there were no “no-go” areas in the inner-cities. When, one 
day prior to the 1981 Brixton riot, two police officers attempted to help a wounded black youth 
named Michael Bailey, the already suspicious community surrounded and confronted them, pulled 
Bailey out of the police car “and spirited [him] away to shouts of ‘We will look after our own’” 
(Kettle and Hodges 99-100).  
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drugs and sex; red-light districts where illicit shebeens were commonplace and 
the streets were populated at all times of the day and night by the aimless and 
excluded.  
Yet while this emphasis on the “crumbling” inner city is redolent of 
Winterson’s description of Venice in The Passion, there is a crucial difference 
between the two in that where a kind of horror accompanies the former—
articulated by pro-Thatcher pundits in conservative newspapers—the latter is 
saturated with what the novel characterises as specifically political potential. 
Indeed, to the extent that Venice functions as a projection of the inner city, 
Winterson might be said to perceive in both a “promise of possibility”, in that 
they appear peculiarly resistant to domination by their respective oppressors. 
Now, this might seem like a novel and invigorating take on a type of space that, 
during the 1980s, was subject to much opprobrium. However, difficult questions 
begin to arise when we remember that a fundamental condition of Venice’s 
political promise is its status as a spatial expression of exile. As such, in the 
terms already established, it represents an apolitical space—something both 
Arendt and Agamben value negatively. In a state of exile, formal politics are 
suspended—or, at least, apply only in no longer applying. So how is it that 
Venice can be considered politically fecund? Conspicuously avoided until now, 
Agamben’s paradigmatic example of the state of exception—the concentration 
camp—cannot be ignored any longer. For how can a city that exists in a 
permanent state of exception, which is populated by the banned and the 
exiled—the wretched, the politically powerless—become a model for political 
resistance?  
The answer, I think, is that Winterson’s interpretation of “politics” 
extends well beyond the rarefied Arendtian understanding of the term and 
segues in an intriguing way into the body of thought I have described as Left 
culturalism. As we have seen, at the time of the novel’s composition the latter 
was providing a sustained interrogation of the idea that politics represent a 
discrete category which only occasionally impinges upon the realms of culture 
and society. And the idea of resistance was key to this project: as Cary Nelson, 
Paula Treichler and Lawrence Grossberg observe, the discipline already had “a 
long history of commitment to disempowered populations” and was thus 
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“forged in the face of a sense of the margins versus the center” (Nelson et. al. 
11). Indeed, Stuart Hall echoes this commitment when he claims that one of the 
central aims of cultural studies was “to enable people to understand what is 
going on, and especially to provide ways of thinking, strategies for survival, and 
resources for resistance” (qtd. in Nelson et. al. 2). This entailed a challenge to the 
isolated, a priori individual of liberalism, and an attempt to define agency 
collectively and identity performatively: Alan Sinfield’s conceptualisation of 
resistance, for example, distances itself from a liberal approach by arguing that 
“[f]or agency to operate […] a ‘doer’ does not have to be in place first; rather, she 
or he is constructed through the deed. Identity develops, precisely, in the 
process of signification”. A clear corollary of this, he argues, is that the individual 
becomes an “unlikely [source] of dissident identity and action” because 
“[p]olitical awareness does not arise out of an essential, individual, self-
consciousness of class, race, nation, gender or sexual orientation; but from 
involvement in a milieu, a subculture” (Sinfield “Cultural Materialism” 811, 
emphases in original). 
 There are shades of Judith Butler here—particularly in the idea of 
identity developing in the process of signification—and plainly this point is 
significant, as it segues into the emphasis on performativity in Winterson’s 
representation of Venice. However, equally important is Sinfield’s identification 
of the subculture as a space in which collective agency finds its most effective 
expression. Though Sinfield was a key figure in attributing to subcultures a 
specifically political content, the broadly oppositional mode of these collectives 
was identified somewhat earlier. In his 1979 work Subculture: The Meaning of 
Style, for instance, Dick Hebdige provides a groundbreaking response to earlier 
explorations of the subcultural phenomenon, which he argues tended to 
emphasise the desire of the post-war young to repair an imagined broken 
connection between themselves and the working class culture of their parents’ 
generation. By contrast, Hebdige contends that “emphasiz[ing] integration and 
coherence at the expense of dissonance and discontinuity” risks “denying the 
very manner in which the subcultural form is made to crystallize, objectify and 
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communicate group experience” (Hebdige 79).36 Providing a poststructuralist 
gloss on this subcultural commitment to dissent, Hebdige argues that 
 
violations of the authorized codes through which the social world 
is organized and experienced have considerable power to provoke 
and disturb […S]pectacular subcultures express forbidden 
contents (consciousness of class, consciousness of difference) in 
forbidden forms (transgressions of sartorial and behavioural 
codes, law breaking, etc.). They are profane articulations, and they 
are often and significantly defined as “unnatural”. (91-92) 
 
So if dissent is the ultimate end of the subculture, the performance is the means 
of achieving this end. And where the instinct of a hegemonic power structure is 
so often to essentialise—to further entrench its own discourse, thereby 
rendering “unnatural” any oppositional activity—the response of the subculture 
is to emphasise difference and to render identity indeterminate; an ongoing 
process rather than a static ontological marker. This, Hebdige implies, is why 
performance is fundamental to the oppositionality of the subculture: it is, in a 
way, its modus operandi, and so when we speak of subculture, we must recognise 
that we are inevitably referring to a performative or “spectacular” phenomenon.  
Even more significant than the emphasis on performativity is the 
importance Hebdige attaches to outsiderness—or exile—as a condition of 
subcultural style. He points out that in order to investigate the latter we are 
required to focus our attention on “the most mundane objects—a safety pin, a 
pointed shoe, a motor cycle—which, none the less […] take on a symbolic 
                                                 
36 He cites the examples of the skinheads and the mods: “[T]he skinheads undoubtedly reasserted 
those values associated with the traditional working-class community, but they did so in the face 
of the widespread renunciation of those values in the parent culture—at a time when such an 
affirmation of the classic concerns of working-class life was considered inappropriate. Similarly, 
the mods were negotiating changes and contradictions which were simultaneously affecting the 
parent culture but they were doing so in the terms of their own relatively autonomous 
problematic—by inventing an ‘elsewhere’ (the week-end, the West End) which was defined 
against the familiar locales of the home, the pub, the working-man’s club, the neighbourhood” 
(Hebdige 79, emphases in original). 
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dimension, becoming a form of stigmata, tokens of a self-imposed exile” 
(Hebdige 2). Now at first this sounds quite unlike our analysis of the term: most 
obviously, the element of choice implied in “self-imposed” is not a luxury 
afforded the exiles of The Passion—though it must be said that, in deserting the 
Grande Armée, Henri, Villanelle and Patrick do place themselves in this situation. 
Irrespective of whether it is self-imposed or not, however, it is not difficult to see 
how the emphasis on exile as a tactic of oppositionality—a means by which a 
subculture may pronounce the “dissonance and discontinuity” of its relationship 
with a hegemonic culture—is helpful in understanding why The Passion 
perceives a “promise of possibility” in Venice, an urban space that represents 
exile writ large. 
 Like Hall and Sinfield, Paul Gilroy recognises that the possibility of 
resistance arises in collective action, rather than in the discrete individual of 
liberalism. But if anything he is more radical in examining how withdrawal—or 
outsiderness, or exile—interacts with collectivised cultural space, and how the 
two militate against nationalist discourse. Early in There Ain’t No Black in the 
Union Jack (1987) he questions an orthodox position within British sociology 
that perceives the possibility of resistance exclusively in relation to the political 
institutions of the state. In this understanding of resistance, he writes, “[t]he 
state’s institutions map out the strategic configuration of political conflicts 
[…and] provide a material context for the development of movements and 
organizations as well as an important basis for any relationship” (Gilroy Union 
Jack 33). He goes on to quote Frances Fox Piven’s and Richard A. Cloward’s Poor 
People’s Movements (1977), which argues that “[i]nstitutional life aggregates 
people or disperses them, moulds group identities and draws people into 
settings in which collective action can erupt” and suggests that, as a 
consequence, “institutional roles determine the strategic opportunities for 
defiance” (qtd. in Union Jack 33). Superficially at least, this spatial, collective 
agency appears to approximate the performative subculture described by 
Hebdige. However, what Gilroy is keen to contest is not Piven and Cloward’s 
understanding of agency but their rarefied definition of politics, arguing that, by 
itself, an understanding of politics as the state and its institutions is capable of 
neither recognising nor remedying a particular kind of cultural racism that had 
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become increasingly widespread in Thatcher’s Britain.  
This form of racism—which he labels “ethnic absolutism”—relies on a 
perception of “black history and culture […] as an illegitimate intrusion into a 
vision of authentic British national life which, prior to their arrival, was as stable 
and as peaceful as it was ethnically homogenous” (“Ethnic Absolutism” 188). 
Associating politics only with the state, he argues, fails utterly to recognise the 
significant cultural dimension of politics relative to the nation, because 
 
[t]he politics of “race” in this country is fired by conceptions of 
national belonging and homogeneity which not only blur the 
distinction between “race” and nation, but rely on that very 
ambiguity for their effect. Phrases like “the Island Race” and “the 
Bulldog Breed” vividly convey the manner in which this nation is 
represented in terms which are simultaneously biological and 
cultural. (Union Jack 45) 
 
In principle, Gilroy’s point is not all that dissimilar to Arendt’s argument 
concerning imperialism. Like Arendt, Gilroy understands that the state and the 
nation are not one and the same thing, and that their forced marriage represents 
a unique opportunity for the idea of the “national soul” to become harnessed for 
politically deleterious ends. Indeed, the similarity between Gilroy, Arendt and 
Agamben becomes even clearer when he suggests that the “new racism” is 
“primarily concerned with mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. It specifies 
who may legitimately belong to the national community and simultaneously 
advances reasons for the segregation or banishment of those whose ‘origin, 
sentiment or citizenship’ assigns them elsewhere” (45).37 This said, it is in 
                                                 
37 In fact, it could be argued that, in many ways, Gilroy—together with Left culturalism more 
generally—is focusing his attention on a problem very similar to that which vexed Arendt before 
him and would come to be theorised by Agamben afterwards. This makes clear how erroneous it 
would be to dismiss the political thought of Arendt and her intellectual successors—including 
Agamben—as somehow anachronistic, beside the point, or limited in valence to a particular point 
in modern history. Similar questions to those posed by Arendt in Origins in 1951 were asked again 
in the 1980s and continue to be debated today through Agamben’s exploration of the political and 
juridical nature of inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, when applied specifically to the United 
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Gilroy’s solution to the problem of ethnic absolutism that we ultimately locate 
the reason behind Winterson’s attachment of political potential to the Venetian 
“zone of morbidity”, despite the dubious political logics that Arendt would no 
doubt consider to operate there. At the end of There Ain’t No Black in the Union 
Jack Gilroy criticises the attempts by Labour in the early 1980s to persuade 
black people that the institutions of the white working class were the best 
vehicle for mobilising their frustrations with racism in the UK. Going much 
further than Hall, he charges that this approach completely misunderstood the 
depth of the problem, since the cultural politics of nation had already become 
aligned with the structures of the state in a way that foreclosed the possibility of 
the latter serving as a vehicle for resistance against the former. Consequently, he 
argues, “being political now requires complete disassociation from the 
corporate structures of formal politics”; indeed, “[a]uthentic politics is [today] 
thought to recommence with this act of withdrawal”. Like wandering out into the 
frozen wastes, however, this process of withdrawal does not in itself constitute a 
“new” politics, since the latter is more likely to be found at “the intersection of 
territoriality and identity in urban black cultures” (Ain’t No Black 228). In this 
way the city—not the rarefied polis, but “urban processes and experiences” 
(228)—becomes a space that promises a new kind of “[c]ommunity which is as 
much about difference as it is about similarity”, and which thus militates against 
                                                                                                                                          
Kingdom, these questions remain just as pressing as ever today, when regionalism and devolution 
are higher on the constitutional agenda than at any time since Irish independence, the doctrine of 
multiculturalism is valorised or lambasted with more vigour than ever before and barely a month 
passes by without one or another functionary of the state attempting to paper over the 
increasingly chasm-like cracks of the nation-state by deploying the concept of “British values”. One 
example of this came in March 2008 when the former attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, 
announced a range of proposals aimed at celebrating “Britishness”, including the establishment of 
a national holiday, community service and a ceremony for school leavers which would involve 
pledging allegiance to the Crown. Quite what an Irish nationalist living in Belfast might think 
about this was one of a number of witheringly incredulous questions that were begged of the 
proposals. The increasing fractiousness and fragility of the British nation-state is evidenced in 
many contradictory ways, not least in the growth of the more extreme nationalist parties (BNP, 
DUP, Sinn Féin) at the expense of their more moderate alternatives (the Westminster parties, 
Ulster Unionists, SDLP) at a time when moderate secessionist parties such as the SNP and Plaid 
Cymru have also seen an unprecedented growth in support. 
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the idea of a homogeneous national culture (235).  
To this extent both the Arendtian and culturalist solutions resist the 
liberal notion that freedom can only be located in spaces where the individual is 
able to exercise her natural faculties in order to produce private wealth. But 
where Arendt narrows the definition of politics and elevates it above culture and 
society, Gilroy broadens it to include culture. And where Arendt responds to the 
problematics of nation by engaging with politics in the yet more discrete and 
rarefied realm of the polis, the culturalist approach repudiates formal politics 
altogether, exiles itself and emphasises the resistant potential of the 
performative subculture operating in urban “non-work time and space”. To 
Winterson, I think, Venice (and, by extension, the inner-city) represents just 
such a milieu: a spatial projection of alterity, fostering a subcultural—rather 
than a political—expression of subjectivity, in which identity is not conceived of 
a priori but is generated through performance. The very characteristics that 
would render the city a “zone of morbidity” for Bianco represent a “promise of 
possibility” to Winterson: being placed in an indeterminate relationship with 
the sovereign does not seem to her dangerous but liberatory, since it unleashes 
the power of difference to frustrate the homogenising rubrics of nationalism. 
Thus despite being abjectly unfree, Venice remains an emancipatory space 
because freedom exists most provocatively, most excessively, where there has 
been a complete withdrawal from formal politics; where the distinction between 
inside and outside is most unclear and the prevailing political scenario is exile. 
This is the key paradox that characterises the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement: a paradox which suggests that we are most free when we 
relinquish any claim on political structures that might recognise us as such. The 
unique political ontology that arises from this abjuration is inert and thus of no 
use in itself; consequently, in order to deliver on its emancipatory potential it 
must be mobilised through expressive cultures, since only these are capable of 
providing a meaningful substitute for the political mechanisms that have been 
repudiated. And it is for this reason that the urban experience is fundamental to 
this model of freedom, because the latter can only be realised in spaces that are 
saturated with such cultures, like the city—and specifically the inner city, whose 
ambivalent political situation and diverse identities Venice mirrors. Only in 
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spaces like this will the cultural politics of disenfranchisement work, because 
only here can the full emancipatory potential of exile be enacted. 
 
* * * 
 
It is because of the way it connects this unique model of freedom with the city 
that The Passion is able to help us identify the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement. Consequently, I think it deserves to have its status in the 
canon of contemporary British literature reappraised; to be recognised 
alongside Winterson’s more frequently-discussed novels Oranges Are Not the 
Only Fruit (1981), Sexing the Cherry (1989) and Written on the Body (1992) as a 
text that says something important about the relationship between literature 
and critical theory in the British intellectual context. Having said this, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the cultural politics of disenfranchisement should 
emerge through the “lesser” efforts of key contemporary writers, since it 
confronts us with a slightly different trajectory to the one British cultural studies 
is typically deemed to have taken. Our task going forward will be a gloomy one, 
since we will trace how this logic led eventually to crisis and impasse. But for the 
moment it is worth returning to The Passion in order to observe how, at the end 
of the novel, Winterson chooses to marginalise the Napoleonic/Thatcherite 
subject rather than the subaltern one, thereby affirming the oppositional 
potential of Venice and the inner city in the face of a seemingly insurmountable 
hegemon. 
This is hardly a happy conclusion, for the subject in question happens to 
be Henri—a sympathetic character, if a rather colourless one. Then again, it is 
not surprising that ultimately Venice remains bewilderingly unknowable to him. 
On their trek through Eastern Europe Villanelle assures him that “When we get 
through this snow, I’ll take you to the city of disguises and you’ll find one that 
suits you” (Winterson Passion 100); however, when they arrive in Venice Henri 
is completely incapable of functioning there. The unmappable spaces require 
him to surrender his need for stability and embrace indeterminacy, but this is 
something he is unable to do: shortly after arriving in the city he goes for a walk, 
becomes lost and remains missing for five days; he only finds Villanelle again by 
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chance and, when he does, is told that she thought he had gone back to France 
(113). When he tries to articulate his disorientation it is not exactly surprising 
that he can think only in terms of Napoleon: “Where Bonaparte goes”, he says, 
“straight roads follow, buildings are rationalised, street signs change to celebrate 
a battle but they are always clearly marked. Here, if they bother with street signs 
at all, they are happy to use the same ones over again” (112). Similarly, he is 
quite incapable of adapting to live in a situation in which ontological categories 
enter a state of flux: when Villanelle introduces him to her parents he finds it 
incomprehensible that “the fact that I was a Frenchman didn’t bother them at 
all”, despite her stepfather assuring him that “[n]ot every Frenchman is 
Napoleon Bonaparte” (110). To Henri the citoyen—the national whose 
experience under Napoleon has encouraged him to consider his identity as fixed 
first and foremost in relation to the sovereign, who in turn embodies the 
nation—this talk is anathema. Indeed, Henri remains imaginatively a citoyen all 
the time he is in Venice, and this dooms his love affair with Villanelle, since each 
character is fundamentally at odds with the other: as Villanelle notes, “[H]e 
couldn’t live in Venice and I wouldn’t live in France” (148). 
At the novel’s denouement Villanelle’s husband—the one who sold her to 
the army as a vivendière—finds her returned to Venice and, by a rather 
staggering coincidence, recognises Henri as the boy who stole his job as 
Napoleon’s cook. He threatens to betray their whereabouts to the French and so 
Henri murders him with Villanelle’s knife before carving out his heart and 
handing it to her. After being apprehended for the crime, Henri is deemed insane 
and imprisoned in the asylum on San Servelo.38 And when Villanelle comes to 
break him out he refuses to go with her, choosing instead to consign himself to 
the madhouse, where he can tend the rose garden and write his memoir. This 
voluntary imprisonment is really quite ironic considering that—as Michel 
Foucault suggests in Madness and Civilization (1961)—the purpose of the 
asylum in modernity has been to contain, regiment and render invisible 
behaviour that frustrates the normative behaviour of Western society, and that 
its inmates were often considered to sit at the threshold between the human and 
the animal. Indeed, in some ways the asylum is no less a state of exception than 
                                                 
38 An apparent mistake on Winterson’s part, since the island is actually named San Servolo. 
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Venice, but it appears to provide Henri with an illusion of stability which appeals 
to his Napoleonic mindset. Whether the madness of the asylum’s inmates is real 
rather than simply another kind of performance—one that fools even the 
inmates themselves—is debatable; either way, Henri is much more content with 
this illusion than he is with the “living city” of Venice, because in tending his 
garden he exercises a kind of control which enables him to assert with absolute 
certainty that he “will have red roses next year. A forest of red roses” (113, 160). 
And perhaps this is Winterson’s last comment on Henri the provincial: for, 
however illusory it might be, he has finally found his suburb. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
RAVE TO THE GRAVE: 
Hanif Kureishi and the Failure of Left Culturalism 
 
 
 
 
In the last chapter we saw that careful reading of Winterson’s 1987 novel The 
Passion sheds light on a moment in the late 1980s when certain figures on the 
British cultural Left came to substitute urban culture for city politics. I argued 
that this substitution forms part of a broader political narrative that was 
inherent to Left culturalism in its second iteration, which I have labelled the 
cultural politics of disenfranchisement. And I suggested that the level of 
emancipatory potential that was considered to reside in urban culture was 
remarkable, given that the process that led to its lionisation eschewed any 
political structure capable of recognising an action as bearing political meaning. 
This chapter will pursue the consequences of this process into the post-
Thatcher period, when this experiment with freedom came under increased 
scrutiny and was considered by some to have led the cultural Left into a cul-de-
sac from which it might never emerge intact.  
On 26 August 1991, the most ostentatious contribution to the London 
skyline in thirty years was officially opened by the Duke of Edinburgh. Looming 
more than 240 metres above the capital, One Canada Square was the 
culmination of a decade of planning and construction, starting with the closure 
of the West India Dock in 1980. Designed by César Pelli—an architect well-
known for advocating the aesthetic virtues of postmodernism—the tower’s 
pastiche of Big Ben was quite fitting for a building that symbolised the 
incumbent Right’s most grandiose attempt to rationalise urban space. A pity, 
then, that Margaret Thatcher was no longer around to witness its opening in an 
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official capacity: ten months earlier, she had been turfed out of office by a 
cabinet which, in the light of the Poll Tax debacle, increasingly saw her as a 
liability. But while the fall of the modern Napoleon might have inspired the Left 
to rejoice, this sentiment paled beside all there was to mourn in the Docklands’ 
redevelopment. In the late 1970s the latter had not been all that far from the 
kind of entropic extreme represented by Jeanette Winterson’s Venice: a once-
glorious emblem of mercantilism in danger of slipping into the very waters it 
had previously sought to master and exploit. Its environs were home to some of 
the UK’s poorest and most dispossessed citizens, as well as artists, vagrants and 
squatters attracted by the prospect of zero or near-zero rents. And when the 
London Docklands Development Corporation threatened to pull apart this 
community, the docks served as a theatre of conflict between a motley bunch of 
disenfranchised collectives and the combined power of state and capital. Unlike 
Winterson’s Napoleon, however, this invading force succeeded in “BLEEDING 
DOCKLANDS DRY”, as one piece of graffiti put it, and at the beginning of the 1990s 
that success was made incarnate in One Canada Square. The redeveloped 
docklands are thus a good place to begin this chapter. For while, in the form of 
the Militant Tendency, the radical Left had been instrumental in Thatcher’s 
downfall—helping to organise the anti-Poll Tax demonstration of March 31 
1990 that would become known ironically as the “Battle of Trafalgar”—in 
broader historical terms, it was not until Thatcher left office that the crisis of the 
Left really set in. And the challenge posed by postmodern space—specifically 
the kind produced by the LDDC—is one of the issues that concerns us now. For 
while the sheer scale of the Docklands project—the monumentalism of its 
architecture and the arrogative way in which it was developed with little 
concern for the communities that already lived there—recalls a kind of 
Corbusian approach to urban space, the planning regime under which it was 
delivered was axiomatically opposed to that which produced the shopping malls 
and high-rise estates of the 1960s and 70s. Where late modernist urbanism was 
typified by a rigid spatial logic, postmodern planning was distinguished above 
all by the significance it attached to flexibility. And this implied a relationship 
between the kind of flexible spaces celebrated in The Passion and those 
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produced by Thatcherism which, for some key figures on the cultural Left, was a 
little too close for comfort.  
More importantly—and far more devastatingly—the similarity between 
the spatial regimes of the New Right and the cultural Left yielded implications 
about how the latter had conceptualised the relationship between culture and 
politics that caused it to question some of the most fundamental components of 
its emancipatory project. However, it is important to understand that, just as—
indeed because—urban space was central to how Left culturalism articulated its 
experiment with freedom, the crisis that penetrated to the heart of this 
experiment also manifested itself in an attitude towards the city. It is thus hardly 
a surprise to find that, by the mid-1990s, enthusiasm for the emancipatory 
potential of the inner city appeared to be waning: notable leftists seemed to 
have quietly abandoned it as a site of political possibility, and by the turn of the 
millennium more pessimistic accounts of the urban experience were 
increasingly common.39 Charting the anagnorisis that accompanied this change 
is vital in understanding how the cultural Left struggled to confront the 
challenge of postmodernity, and it is once again the fiction of the period that 
best enables us to do this—specifically, the fiction of Hanif Kureishi, a writer 
who has consistently functioned in critical discourse since the 1980s as the 
literary mouthpiece for cultural hybridity. We have already explored how, in his 
earliest work, Kureishi insists on identity as comprising a complex and 
contradictory flux of multiple differences, and established that in this way his 
writing evidences many theoretical concerns that were also central to Left 
                                                 
39 There is a notable exception to this which needs to be acknowledged: Zadie Smith’s White Teeth 
(2000). For while this novel is shot through with intergenerational pathos, it remains stubbornly 
optimistic and could easily be argued to maintain the role of the urban experience as a guarantor 
of cultural pluralism and hybridity. However, if it therefore continues the emancipatory project of 
which Kureishi’s early fiction formed such a crucial part—and that is far from certain—it does it, 
by and large, alone. After The Black Album Kureishi himself became entirely disenchanted with the 
urban experience, which the work of his middle period seems to suggest guarantees little more 
than an illusory and impermanent kind of individual self-realisation. It is telling, therefore, that 
while in her 2003 novel Brick Lane Monica Ali appears to echo Smith’s enthusiasm for London’s 
verve and vitality, she is less invested in the collective possibilities it represents and articulates 
her narrative of female emancipation in a depressingly individualised way. 
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culturalism. The slippery characters of My Beautiful Laundrette—from Tory-
voting south Asians to gay national front thugs, Pakistani feminists to working-
class dilettantes—seemed to Stuart Hall to embody an understanding of identity 
as constantly evolving in response to social pressures that cannot be properly 
accounted for without a correspondingly complex understanding of culture. 
Moreover, in his protagonists’ peregrinations from the sexual and ethnic 
outskirts of society to its core, Kureishi reflects the belief that it is through 
studying the margins that light is cast most brightly on the centre. That these 
journeys are nearly always manifested in a migration from London’s 
homogeneous suburbs to its vibrant inner regions corresponds with Gilroy’s 
celebration of the political potential of expressive urban cultures in There Ain’t 
No Black in the Union Jack. Indeed, in his early work Kureishi frequently appears 
to consider the formative influence of the city upon the subject to be greater—
and more progressive—than that of the nation: as he writes in his account of the 
creative process that produced Sammy and Rosie Get Laid (1987), “I was brought 
up in London. It’s my city. I’m no Britisher, but a Londoner” (Kureishi Dreaming 
142). And this attitude is born out in his first novel, which explicitly deploys a 
literary mode—the bildungsroman—that is deeply concerned with the 
emergence of the subject in order to chart its protagonist’s rejection of the 
nation in favour of the city. Beginning, “My name is Karim Amir, and I am an 
Englishman born and bred, almost”, The Buddha of Suburbia invents and 
explores a plethora of fractious identities—all, to varying extents, subaltern—
that, while contesting themselves and one another, are exhilaratingly 
accommodated by a captivating and polymorphous London (Buddha 3). It ends 
on a touching flourish of optimism, with Karim, his family and friends 
committed to an uncertain life in the inner city: “And so I sat in the centre of this 
old city that I loved, which itself sat at the bottom of a tiny island. I was 
surrounded by people I loved, and I felt happy and miserable at the same time. I 
thought of what a mess everything had been, but that it wouldn’t always be that 
way” (284). 
 Initially at least, Kureishi’s second novel, The Black Album (1995), seems 
to mirror this approach. Set between 1988 and 89—a period that encompasses 
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the so-called “second summer of love” as well as the Satanic Verses 
controversy—its account of the city and the subject is as fraught as in any of his 
previous fictions. Its protagonist, Shahid, moves away from the Kent countryside 
to study the greats of English literature at a run-down inner-London college, but 
ends up in bed with a lecturer—Deedee Osgood—whose classes revolve around 
contemporary and popular culture.40 Their affair involves plenty of passionate 
and subversive sex, and makes much use of the city’s dance and drug 
subcultures; however, at the same time, Shahid also falls in with a group of 
Muslim students headed by Riaz, a pious and enigmatic Pakistani who defines 
himself against the sex- and drug-fuelled debauchery of contemporary urban 
Britain by insisting on strict adherence to a narrow understanding of Islam that 
frowns on music and literature and seeks to emphasise the pleasures of the 
spirit over those of the body. In this way—that is, by forcing Shahid to choose 
between Riaz’s communitarian agenda and the hedonistic possibilities 
represented by Deedee—The Black Album establishes its principal narrative and 
political tension, constructing its protagonist as the contested territory between 
the libidinous possibilities of urban culture on the one hand and an 
essentialising Islamic nationalism on the other. Its similarity to Kureishi’s earlier 
work is thus readily identifiable: the novel is deeply invested in exploring the 
place of nationalist and culturalist politics in the contemporary urban milieu, 
and is keen to engage with the tension between a priori and a posteriori 
accounts of subjectivity at a historical moment when political, economic and 
cultural circumstances seem to be changing by the minute. Whether subjective 
fixity is represented by nationalism—English or Islamic—or Marxism, Kureishi’s 
response remains basically the same: while he understands the appeal of the 
                                                 
40 It is necessary to acknowledge that Kureishi has consistently suggested that the debate he stages in 
The Black Album pits Islamic fundamentalism not against Left culturalism but what he calls 
“liberalism”. In the introduction to his stage adaptation of the novel—first performed at the 
National Theatre in July 2009—he recalls that, despite worrying that his observations would seem 
passé fifteen years after they were first written, “it wasn’t as though the subject of liberalism and 
its relation to extreme religion had gone away” (Kureishi “Newness” vi). For reasons that will 
become clear, I consider Deedee to be emblematic of Left culturalism to a far greater extent than 
she is of liberalism. The fact that she teaches popular and contemporary culture is one of these. 
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comfortable and unchanging truths upon which these world-views are founded, 
he cannot accept the hypostatised ontologies they inevitably entail. And it is for 
this reason that he ends The Black Album with a familiar endorsement of 
hybridity, declaring that “[t]here was no fixed self”.  
However, this time Kureishi seems far less sure of himself, and 
immediately qualifies this statement with a question—“surely our several selves 
melted and mutated daily?”—that strikes the reader as not entirely rhetorical 
(Kureishi Black Album 274). This uncertainty is only compounded by the sense 
that, between his first and second novels, his enthusiasm for the city has been 
significantly dampened. Because while he never shies away from representing 
London’s shabbier side in the The Buddha—if anything, it is this aspect that 
excites him the most—in The Black Album there is less and less about urban life 
that Kureishi finds inspiriting. Early on he quietly signals that there will be far 
less of the comedy and concupiscence that typified his previous fictions by 
describing how the films Shahid watches in order to prepare himself for “how 
rough and mixed London would be” fail to “stead[y] him for such mundane 
poverty” as actually exists there (3). Moreover, in pointed contrast to Karim’s 
flirtation with fame in the intoxicating capital of The Buddha, once Shahid 
arrives in the city he feels “invisible; somehow this wasn’t the ‘real’ London” (4). 
Over the course of the novel we gradually become acquainted with this “real” 
London but, as Kureishi himself has suggested, the tone of The Black Album is 
consistently cooler and more detached than that of The Buddha.41 And when, 
finally, Shahid does embrace Deedee’s politics of play and pleasure over Riaz’s 
nationalist agenda, the resolution comes at the price of a disengagement with 
the city. For where in the earlier works his protagonists remain in London at the 
narrative’s close, in The Black Album Kureishi’s solution to the political tensions 
that have variously torn Shahid and Deedee apart and kept them together is a 
rather bewildering escape to the seaside.42 
                                                 
41 In interview with Kenneth Kaleta, Kureishi argues that “The Black Album is a more objective novel” 
than The Buddha, “a cooler book emotionally” (Kaleta 144). 
42 In the closing sentences, as the unlikely lovers sit on a coast-bound train, Kureishi writes that “the 
air outside seemed to be clearer. It wouldn’t be long before they were walking down to the sea […] 
They looked across at one another as if to say, what new adventure is this?” (Kureishi Black Album 
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  Given Kureishi’s outspoken enthusiasm for the urban experience, the 
reader is entitled to ask how this volte-face occurred; to wonder what took place 
in his political imagination between composing The Buddha and the The Black 
Album that encouraged him to doubt the city’s unique ability to reconcile 
politics and identity. The aim of this chapter is to answer this question, and in 
order to do this it will first explore a particular impasse that ensnared the Left in 
the late 1980s. This impasse has everything to do with the Arendtian conception 
of politics as presence and participation within an explicitly political space that 
formed such an important part of the previous chapter. Because, to a greater 
extent than in any of his previous fictions, The Black Album seems acutely aware 
of the oppositional possibilities of a communitarian politics organised around 
recognition, and doubts whether an emphasis on spatial and political 
indeterminacy—which is so central to The Passion’s celebration of exile—is in 
fact capable of combatting the reactionary discourses of the Right in an urban 
context. Like The Passion, The Black Album represents a very particular 
intervention in the debate surrounding Left culturalism, and careful reading of 
this intervention yields compelling insights into the latter which would not be 
available to us otherwise. Apropos of this it is worth noting that around the 
same time that Kureishi published The Black Album, Paul Gilroy appeared to 
effect a similar abandonment of the city as a site of emancipatory possibility. For 
while black urban culture is valorised in There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack—
published, like The Passion, in 1987—come 1993’s The Black Atlantic and the 
explicitly urban styles and processes that formed such an important part of the 
earlier book no longer seem capable of sustaining the author’s attention. 
Certainly, his analysis of the “black Atlantic”—a heuristic that unearths a 
“counterculture of modernity” which, Gilroy argues, “reconstructs its own 
critical, intellectual, and moral genealogy in a partially hidden sphere of its 
own”—reaps fabulous rewards (Gilroy, Black Atlantic 38-39).43 However, in so 
                                                                                                                                          
276). Despite—or perhaps because of—their uncharacteristic and unsteady commitment to one 
another, the reader is not inclined to find this adventure particularly adventurous. 
43 In this text Gilroy attempts to resist what he claims is a foundational Anglocentric prejudice of first-
generation Left culturalism by suggesting that “historians could take the Atlantic as one single, 
complex unit of analysis in their discussions of the modern world and use it to produce an 
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far as our own discussion is concerned, the fact that both he and Kureishi 
distanced themselves from the city at the same historical moment is surely 
worthy of note.  
In response to this seeming abandonment of the city as a site of meaningful 
political action by two prominent Left culturalists, a central subject of this 
chapter will be the now-familiar claim that the development of the so-called 
“postmodern metropolis” has been concomitant with a near-wholesale 
abrogation of the city as a political entity. For the The Black Album implies that 
Left culturalism shares some of the responsibility for this phenomenon, and for 
a diminution of the political in postmodernity generally. I want to suggest in the 
first instance that this was precipitated by the exposure of Left culturalism’s 
account of the close relationship between urban space and resistant praxis as 
ineffective in combatting Thatcherism’s spatial logic by theoretical 
developments elsewhere on the Left, within a body of thought known as the 
“spatial turn”. The fundamental challenge of the spatial turn—which emerged 
within Marxist discourse at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
                                                                                                                                          
explicitly transnational and international perspective” (Gilroy Black Atlantic 15). Using black 
music from around the Atlantic he argues for the existence of what he calls a “politics of 
transfiguration” within which “the bounds of politics are extended precisely because this tradition 
of expression refuses to accept that the political is a readily separable domain”. And he proposes 
that critics should “reread and rethink this expressive counterculture not simply as a succession of 
literary tropes and genres but as a philosophical discourse which refuses the modern, occidental 
separation of ethics and aesthetics, culture and politics” (38-39). Of course, the collapse of politics 
and culture that Gilroy urges here also forms a significant aspect of his earlier text, which in its 
closing passages identified the city as the most appropriate site for realising the progressive 
potential of this collapse. However, in terms of Gilroy’s own intellectual development it appears 
that ultimately the direction of travel is away from the city, both as an object of study and as a site 
of emancipation. In The Passion, the unpredictable interplay between water and the city—and the 
political indeterminacy that this implies—suggests, in Grice’s and Woods’s terms, “a promise of 
possibility lying untapped in the history of space”. However, where There Ain’t No Black in the 
Union Jack might be seen to endorse this statement with its emphasis on urban cultures in inner-
city areas, in The Black Atlantic that urban context has disappeared completely, to be replaced—
metaphorically, at least—with only flux, accident, indeterminacy. And this leads to a situation, as 
Laura Chrisman puts it, in which Gilroy accords specifically political action “no transfigurative 
potential, labelling it as expressive exclusively of a politics of bourgeois civic ‘fulfilment’” 
(Chrisman 460). 
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1990s44—consisted in its convincing demonstration that the principal agency 
behind the massive expansion of indeterminate space in the postmodern 
metropolis was not the Left, but the Right. This contention posed a number of 
cutting questions regarding the political value Left culturalism attached to inner 
city space: it challenged the extent to which cultural, spatial and political 
indeterminacy could remain central to oppositional praxis and, most worryingly 
of all, raised the possibility that, rather than enabling resistant activity, the 
cultural politics of disenfranchisement inherent to Left culturalism’s celebration 
of mercurial urban identities in fact served to abet the Right in its strategy to 
totalise and to dominate.  
I want to suggest that the shift of tone in Kureishi’s representation of the city 
between his first and second novels—from the sanguine and celebratory 
Buddha to the anxious and far less optimistic Black Album—represents a 
moment in which this problematic was acknowledged by Left culturalism’s most 
famous literary celebrant. I want to argue that, in reaction to this realisation, 
Kureishi came to believe that Left culturalism no longer promised a more 
effective opposition to Thatcherism than other resistant modes—specifically, 
nationalism—that contradicted its emphasis on cultural indeterminacy. And I 
want to suggest that this belief led Kureishi to question some of the more deeply 
held aspects of the Left culturalist project, such as its collapse of politics into 
culture and its connection of the latter with resistant praxis. Ultimately, I want to 
suggest that the abandonment of the city at the end of The Black Album not only 
                                                 
44 Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space—a foundational text of the movement—was first 
published in France in 1974, but not translated into English until 1991. It was something rather 
more significant than prescience that enabled Lefebvre to write, more than a decade before space 
was engaged with in a meaningful way in Britain and America, that “[t]heoretical and practical 
questions relating to space are becoming more and more important. Questions, though they do 
not suppress them, tend to resituate concepts and problems having to do with biological 
reproduction, and with the production both of the means of production themselves and of 
consumer goods” (Lefebvre 62). Like many of the theorists connected to the spatial turn, Lefebvre 
suggests that “neocapitalism” (his term for the then-emerging orthodoxy that would become 
known as neoliberalism) creates “spatial chaos”; however, unlike later critics—and very much like 
the Left culturalists—he seems to believe that in this chaos may also consist the most fruitful 
means of developing an oppositional praxis (63). 
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expresses a sense that the city will no longer serve as a venue for Left 
culturalism’s emancipatory project; despite the novel’s apparent endorsement 
of Deedee’s cultural politics of play and pleasure, its conclusion represents a 
moment of profound disillusionment with the project itself. 
 
 
1. The Spatial Turn 
 
Whether in delight or protest, the academic Left is generally unified in 
acknowledging that, since the mid-1970s, there has been a steady erosion of the 
nation-state in political and economic terms, as well as a corresponding increase 
in the relevance of the city as a unit of social analysis.45 Thatcherism is generally 
deemed to have played a central role in this process and, in most accounts, to 
have compensated for the political and economic action it took to render the 
borders of the UK more porous—such as dismantling nationalised industries 
and opening British markets to international competition—by indulging in the 
kind of cultural nationalism that characterised the aftermath of the 
Falklands/Malvinas conflict. As we have already seen, Left culturalist figures 
followed Thatcherism onto this cultural terrain and valorised, in Gilroy’s words, 
“the role of distinctively urban processes” as a means of combatting its jingoistic 
                                                 
45 This is certainly true of Left culturalism too: in his exploration of the decline of the nation state, the 
New Times theorist David Held attributes particular responsibility to “the internationalisation of 
production finance and other economic resources” for  “eroding the capacity of the state to control 
its own economic future” (Held 194). However, the claim that the nation-state should no longer be 
the principal focus of political, social and economic analysis has not just been heard on the Left. In 
her 1986 book Cities and the Wealth of Nations, Jane Jacobs criticises Keynesian macro-economic 
theory for insisting that “national economies are useful and salient entities for understanding how 
economic life works and what its structure may be” (Jacobs Wealth 29). She contends that this 
perspective fails to account for the fact that within states there are often multiple economies that 
usually centre on cities. The latter, she claims, “are unique in their abilities to shape and reshape 
the economies of other settlements, including those far removed from them geographically” and 
should therefore take pride of place in any economic analysis (32). As we will see shortly, Jacobs’s 
contention is very similar to the quarrels of Doreen Massey and Edward Soja with orthodox 
Marxism, whose exclusively historical materialism they consider limited in its ability to account 
for the obviously spatial dimension of capitalist development. 
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and hypostatised account of national identity. This strategy, as I argued in my 
reading of The Passion, entailed a celebration of the inner city as a site of social 
emancipation that embraced the political possibilities of disenfranchisement, 
and was expressed in Winterson’s novel very much in spatial terms. The 
plurality of marginalised inner-city communities was considered to possess the 
potential to resist the nationalism of the New Right because it appeared to 
provide real-world ballast to the culturalists’ theoretical account of identity-
formation as an endless, discursive process in which groups and individuals are 
perpetually reconstituted by a free play of cultural signifiers that contradict as 
often as they complement one another. The plural approach to identity was thus 
mapped onto the space of the inner city, which became as mercurial as the 
populations that called it home, and in this way the flexibility of urban space 
was perceived to both express and reflect the highest progressive value of 
cultural complexity. 
 Like the Left culturalists, many figures connected to Marxism’s spatial 
turn were centrally concerned with the role of flexibility in post-Fordism.46 And, 
                                                 
46 The transition from Fordism to post-Fordism consisted in the shift away from the mode of capital 
accumulation represented by the practises of Henry Ford and characterised overwhelmingly by 
rigidity—an emphasis on economies of scale, highly organised labour, and mass production and 
consumption—to a new mode organised around flexibility and specialisation, and consisting in 
economies of scope, non-unionised labour, and the specific targeting of consumer demographics. 
Hall and Jacques urge that the shift from the “rigid” world of Fordism towards the “flexible” one of 
post-Fordism “must not be understood as exclusively an economic development, in the narrow 
sense. Just as Fordism represented, not simply a form of economic organisation but a whole 
culture […] so post-Fordism is also shorthand for a much wider and deeper social and cultural 
development” (Hall and Jacques New Times 12). As part of their attempt to locate new sites of left-
wing inquiry and action in postmodernity, Hall and Jacques sought to resist a tendency across the 
British Left to dehistoricise Thatcherism and treat it as somehow coterminous with post-Fordism, 
rather than as a specific response to historical circumstances that were value-free. They provide a 
rebuttal to the claim that the new economic, political and cultural circumstances rendered the Left 
irrelevant by urging that post-Fordism never possessed a particular political trajectory, and that it 
was a major mistake for leftists to have assumed that it did: “It was not just that much of the Left 
had failed to understand the novelty and specificity of Thatcherism. What is more important is 
that it failed to distinguish adequately between […] Thatcherism and the world which 
Thatcherism claimed to represent and aspired to lead […] As a result, the Left failed to recognise 
the new ground or understand the new world that was being made. That new world and 
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like the Left culturalists, they sought to respond to both the challenge presented 
by the Right’s apparent appropriation of flexible space for its own ends, as well 
as some of the most antiquated—and deeply-held—assumptions of the Left 
itself. However, the way in which they formulated this response differed 
significantly from the methodology of figures such as Hall and Gilroy, who 
started by analysing flexibility in relation to cultural identity, and then expanded 
their analysis to exploit the possibilities they perceived in inner-city space. 
While still maintaining an interest in the cultural dimensions of post-Fordism, 
thinkers such as David Harvey—whose The Condition of Postmodernity (1989) is 
a key text of the spatial turn—focused instead on elaborating a theory of space 
that might be reconciled more readily with an orthodox emphasis on historical 
materialism.47 In other words, for Harvey the starting point was not identity, but 
space, time and the relationship between the two. He begins his investigation by 
characterising the experience of postmodernity as deeply bound up with “new 
dominant ways in which we experience space and time” that owe much to the 
emergence of “more flexible modes of capital accumulation, and a new round of 
‘time-space compression’ in the organization of capitalism” (Harvey vii). In this 
way, he identifies this changing experience of time and space as the place to 
begin in any attempt to describe postmodernity in cultural terms.48 This said, 
                                                                                                                                          
Thatcherism were seen as one and the same thing. The latter, as a consequence, looked 
omnipotent, as if it was in command of history” (Hall and Jacques New Times 15). 
47 While many of the Left culturalists challenge the orthodoxy of economic determinism, Harvey 
abides by it and argues that “when set against the basic rules of capitalistic accumulation”, the 
new economic, political and cultural circumstances that emerged from 1972 onwards—that is, 
post-Fordism—“appear more as shifts in surface appearance rather than as signs of the 
emergence of some entirely new postcapitalist or even postindustrial society” (Harvey vii). 
Postmodernism serves only as a cultural expression of new, post-Fordist economic practices, 
rather than a gesture beyond the economistic base-superstructure model itself; his aim is merely 
to “give an account of space and time in social life so as to highlight material links between 
political-economic and cultural processes” (Harvey 201). 
48 Harvey identifies the cultural corollary of Fordism in the emphasis on rational organisation as a 
utopian project in, for example, the architectural modernism of Le Corbusier, which—as typified 
in his slogan “By order bring about freedom” (qtd. in Harvey 31)—appealed to rationality as a 
means of bringing about social emancipation. Harvey claims that it was just this totalising 
rationality that came to be opposed by the countercultural movements of the 1960s, which 
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Harvey is by no means the only thinker to come upon this revelation, nor to 
draw on it in shedding light on postmodernity’s cultural dimensions: crucial to 
Fredric Jameson’s 1984 essay “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” is an 
elucidation of the representation of time and space in postmodernity, and 
particularly of the flattening and disorientating effects of postmodern 
architecture, photography and film. In fact, the “reassertion of space in critical 
social theory”, as Edward Soja subtitles his Postmodern Geographies (1989), was 
by the end of the decade a well-established theoretical trend within Marxism. In 
addition to responding, as Harvey suggests, to the new political, economic and 
cultural circumstances of post-Fordism, this reassertion of space was also 
informed by a growing awareness of globalisation and its effects: firstly, as trade 
and migration barriers lifted and revealed the geographical iniquities of wealth 
and development across cities, countries, continents and the planet; and, 
consequently, as progressive agendas sought to identify a praxis that was 
capable of spanning the seemingly unbridgeable distance between the global 
and the local. Some fundamental questions were asked of the Left by texts such 
as Doreen Massey’s Spatial Divisions of Labour, in which she argues that “[e]ach 
country is different, and these differences have geographical implications”; that, 
even within individual nation-states, “things are more complex than a simple 
confrontation between capital and labour” (Massey 16-17). In the face of these 
various geographical differences, Marxism’s rigidly diachronic perspective 
seemed suddenly myopic: surely uneven development needed to be accounted 
for synchronically as well? As Soja writes, an exclusively historical materialism 
“tended to occlude a comparable critical ability to the spatiality of social life, a 
practical theoretical consciousness that sees the lifeworld of being creatively 
                                                                                                                                          
disdained the “oppressive qualities of scientifically grounded technical-bureaucratic rationality as 
purveyed through monolithic corporate, state, and other forms of institutionalized power”. Laying 
down the cultural foundations of postmodernism, these movements emphasised instead 
“individualized self-realization through a distinctive ‘new Left’ politics, through the embrace of 
anti-authoritarian gestures, iconoclastic habits (in music, dress, language and lifestyle), and the 
critique of everyday life” (38). In other words, just those gestures and habits explored by early 
Left culturalist texts such as Hebdige’s Subculture. 
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located not only in the making of history but also in the construction of human 
geographies, the social production of space and the restless formation and 
reformation of geographical landscapes” (11). 
 However, as far as the present investigation is concerned, what is crucial 
about the spatial turn is that it explicitly identified the Right as the agency 
behind the massive expansion of flexible space in postmodernity, as well as the 
worrying consequences this entailed. Mike Davis’s City of Quartz (1990) 
provides the most emotive example of this kind of analysis, 49 but more 
interesting for us is without doubt Beatrix Campbell’s 1989 foray into Britain’s 
“New Times Towns”, due to the peculiar nature of its connection with Left 
culturalism.50 In her essay, Campbell visits a number of locations she claims are 
expressive of post-Fordist urbanism, and after a discussion of Livingston, 
Sheffield and Swindon, we end up in Basingstoke, forty-eight miles west of 
                                                 
49 At its most dystopian, Davis’s account reads like a Nineteen Eighty-Four of postmodernity. In his 
“Fortress LA”, “municipal policy has taken its lead from the security offensive and the middle-class 
demand for increased spatial and social insulation” (Davis Quartz 227). The LAPD’s “quixotic 
quest” to bring safety to sidewalks conceals a brutal spatial dichotomy whose true logic leads 
inevitably to a massive assault on the public realm: “good citizens, off the streets, enclaved in their 
high-security private consumption spheres; bad citizens, on the streets (and therefore not 
engaged in legitimate business)” (253). What is more, there is very little we can do about it. There 
are no spaces of resistance in Davis’s account, no heterotopias, no enclaves of anti-hegemonic 
activity. As implied in my reading of The Passion, totalisation is indeed the end of neoliberalism’s 
spatial project, but this is achieved via an emphasis on precisely the kind of flexibility and 
indeterminacy that the novel locates at the heart of any attempt to combat such totalisation. The 
inner cities, which are represented as politically fecund in The Passion, are, in City of Quartz, solely 
“carceral”; their best expressions located in “pop apocalypses and pulp science fiction” like Escape 
from New York, Running Man and Blade Runner(223).  
50 Campbell herself could not be properly labelled a Left culturalist: she is a left-wing investigative 
journalist whose reports cover a range of subjects from sexual politics to child abuse and the 
plight of British urban youth. Nonetheless, it is significant that “New Times Towns” was initially 
published in Marxism Today when the journal was edited by Martin Jacques and heavily 
influenced by Hall and his culturalist agenda, and subsequently reprinted as part of the collection 
New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s, which was edited by Hall and Jacques and 
anthologised a number of other leading Left culturalists, including Dick Hebdige. Campbell thus 
operates with sufficient proximity to Left culturalism to be familiar with its agenda while also 
maintaining a critical distance that enables her to discuss it with an outsider’s trenchancy. 
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London. This town, Campbell concludes, is a perfect example of “Thatchergrad”. 
The historic market centre has been demolished and rebuilt as a fortress of 
high-tech companies, and so thoroughly privatised is social space that leisure 
time has been completely domesticated: a wine box and a video at night; car-
cleaning and DIY at the weekend. There is a general focus on policing and 
surveillance, territorial imperatives and forbidden spaces. For example, she 
writes: “The place dies at night—one evening I counted precisely fourteen 
people in the town centre—six were at cash points, the rest were on their way to 
somewhere else […] Legend has it that the Pru[dential financial company]’s 
security people have rid the place of undesirables” (295). However, for all this 
obsession with menacing security forces and desolate urban vistas, we should 
be careful to differentiate Campbell’s vision from the bureaucratised and 
absurdly violent regimes of a thousand mid-century dystopias.51 For the logic of 
this dark and dismal urban space has more to do with laissez-faire than with red 
tape and regulation. Campbell is emphatic in attributing responsibility for this 
state of affairs to the ruling Conservative council, and draws explicit attention to 
the retrusion of political impediments to investment and development which, 
she says with some irony, has produced “a flourishing economy unimpeded by 
planning, by civic pride, or by community politics”.  
In this respect Basingstoke is typical of Thatcherite urban design, which, 
as we have seen, emphasised the need to sweep away local planning ordinances 
and the political power that protected them. What is interesting is that the 
                                                 
51 Without a doubt, the best-known novels to explore the spatial logic of the post-Fordist city are 
Neuromancer, Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive (1984, 1986, 1988)—William Gibson’s so-
called “Sprawl” trilogy—which is widely perceived to be a crowning achievement of the 
cyberpunk genre. Decrepit cities, youth subcultures and criminal personalities are staples of 
cyberpunk literature, which often features near-future dystopias in which multinational 
corporations wield more power than elected governments. These companies have to be resisted 
by fugitive outcasts, who are frequently computer hackers that must to negotiate competing—
often amoral—interests with the currency of controlled information. All these generic features are 
present in British author Jeff Noon’s “Vurt” trilogy (Vurt, Pollen and Nymphomation (1993, 1995, 
1997)). That rave-era Manchester is such as influence on Noon’s cyberpunk fiction is worth taking 
note of, as the political (and apolitical) aspects of late 1980s dance subculture will be discussed 
shortly. 
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rhetoric of this agenda relied heavily on the concept of flexibility: for instance, in 
his 1984 speech to the House of Commons, Environment Secretary Patrick 
Jenkin urged that “[p]lanning authorities must adopt a flexible and pragmatic 
approach to meet the ends of versatile enterprises” (qtd. in Brinley et. al. 16). 
Concluding their study of urban planning during the 1980s—published in the 
same year as “New Times Towns”—Tim Brindley, Yvonne Rydin and Gerry 
Stoker argue that going into the 1990s “‘[f]lexbility’ will be the keyword of the 
new style of trend planning. Development plans will be flexible planning 
frameworks” (Brinley et. al. 177). And this is the crux of the issue: rather than 
providing a basis for oppositionality, flexibility becomes the means by which 
Thatcherism realises its totalising spatial logic. Indeterminate spaces no longer 
provide the best conditions for realising the concept—much-vaunted by Left 
culturalism—of cultural complexity. As Campbell writes, “Citizenship has none 
of the multiple identities implied by the broader vision of the new times theory. 
Here the citizen is only a consumer” (295). Once, flexibility had been the 
foundation upon which the cultural Left built its model of resistance, by focusing 
on the endless flexibility of the subject herself. And, as our discussion of The 
Passion suggested, it was out of this flexible account of subjectivity that the 
celebration of flexible space arose. But in light of the observations provided by 
the spatial turn, this account appeared dangerously close to the right-wing 
logics it was intended to resist, and the celebration of indeterminacy—whether 
spatial or identitarian—no longer seemed to possess emancipatory promise. 
Indeed, now flexibility appeared to have become aligned quite explicitly with 
isolation, atomism—even totalitarianism. 
 
 
2. Culturalism and Nationalism in The Black Album 
 
Any reading of The Black Album cannot but observe that the intersection of 
urban space, culture and politics occupies a far more anxious position in this 
novel than in any of Kureishi’s previous fictions. And, as we have seen, it is its 
account of nationalism that seems to be at the heart of this anxiety—indeed, the 
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novel takes place in a London that is being quite literally blown apart by 
nationalist politics. It is reasonable to assume that in representing a bomb 
exploding on the main concourse of Victoria station a third of the way through 
the book (Kureishi Black Album 101-104), Kureishi has in mind the similar IRA 
attack of February 1991. But there are two important aspects of this episode 
that should be noted, the first and less important of which is its anachronism.52 
More significant is the fact that any agency behind the bombing remains 
pointedly ambiguous: as Shahid travels along the Underground shortly after the 
attack he wonders of the jumpy commuters sharing his carriage, “What did they 
feel? Confusion and anger, because somewhere outside lurked armies of 
resentment. But which faction was it? Which underground group? Which war, 
cause or grievance was being demonstrated?” (103). In this way the oblique 
reference to the IRA attack has the effect of connecting the destruction of 
London’s urban space with nationalist conflict while never defining specifically 
the conflict—or the cause—concerned. As such, we might argue that a 
significant underlying anxiety of the novel is the general tension it perceives as 
arising from the presence of nationalist politics within an urban setting. 
 Of course, these politics are most clearly manifested in the agenda of 
Riaz’s group. Kureishi’s representation of the latter proved highly controversial, 
and has since been the subject of sustained attacks. The most acute of these is 
voiced by Ruvani Ranasinha, who argues that “despite Kureishi’s sympathy for 
his characters’ cultural disorientation, the attempt to demonstrate the draw of 
Islam for young people fails” because “the ‘debate’ is so weighted against the 
Islamists that Shahid’s liberal individualism and decision to leave the ‘paranoid’ 
Islamic group is unequivocally presented as enlightened self-interest” 
(Ranasinha 88, 85). However, the representation of Riaz and his group also has 
some eloquent supporters. In marked contrast to Ranasinha, Bart Moore-Gilbert 
argues that “The Black Album programmatically counters many stereotypes 
about ‘fundamentalism’”: 
 
                                                 
52 Being set over the winter of 1988-89, the events in the novel actually take place two years prior to 
the Victoria bombing. 
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Shahid—at least in the beginning—respects Islam as a faith and 
understands its appeal both in the context of his own existential 
uncertainties and of the hostile attitudes of the host society. Riaz is 
initially a relatively complex character, and is by no means 
unsympathetic, as his avuncular interest in Shahid indicates […] 
Moreover, Kureishi is at pains to avoid suggesting that Riaz is 
simply an aged obscurantist. (Moore-Gilbert 135) 
 
This contention that Riaz and his agenda are represented in a complex and 
sympathetic way is important, because it implies that Ranasinha’s perspective 
fails to appreciate fully how the novel is keenly aware of the political 
possibilities inherent to nationalism. Indeed, I think it is crucial to acknowledge 
that in The Black Album the latter is represented as possessing genuine potential 
for resisting the “hostile attitudes of the host society”, and that it is thus central 
to the book’s concern with the Left. For, despite the fact that Shahid decides to 
align himself with Deedee at the novel’s end—at least, until it “stops being fun” 
(Kureishi Black Album 276)—in many ways she actually functions as a symbol 
for the failure of Left culturalism. Indeed, I think that the novel as a whole can be 
read as a painful meditation of the failure of Left culturalism as an emancipatory 
project. For whereas in his earlier fictions Kureishi appeared relatively certain of 
the potential for a flexible understanding of space and culture to combat the 
new and entirely pernicious kind of cultural nationalism exhibited by 
Thatcherism, in this novel he seems far less certain that flux and mutability are 
in themselves capable of resisting the assimilationist strategies of the Right. 
Indeed, I think that in The Black Album we witness a sophisticated critique of the 
strategies for political resistance that were lionised by Left culturalism—and 
which, once upon a time, Kureishi had enthusiastically embraced.  
 Crucially, this attitude is not expressed straightforwardly in terms of the 
novel’s representation of cultural complexity, but via its account of how the 
latter intersects with urban space. As in much of Kureishi’s earlier work, urban 
youth culture occupies a central position in The Black Album, and the subculture 
it is particularly interested in is the acid house scene that emerged in Britain 
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towards the end of the 1980s. From early on the febrility and ostensible 
subversiveness of this scene speak to Shahid’s thirst for the “real” London,53 for 
it seems a world away from the “mundane poverty” that characterises his initial 
experience of the capital. And it is significant in this respect that Deedee is the 
one who introduces him to it. During an after-class meeting, she and Shahid 
discuss their shared enthusiasm for Prince, and Deedee suggests that he might 
write an essay about the musician’s indeterminacy: he’s “half black and half 
white”, she says, “half man, half woman, half size, feminine but macho too” (25). 
She invites Shahid to her house so they can discuss the essay further, but when 
he arrives it soon becomes apparent that she has other plans, and as he is 
summoned upstairs to help her dress, Shahid finds himself wondering “what she 
and the night promised” (54). In this way, Deedee is immediately established as 
the apogee of libidinal satisfaction. More importantly, however, Kureishi is 
explicit in concatenating her sexual appeal with the possibilities of the city and 
the unpredictable milieu of rave culture, while marking all with a promise of 
dissident possibility. Later, as they travel to a rave, Deedee offers Shahid an 
ecstasy pill and before accepting he looks out of the taxi’s window and thinks, 
“You could drive for two or three hours through this limitless city which had no 
shape, and not come out the other side” (57). London here recalls the 
labyrinthine spaces of Winterson’s Venice, just as Deedee, to the extent that she 
serves as a guide for the disorientated provincial, recalls Villanelle, and together 
                                                 
53 Dance culture had not by this point found a single institutional form, and was not yet dominated by 
the superclubs that would come to typify it a decade later. Instead, event organisers would occupy 
farmland and disused warehouses for the purposes of staging all-night raves that were sometimes 
free and often illegal. Partly because of this spatial transgressiveness—the leafy Home Counties, it 
was felt, were no place for young people to be enjoying themselves—and partly because of the 
prevalence of MDMA at these events, the rave scene soon faced moral panic, police hostility and 
parliamentary action. Most notoriously, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) 
attempted to target electronic dance music by defining it as “sounds wholly or predominantly 
characterised by the emission of a succession of repetitive beats” (Home Office Criminal Justice 63 
1 b). Given this definition, and the definition of a rave as “a gathering of 20 or more persons” 
taking place “on land in the open air” (63 1A a, 63 1), the legislation appeared to criminalise 
military parades similar to the one that marks the Queen’s birthday—a curious decision for a 
Conservative government to take, since Tories are usually keen to celebrate such occasions. 
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she and the city come to be associated with the excessive and subversive 
pleasure of expressive culture. This consonance between London and Venice, 
Deedee and Villanelle, becomes yet more striking when we arrive at the rave; 
when Deedee leads Shahid along the corridors of a dilapidated industrial 
building and they emerge into a fanstastical space full of performative and 
provocative indeterminacy. “Many of the men”, Kureishi writes, “were bare-
chested and wore only thongs”, and “[o]ne woman was naked except for high 
heels and a large plastic penis strapped to her thighs with which she duetted. 
Others were garbed in rubber, or masks, or were dressed as babies” (59). 
 However, while Shahid’s intoxication with this milieu is clear—it is 
implied allegorically through his desire for Deedee—it cannot be said that 
Kureishi is convinced that its emancipatory promise is genuine, and it is 
important that our suspicion of this is aroused primarily through his 
representation of space. As the night wears on, Deedee says she wants to take 
Shahid to “a much better place” farther out of the city. They climb back into a 
taxi and it carries them to “a lush, open area without shops” where “[t]he unlit 
mansions, behind tree-lined high walls and iron gates, sat far back from the 
road”. When they finally draw to a stop, it is at “the sort of place an English 
Gatsby would have chosen” (60-61). However, in these opulent surroundings a 
riotous party is in full swing: inside there are marble floor tiles, a grand 
staircase and a Jacuzzi, but also drug dealers shouting “Up the working class!” 
and doling out pills called “Leg-openers” (61-62). The mansion is “overrun by 
hordes of boys and girls from south London”, and this initially encourages the 
reader to understand the party as a kind of expropriation of suburban space by 
the dispossessed denizens of the inner city. Kureishi writes of the ravers that 
“most had probably never been inside such a house before, unless they were 
delivering the groceries. Now they were having the time of their lives. By the end 
of the weekend the house would be ashes” (62). And this reading only becomes 
more persuasive when combined with the repeated, apparently ironic emphasis 
on whiteness—from the carpets, to the stuffed polar bear, to the pills that 
Shahid buys. Yet there persists throughout this a sense that, actually, this irony is 
an illusion; that, in fact, the party represents nothing like the kind of pluralism 
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that Kureishi finds so compelling in his earlier fiction. In the taxi home Deedee 
apologises for taking Shahid places where there are “only white people” (66), 
and the author seems to imply that this homogeneity somehow alters the way 
his protagonist reads urban space. Arriving back at his inner-city digs, Shahid 
“recognize[s] the street” but finds that “all the doors [look] the same” (64). The 
“inner-European Orientalism” that Manfred Pfister used to describe Venice’s 
complex psychogeographical situation in The Passion—and which I think also 
applies to the way the inner cities were imagined by Left culturalism—appears 
to have been eradicated and replaced by sameness. Thus not only is the rave 
scene itself devoid of the promise of pluralism that Kureishi had previously 
considered inherent to youth subcultures; it somehow serves to occlude or elide 
the very spatiality that had previously served to express this promise. 
What is more, in the context of the acid house subculture, identity itself is 
homogenised, individualised and emptied of the political possibility it possessed 
in the inner city. This is evidenced in Shahid’s experience on ecstasy while lying 
on a floor in an upstairs room with hundreds of other addled party-goers. Right 
at the outset of this episode Kureishi creates a clear link between anonymity, 
pleasure and death: “[K]ids were lying on the floor not moving—except to kiss 
or stroke one another—as if they’d been massacred” (63). And he is clearly 
horrified as his protagonist lies beside them; as Shahid succumbs to an 
annihilation of ego, self, subject, and abandons himself to the mercuriality of the 
ecstasy high: 
 
He was […] liquid, as if the furnace in his stomach was simmering 
his bone and muscle into lava […] Somewhere in his mind there 
lurked desolation: the things he normally liked had been drained 
off and not only could he not locate them, he couldn’t remember 
what they were. He needed to find a pen and list the reasons for 
living. But what on the list could be comparable to the feeling of 
this drug? He had been let into a dangerous secret; once it had 
been revealed, much of life, regarded from this high vantage point, 
could seem quite small. (63)  
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There is throughout this episode an implication that liquidifying the self in the 
putatively collective context of the rave serves to annihilate social distanciation 
in an apolitical rather than a fruitful way; that in rendering all boundaries 
permeable, the high serves to remove the subject from the realm of socialisation 
altogether. Earlier, as he watched the dancing in the warehouse—which is not 
quite ironically named the “White Room” (59)—Shahid “noticed, through the 
golden mist, that no one appeared to have any great interest in anyone else, 
though people would fall into staring at one another” (60). And in this way, 
Kureishi seems to suggest that the ultimate effect of the ecstasy high—and of the 
rave subculture in general—is a kind of social dislocation; that, in many ways, it 
is the nadir of atomistic individualism. The rave might resemble a community of 
difference—it is, to say the least, highly performative—but it has been robbed of 
the profound complexity that was the condition of the cultural model’s 
subversive potential, and so grown soporific and meaningless. In a way, Kureishi 
seems to imply that the rave is what remains of Left culturalism when it has 
been evacuated of its political content: superficial diversity masking sameness. 
And while the party might initially strike us as a hedonistic expropriation of 
suburban space, its provocativeness is undermined by his representation of it as 
a disengagement with the political challenges of the inner city—a kind of 
Rabelaisian white flight—and a way of evacuating identity of its political 
content.  
At the same time, he is quite clear in implying that the difficulties faced 
by oppressed communities are more considerable than ever. 54  Unlike 
Laundrette, The Buddha and (arguably) Sammy and Rosie Get Laid, The Black 
                                                 
54 Riaz’s “rescue” of Shahid  at the end of the rave only serves to lend this implication an existential 
urgency. When the latter arrives home at the end of the night and tries, in an hallucinatory stupor, 
to make an omelette, he nearly gasses himself and has to be tended to by Riaz, who turns off the 
cooker, clears up the vomit and puts Shahid to bed. Without this act, Shahid—having disappeared 
as a subject during his high—would have literally disappeared, too. Thus when he announces to 
Chad the following morning that Riaz “saved my life” (Kureishi Black Album 70-71), the 
implication is clear that, in many ways, dance culture is a culture of death—social, political, even 
literal. 
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Album is also much more preoccupied with representing the vulnerability of 
disenfranchised inner-city communities over the progressive promise the latter 
possess as a whole. And in the absence of any alternative mode of resistance, 
these communities increasingly feel the need to protect themselves by 
possessing a stake in the physicality of the city. One particular episode in the 
novel demonstrates this neatly, and concerns a Muslim family whose home is 
being besieged by violent teenagers: “The husband had been smashed over the 
head with a bottle and taken to hospital. The wife had been punched. Lighted 
matches had been pushed through the letter-box. At all hours the bell had been 
rung and the culprits said they would return to slaughter the children” (90). In 
response to these threats, Riaz arranges for the family to be moved to a Bengali 
estate, but as this will not happen immediately he charges his followers with 
guarding the family’s flat. Shahid is asked to assist and, armed with machetes, 
bats and meat cleavers, the group drives to an estate that could not be more 
different from the kind of inner-city spaces celebrated in the earlier novels and 
screenplays: 
 
A sombre sky, misty pathways and dead grass bound the blocks 
together. Small trees, in wire wrapping, had been snapped in two, 
as if they gave offence. There was graffiti, but only tags, nothing 
more to say, apart from the strange legend in foot-high gold and 
silver letters, “Eat the Pig”. 
The streetlamps shed little light. The shadows of the posse 
rode beside them, like figures on horseback. The silence was 
broken by car alarms. There was the sound of a man running, 
followed by another, and shouts. The group stood and waited as 
one, anticipating attack. They were ready; indeed, they wanted, 
required, confrontation. But the moment passed. Menacing silence 
resumed. (89) 
 
It is surely worthy of note that, where once the inner city was busy and 
boisterous—characterised by an excess of signs, actions, identities—here it is 
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ominously barren. More importantly, in a departure from The Buddha—in which 
racism in its baldest manifestation takes place in the dreary suburbs55—here 
Kureishi emphatically situates racist violence in the inner city. And as far as 
Riaz’s group is concerned, the best means of resisting such violence consists in 
establishing defensible spaces with vigorously—even violently—maintained 
boundaries: as Shahid walks through the estate Kureishi tells us that “[t]his area 
was notorious for racists”; when protecting the flat the group sits “on the floor 
like guerrillas”, and when there is a knock at the door they stand to attention 
while Chad “unbar[s]” the entrance (100, 92-93). This focus on spatial 
fortification is quite opposed to the porous and mercurial spaces that are 
emphasised Kureishi’s other fictions, as well as in The Passion. The clamour of 
competing and complementary voices has been extinguished to be replaced by 
simple tags, simultaneously proprietorial markers defining and fixing space as 
well as plaintive appeals for recognition. Where previously inner-city space 
underwent a perpetual process of reinvention, and was celebrated as formative 
and expressive of its inhabitants’ contingent and capricious identities, now a 
desperate imperative resides in claiming and protecting it. And it is through the 
lens of this spatial imperative, I think, that The Black Album’s anxiety over the 
presence of nationalist politics within an urban context is most fruitfully 
assessed. Because Kureishi fundamentally doubts whether the city is able to 
reconcile all these competing politics: it is being literally torn apart, but the 
agencies behind this process remain unclear, as there are so many of them. In 
short, the question Kureishi seems to be asking is this: with every conceivable 
identity potentially queuing up to stake a claim on urban space, how is it 
supposed to contain them all?  
                                                 
55 In one of The Buddha’s most memorable episodes Karim cycles to see his girlfriend Helen, who lives 
in the south London suburbs, only to be confronted by her objectionable father: “You can’t see my 
daughter again […] She doesn’t go out with [...] wogs […] We don’t want you blackies coming to the 
house […] you little coon” (Kureishi Buddha 40). This lazy and pernicious form of racism is 
explicitly identified with the suburbs over the inner cities when Karim recalls taking a train ride 
with his suburbanite uncle through Brixton. Seeing Karim gazing out of the window at the 
“gardens […] full of rusting junk and sodden overcoats”, Ted says, “That’s where the niggers live. 
Them blacks” (43). 
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At the same time, the novel implies an understanding of why oppressed 
communities are resorting to this strategy. During an early exchange in which 
Shahid asks Riaz where he is from the law student replies, “Lahore. Originally”. 
Shahid says, “That ‘originally’ is quite a big thing”, and Riaz responds, “The 
biggest thing of all” (6). The desire to maintain this “original” identity—and to 
encourage British-born Shahid to “return” to it—is manifested throughout the 
novel in Riaz’s repeated valorisation of cultural authenticity. Of course, the fact 
that all the members of his group seem to originate from south Asia should not 
be ignored; however, what is more important is that they perceive themselves to 
share a common cultural identity in Islam, and it is this that enables Riaz to 
opine, “We’re not blasted Christians […] We don’t turn the other cheek. We will 
fight for our people who are being tortured in Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir!” 
(82). The elision between race and culture that lies at the heart of this statement 
might be read as an expression of Gilroy’s concept of ethnic absolutism, in which 
a racially and culturally homogenised Other is condemned as impinging upon a 
similarly constructed but more “authentic” culture that is perceived to require 
and deserve protection. Of course, Gilroy argues that ethnic absolutism as a 
racist discourse developed rapidly in Britain in the context of black immigration 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s—the arrival of the so-called “Windrush 
generation”. But in Riaz’s articulation the terms are flipped: Christianity is 
constructed as both racially and culturally other, while a stable and essentialised 
Muslim identity is used to string together a group of nationalities (Palestinian, 
Afghan, Kashmiri) that are in fact ethnically and culturally heterogeneous.  
Significantly, rather than simply dismissing this model of culture as an 
unappetising perversion of an already obnoxious discourse, Kureishi seems 
sympathetic to the appeal of an essentialised Islamic identity to the subaltern 
subject confused by a form of cultural racism which dictates that someone may 
be British by citizenship yet irredeemably inauthentic by dint of her cultural 
otherness.56 The “authentic” Islamic identity Riaz offers up to him as an 
                                                 
56 Indeed, this sympathy is structurally central to the novel, in that the search for a more secure sense 
of political identity is what motivates Shahid to engage with Islamic nationalism in the first place: 
early on we learn that before coming to London he suffered from a profound identity crisis. 
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alternative is identical to that at the heart of the “white” racism he has 
previously endured, except that—and because—it inverts the latter’s logic to 
hinge on Shahid’s supposed “origins” in Islamic culture. And in light of this, the 
reader is entitled to wonder why, given that Kureishi’s representation of cultural 
essentialism is so derisively satirical when it is dressed up in Thatcherite garb, 
he is prepared to treat it as an even remotely viable political opportunity when it 
appears in the guise of Islamic nationalism. We have already explored the 
specifically spatial explanation for this: with the apparent exposure of Left 
culturalism’s celebration of indeterminate space as little more than a sop to New 
Right urbanism, oppressed communities might reasonably seek to fortify their 
claim on the city in order to protect themselves from racist violence that is only 
getting worse. But in order to answer this question in specifically cultural terms, 
we might compare the latter with Shahid’s “killing-nigger” fantasies, in which he 
tries to arrogate to himself the politics of the racists at whose hands he suffers,57 
and which thus represent another, similar attempt to appropriate an hegemonic 
discourse. Although he attempts to mimic this racism, Shahid cannot replicate it 
exactly because, despite his apparent desire to deflect it by “fitting in”, he is 
inescapably its object. In the words of Homi Bhabha, he is “almost the same” as 
the whites he mimics, “but not quite”—or rather, “not white” (Bhabha 89, 90, 
emphasis in original). To Bhabha’s mind this almost-but-not logic should be 
capable of providing a provocative disruption of any essentialising discourse, 
since mimicry is, “like camouflage [...] a form of resemblance, that differs from 
[…] presence by displaying it in part, metonymically”; the “threat” of mimicry 
                                                 
57 He confesses to Riaz that he thought of “going around abusing Pakis, niggers, Chinks, Irish, any 
foreign scum. I slagged them under my breath whenever I saw them. I wanted to kick them up the 
arse. The thought of sleeping with Asian girls made me sick […] When they came on to me, I 
couldn’t bear it. I thought, you know, wink at an Asian girl and she’ll want to marry you up. I 
wouldn’t touch brown flesh, except with a branding iron. I hated all foreign bastards [...] I argued... 
why can’t I be a racist like everyone else? Why do I have to miss out on that privilege? […] I have 
wanted to join the British National Party” (Kureishi Black Album 11). Chad, Riaz’s most ferocious 
disciple, tells Shahid that “There’s a bit of Hitler in all white people—they’ve given that to you”, 
and Riaz confirms, “Only those who purify themselves can escape it” (12). The implication is that 
this purification process will aid Shahid in resisting—or rather, escaping from— the confusion he 
feels at being nominally British while remaining essentially (culturally) Other. 
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“comes from the prodigious and strategic production of conflictual, fantastic, 
discriminatory ‘identity effects’ in the play of a power that is elusive because it 
hides no essence, no ‘itself ’” (90). Now, once upon a time Kureishi may have 
understood this almost-but-not logic as possessing great political promise: after 
all, The Buddha begins by emphasising “almostness” and it is out of the 
ambivalence of this term, and the possibility of subterfuge that it implies, that 
the novel constructs its optimistic account of cultural hybridity. However, while 
it is true that confusion is a common feature of the beginnings of both novels, 
whereas in The Buddha Karim’s cultural indeterminacy places him in a painful 
but politically advantageous interstice, in The Black Album this situation is 
represented as far more anxious: confusion has begotten madness, and the 
notion of partial or “metonymic” presence is characterised rather more 
unfavourably as absence. As Shahid confesses: “I began to get terrible feelings in 
my head […] I thought I was going mad […] I had been kicked around and chased 
a lot, you know […] I kept thinking there was something I lacked” (9, 10, emphasis 
added). In this way Kureishi leaves us in little doubt that Shahid’s mimicry of 
white racism is not politically fruitful; it may expose the workings of hegemonic 
discourse, but any disruption it entails is epiphenomenal, and no longer capable 
of resisting racism in and of itself. 
  In marked contrast to this, the appropriation of cultural essentialism by 
Riaz’s group, and its conversion into a foundational Islamist politics, possesses 
significantly more promise because it represents an oppositional strategy 
predicated on the centrality of presence. This strategic value is not Spivakian: 
the reader doubts that Riaz would appreciate the contingency inherent to the 
concept of strategic essentialism, and his beliefs do not exactly strike the reader 
as dialogical, or as interventions in a war of position. Nonetheless, Kureishi 
seems to perceive a certain potential in the dislocation of cultural essentialism 
from the hegemonic rubric with which it had previously been associated—
namely, Britishness—and its recasting as a political strategy aimed at resisting 
that hegemony. In this guise, cultural essentialism can no longer be dismissed as 
an objectionable discourse exercised by those who are already systematically 
empowered by the political, social and economic configuration of the UK and the 
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West more widely; it is, rather, a political tool for resistance that must be 
evaluated alongside, rather than in opposition to, other forms of resistant praxis. 
Certainly, it is entirely different from the cultural politics of disenfranchisement 
that we witness in The Buddha and The Passion; nonetheless, it remains an 
oppositional politics—and, more importantly, a politics of recognition, organised 
around a stable, “authentic” identity and evidencing Charles Taylor’s suggestion 
that “misrecognition”—read disenfranchisement—“can inflict a grievous wound, 
saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred” (Taylor 26). Such self-hatred is 
precisely what Shahid confesses to when he speaks of his “killing-nigger” 
fantasies, and it is precisely what afflicts Riaz’s most ardent disciple, Chad—a 
south-Asian adopted by a racist family who hated his cultural otherness, and 
taught him to hate it too. Islamic nationalism offers an opportunity to reverse 
this bad education; its appeal to both Shahid and Chad revolves around its 
ability to reconnect them in an affirmative way with the “original” identities they 
have been encouraged to despise. And this identity in turn provides them with 
stable foundations on which to demand political recognition, and to resist the 
cultural racism that is endemic in Britain—as well as, lest we forget, a 
fundamental component of Thatcher’s political project. Thus when Chad says, 
“No more Paki. Me a Muslim” (128) he is committing to a strategy of opposition 
that, Kureishi thinks, requires genuine critical inquiry alongside all other 
resistant praxes. This apposition is alluded to explicitly when Shahid places 
Islamism within the context of the explosion of foundational identity politics 
that emerged in the wake of the 1970s: “These days everyone was insisting on 
their identity, coming out as a man, woman, gay, black, Jew—brandishing 
whichever features they could claim, as if without a tag they wouldn’t be human. 
Shahid, too wanted to belong to his people” (92). What is implied here is the 
contiguity of these discourses, not their contrariety. Ultimately, Kureishi 
understands that an essentialised, Islamic conception of “origins” can be 
considered to be as legitimate and fruitful a bedrock for political recognition as 
gay, women’s—even human—rights. 
While none of this entails that the stand-off between the agendas of Riaz 
and Deedee is enacted on a level playing field, it does suggest that Kureishi’s 
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engagement with the former—in particular his understanding of its appeal to 
Shahid—is done in good faith, and cannot be dismissed as straw-man thinking. 
As Kureishi insists in an interview conducted shortly after The Black Album was 
published, “I tried to be fair [...] I felt sympathetic […] I didn’t want to write a 
book that took sides […] I’m interested in all sides of the argument” (qtd. in Jaggi 
par. 7, 17).58 The intellectual integrity that characterises this engagement is 
crucial to acknowledge, because only once we have done this are we able to 
appreciate fully its implications: that with the continued tenability of Left 
culturalism in question, oppressed communities are bound—and entitled—to 
explore other modes of opposition. And given that the focus on indeterminacy 
seemed to have achieved little more than to permit the agents of oppression to 
complete their project of domination, recourse to spatial and ontological 
certainties is understandable. 
 
 
3. Bad Endings 
 
Of course, understanding is not the same as endorsement, and it is because of 
this distinction that Kureishi is forced to contrive a way of dismissing Riaz’s 
nationalist agenda without condemning it. Significantly, he does this not by 
targeting Riaz himself, since the latter is too dignified to be discredited with 
ease; rather, he opts for the simpler strategy of exposing Chad—Riaz’s loyal 
dogsbody—as unthinking, misogynistic and ultimately self-destructive. 
Throughout the novel Chad embodies an uneasy mixture of comedy and pathos, 
but towards the end he becomes increasingly vicious as the “wound” of 
misrecognition inflicted upon him by his parents begins to fester. While Riaz 
lectures a crowd about “the crimes committed by whites against blacks and 
Asians in the name of freedom” (Kureishi Black Album 224) Chad sets fire to a 
copy of The Satanic Verses and Kureishi uses this emotive image to finally turn 
                                                 
58 Of course, there is no guarantee that the novel reflects this desire to be fair—Ranasinha is quite 
right when she argues that “textual complexities cannot be contained within authorial intentions” 
(92)—but while Kureishi’s portrayal of Islamic nationalism may still be flawed, this does not mean 
that it is done in bad faith. 
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Shahid against the Islamist group: “Looking across the crowd at Chad’s 
expression he was glad” that he never subscribed wholly to Riaz’s agenda, 
because, Kureishi exclaims, “he never wanted his [own] face to show such 
ecstatic rigidity! The stupidity of the demonstration appalled him. How narrow 
they were, how unintelligent, how… embarrassing it all was!” (225). When 
Deedee calls the police to break up the meeting Chad is furious and condemns 
her as a “pornographic priestess” who “encourages brothers of colour to take 
drugs” (228). The chauvinism that until this point lurked beneath the surface of 
his invective becomes explicit: a few pages earlier he joked that he would like to 
“dynamite her” (218); now he launches into a misogynistic tirade, spitting that 
“[w]hen she is screwed she is heard half-way across London, like a car-alarm. 
And in the end, she is regularly aborted” (228). When one of the group extends a 
fist and says “I feel like giving her one of these” Chad responds, “Who could 
blame you?” (230). And when Deedee addresses him as Trevor—the name given 
to him by his racist parents—he is incited to deliver on this threat, screaming 
“Don’t use that name on me! That ain’t my true identity!” (266).  
However, while we are told that Deedee “would be easy to hit”—indeed, 
while Chad “raise[s] his hand to strike her”—he quickly backs down, because, as 
Kureishi puts it, he knows “it would be an irrevocable step” (266). While easy to 
skip over, this moment is worth highlighting because it represents the baldest 
expression of Kureishi’s narrative and political dilemma at the end of The Black 
Album. To Chad, “Trevor” carries all the force of the most obnoxious epithet, 
since it perpetuates a similar, wilfully grievous kind of misrecognition. The novel 
is sensitive to this, but Kureishi seems aware that if Chad hits Deedee, he too will 
have taken an irrevocable step, since having one of Riaz’s entourage perpetrate 
male-on-female violence is likely to invite the reader’s opprobrium in a way that 
would place their agenda completely beyond the pale. The misogyny that is 
popularly imputed to Islamic politics would be violently evoked and this would 
simultaneously condemn the latter and render them politically untenable. It 
might be a stretch to suggest that Deedee is the paradigm of empowered 
femininity, since her supposed liberation from the yoke of patriarchy by her 
stuttering, Marxist husband Brownlow simply substitutes one set of social 
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expectations with another, without ever really challenging the subjugated 
position she occupies as a woman. Nonetheless, the novel’s readers would 
almost certainly recognise the implication that (Islamic) religious dogma is 
anathema to (Western) feminism and, after consulting the hierarchy of liberties 
that is today so frequently invoked and so rarely problematised, conclude that a 
woman’s right to bodily integrity exceeds the right of a man to exercise his God-
ordained role as patriarch by some degree. This kind of emotive but bastardised 
feminist discourse is frequently invoked by liberalism to highlight the barbaric 
nature of the Other in a way that perpetuates absolutist attitudes towards non-
liberal cultures and only occasionally serves the interests of feminism more 
widely. It appears that Kureishi knows this, knows that it would be a cynical and 
heavy-handed way of resolving his novel, and so avoids it.  
Instead, he has Chad flee the scene and—probably, since Shahid only 
learns this second-hand—kill himself in a bookshop bombing (273). On one 
level this is a more adroit strategy, since it suggests that Islamic nationalism is 
based on little more than self-destructive ressentiment and enables Kureishi to 
sidestep the task of discrediting it in political terms by diagnosing it as a 
pathology, thus tipping the odds in Deedee’s favour by default rather than by 
design. However, while in some ways more palatable than the scenario outlined 
above, this conclusion remains problematic. Because while Kureishi’s 
affirmation of Left culturalism might be just about plausible in narrative terms, 
the authorial machinations that are required to turn the debate in this 
direction—though they comprise sleights of hand rather than dei ex machina— 
make little sense in terms of the open-ended politics he wants to endorse. Even 
if it opts to represent Riaz’s group as paranoid and self-defeating rather than 
murderously misogynistic, The Black Album still reduces itself to a kind of roman 
à thèse—an “authoritarian” form which, as Susan Suleiman writes, is usually 
“written in the realistic mode” but “signals itself to the reader as primarily 
didactic in intent, seeking to demonstrate the validity of a political, 
philosophical, or religious doctrine” (Suleiman 10, 7). Certainly, Kureishi’s novel 
is artful about signalling itself in this way: it is not a treatise but a text “based on 
an aesthetic of verisimilitude and representation” (7), and so does at least make 
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an attempt to conceal the authorial interventions that enable its “doctrine” to 
emerge. Moreover, it is not “authoritarian” all the way through: Ranasinha’s 
argument that the debate is rigged from the start is, as I have suggested, 
mistaken. However, it remains the case that if the novel begins discursively it 
becomes monological in the process of anointing its preferred agenda, which 
seems strange when we consider that this agenda is supposed to be predicated 
on flux and fluidity. What common ground can the latter conceivably share with 
a form that Michel Beaujour describes as “appeal[ing] to the need for certainty, 
stability and unity” (Beaujour qtd. in Suleiman 10)? In forsaking “the modern 
‘textual’ revolt”, which “attempted to […] render impossible the emergence of an 
unambiguous meaning by the production of ‘plural’ texts” (22), doesn’t this form 
contradict some of the most fundamental tenets of Left culturalism, which 
similarly seeks to resist closure? When, on the last page, Kureishi writes, 
“[Shahid] looked out of the window; the air outside seemed to be clearer”, the 
reader almost hears his sigh of relief (276). He has, apparently, exorcised his 
doubts: the political agenda to which he allied himself—and did much to 
pioneer—in his early career has been vindicated; at the end of the debate his 
protagonist is able to conclude that “[t]here had to be innumerable ways of 
being in the world. He would spread himself out, in his work and in love, 
following his curiosity” (274). And yet precisely because of its certitude this 
conclusion fails to convince, for it contradicts the very body of thought Kureishi 
is trying to recuperate. At the end of the day, Left culturalism does not deal in 
conviction; it revels in doubt and paradox.  
We might say that, if the latter had once functioned as articles of faith for 
Kureishi—and for Left culturalism more broadly—in The Black Album he loses 
faith in them. In an exchange early on in the novel Chad upbraids Shahid for 
pursuing a life of pleasure, declaring that “[w]e are slaves to Allah […] He is the 
only one we must submit to. He put our noses on our face [… not] in our 
stomach” (80). And this exchange is recalled at the very end when Kureishi 
anticipates Shahid’s arrival on the coast, where, he writes, “[t]here was 
somewhere [Deedee] fancied for lunch” (276). Clearly appetite has prevailed 
over spirit, but the reader remains unconvinced by this victory—and, what is 
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more, suspects that Kureishi is unconvinced, too. For while Riaz’s agenda might 
ultimately be debunked as “stupid […] narrow […] unintelligent” (225), Deedee’s 
is no better: now, Kureishi writes, Shahid “didn’t have to think about anything” 
(276). In short, the novel’s conclusion feels not just formally authoritarian but 
also politically platitudinous—even wilfully self-deceiving—because while 
Kureishi manages to dismiss one side of the argument, the reader doubts his 
faith in the other. The Black Album thus represents a peculiar variation on the 
object of Suleiman’s critique: a roman à thèse that does not quite believe its own 
thèse. It is a deeply anxious book, a book that is discomfited by the political 
implications of the debate it stages, and so contrives to endorse Left culturalism 
by emulating a form that shuts out the alternatives. It is thus also, paradoxically, 
quite a conservative novel, because in the last analysis its exaltation of doubt, 
contingency and pluralism rests upon a “need for certainty, stability and unity”. 
And perhaps this is why finishing the novel is such an unsatisfying experience. 
Susie Thomas argues that “Shahid and Deedee speed towards Brighton for a 
breath of fresh air” (Thomas 101), but the reader wonders what exactly this air 
is going to taste like. The happy couple might have a whale of a time on the 
coast, getting high and dressing up in one another’s clothes, but there remains a 
sense that this happy ending is unearned, because Kureishi no longer believes in 
the progressive agenda he is advocating.  
We can extrapolate two specific reasons for this, the first of which 
revolves around the failure of culture to serve as a vehicle for political resistance 
in the novel, and the second around what is left of cultural politics when the 
“cultural” part fails to start. Kureishi is not the only literary figure to be troubled 
by dance culture,59 but it is hardly a surprise that the kind of distaste for the 
                                                 
59 In 2008 Will Self argued on Radio 4 that the second summer of love was little more than a popular 
expression of Thatcherism, furnished with a few pseudo-revolutionary phrases stolen from the 
counterculture of the 1960s (Saturday Live). And Matthew Collin considers the question of politics 
to be so charged that in his (rather nostalgic) history of the late 80s dance scene he attempts to 
deal with charges of apoliticism in the prologue: “The idea that Ecstasy culture had no politics 
because it had no manifesto or slogans,” he writes, that “it wasn’t saying something or actively 
opposing the social order, misunderstands its nature. The very lack of dogma was a comment on 
contemporary society itself, yet at the same time its constantly changing manifestations […] 
served to dramatise the times. Ecstasy culture offered a forum to which people could bring 
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scene that he demonstrates should be articulated by a writer who had, until The 
Black Album, made a point of drawing attention to the resistive content of 
popular youth movements. Because, as Sarah Thornton writes in Club Cultures: 
Music, Media and Subcultural Capital, the rave milieu appeared to sever the link 
between culture and resistance that Left culturalism had, to some degree, 
always insisted upon. In her account, Thornton criticises the tendency of 
cultural studies in its New Left incarnation to replicate the taxonomies of taste it 
sought to question by continuing to treat high culture as “vertically ordered”, 
while conceiving of popular culture as “horizontally organized”. Because of this, 
she alleges, popular culture was constructed in accounts by thinkers such as 
Raymond Williams as a “curiously flat” phenomenon. She also alleges that, in 
explicitly linking the organisation of working-class subcultures to strategies of 
class resistance, the early protagonists of Left culturalism’s second iteration, 
such as Dick Hebdige, simply repeated this tendency, treating subcultures 
synchronically as discrete and unevolving entities and failing properly to 
historicise the resistant potential they perceived in them. “For all their concern 
for rebellion and resistance,” she argues, “this tradition gave little consideration 
                                                                                                                                          
narratives about class, race, sex, economics or morality. Again, its definition was subject to 
individual interpretation: it could be about the simple bliss of dancing; it could be about 
environmental awareness; it could be about race relations and class conflict; it could be about the 
social repercussions of the drug economy; it could be about changing gender relations; it could be 
about reasserting lost notions of community—all stories that say something about life in the 
nineties” (Collin 5-6, emphasis in original). The defence here seems to be organised around a 
conception of the culture as a kind of endlessly malleable backdrop against which the salient 
political issues of the period could be dramatised; indeed, Collin goes so far as to attempt to 
politicise the very absence of a political agenda. But he cannot escape the charge that the milieu 
merely animated the core values of Thatcherism, with only the most superficial façade of 
countercultural magniloquence. Collins does acknowledge that the acid house subculture—at 
least in the south-east of England—was overwhelmingly white and middle-class, and shot through 
by middle-class values. And it is only to this very limited extent can rave culture be said to have 
truly mirrored the Sixties’ counterculture. For as Hall writes with John Clarke, Tony Jefferson and 
Brian Roberts in the seminal cultural studies text Resistance Through Rituals: “Middle-class youth 
tend to construct the enclaves within the interstices of the dominant culture”; because of this, 
“[e]ven when the middle-class counter-cultures are explicitly anti-political, their objective 
tendency is treated as, potentially, political” (Clarke et. al. 60, 61). 
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to social change” (9). Her book, by contrast, is “not about dominant ideologies 
and subversive subcultures, but about subcultural ideologies”. She describes the 
latter as the “means by which youth imagine their own and other social groups, 
assert their distinctive character and affirm that they are not anonymous 
members of an undifferentiated mass” (9-10). And she coins the term 
“subcultural capital”—which she argues to operate in a similar fashion to Pierre 
Bourdieu’s concept of “cultural capital”—in order to facilitate her analysis: “Just 
as cultural capital is personified in ‘good’ manners and urbane conversation,” 
she writes, “so subcultural capital is embodied in the form of being ‘in the know’, 
using (but not over-using) current slang and looking as if you were born to 
perform the latest dance styles” (11-12). Thus rather than eliding the 
distinctions between different subcultures by focusing on their general resistant 
potential, Thornton attempts to account for the role of taste within and between 
them.  
Of course, we might consider this analysis to reflect rather than explain 
rave culture’s apoliticism. However, there is a more important point to note here, 
one that concerns the continuing tenability of the subcultural model of political 
resistance celebrated in so many Left culturalist texts, from Hebdige through 
Hall to Gilroy. In the afterword to her account, Thornton suggests that the 
experience of the 1980s, in which the Right was far more politically radical than 
the Left, gave rave culture a political inflection quite different from the youth 
subcultures that preceded it: “Unlike [Jack] Young’s hippies and Hebdige’s 
punks, then, the youth of my research were, to cite the cliché, ‘Thatcher’s 
children’. Well versed in the virtues of competition, their cultural heroes came in 
the form of radical young entrepreneurs, starting up clubs and record labels, 
rather than the politicians and poets of yesteryear” (165-166). In other words, 
Thatcherism fundamentally altered the political logic of youth subcultures, 
which is why the rave milieu frustrates any attempt to locate a left-wing 
resistant praxis within it. This does not necessarily entail that all subcultures—
including dance subcultures—are now apolitical, or even “Thatcherite”; it 
simply means that they can no longer be presumed to be sites of resistance. 
What is more, in some ways this fact enables analyses that were previously 
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occluded or foreclosed, as Thornton argues: 
 
Rather than de-politicising popular cultures, a shift away from the 
search for “resistance” actually gives fuller representation to the 
complex and rarely straightforward politics of contemporary 
culture. The distinctions examined through multiple methods in 
this book demonstrate the rich creativities and originalities of 
youth culture as well as their entanglement in micro-politics of 
domination and subordination. (168) 
 
The argument here is that subcultural politics are—and perhaps always have 
been—too complex to be unconditionally celebrated for their resistant potential. 
There must now be a reconsideration of the relationship between politics and 
culture, for any left-wing praxis that has constructed itself around the latter is 
liable to find that in the wake of Thatcherism it is significantly less capable of 
effecting meaningful social change than it had been previously. And this, I want 
to suggest, is what lies at the heart of Kureishi’s ambivalent representation of 
dance culture in The Black Album: it is not simply that he is uncomfortable with 
its apoliticism; more importantly, he doubts that it—or any other subculture—
can serve as an effective vehicle for left-wing praxis after Thatcher’s revolution. 
 With culture out of the equation, it presumably falls to politics to 
shoulder the burden of emancipatory endeavour. But this, too, is closed off as a 
possibility, because of the collapse of culture and politics that was effected as 
part of Left culturalism’s experiment with freedom. Partly due to its intellectual 
origins in the Gramscian theory of hegemony, Left culturalism has always been 
predisposed towards an agonistic model of the political which rejects any sense 
of politics-as-procedure in favour of politics-as-confrontation. From the 
agonistic perspective, politics is conceived not as a dialogue but as a contest of 
competing wills, each seeking to advance its own hegemonic project. As Chantal 
Mouffe has suggested, this is why the agonistic approach “can properly be called 
‘radical’. To be sure, it is not the revolutionary politics of the jacobin type, but 
neither is it the liberal one of competing interests within a neutral terrain or the 
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discursive formation of a democratic consensus” (Mouffe Political 52). Over the 
last thirty years the Right has succeeded in instituting a hegemony that has had 
the obfuscatory effects of naturalising social relations and turning history into a 
(neo)liberal teleology. However, this period has also witnessed the steady 
enervation of politics, defined confrontationally, as a consequence of what 
Bonnie Honig describes as its “displacement” into other, less agonistic 
discourses, such as law and administration.60 For Honig this process represents 
a serious threat, as it has the potential to “disempower and perhaps even 
undermine democratic institutions and citizens” (Honig Displacement 14). But 
the discourses into which politics has been displaced have not been solely 
bureaucratic, and such displacements have not been performed exclusively by 
the Right. In a crucial way, Left culturalism can be accused of unwittingly 
encouraging this process, and thus of having a similarly enervating impact on 
the political, conceived as a clash of competing wills. In endorsing a radically 
emancipatory strategy that rejected any formal claim on freedom, it overlooked 
the central importance of recognition within a delimited space of contestation to 
the agonistic understanding of politics. Fundamental to the model of the 
                                                 
60 The clearest example of a neoliberal teleology is Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book The End of History 
and the Last Man, which argues that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Hegelian “end of 
history” has been realised—happily—in the global domination of liberal democracy. 
Neoconservatives such as Fukuyama have certainly had something to do with the process of 
displacement Honig describes, and to this extent the Right has continued to do what leftists 
consistently accuse it of: it has obfuscated the contingent historical and social processes that mark 
its actualisation by providing the illusion of immanence. However, as Honig also points out, the 
process has been aided in no small part by political theorists of numerous political persuasions, 
from communitarians like Michael Sandel to liberals like Jürgen Habermas. Indeed, she writes, 
“[m]ost political theorists are hostile to the disruption of politics. Those writing from diverse 
positions—republican, liberal, and communitarian—converge in their assumption that success 
lies in the elimination from a regime of dissonance, resistance, conflict, or struggle. They confine 
politics (conceptually and territorially) to the juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of 
stabilizing moral and political subjects, building consensus, maintaining agreements, or 
consolidating communities and identities. They assume that the task of political theory is to 
resolve institutional questions, to get politics right, over and done with, to free modern subjects 
and their sets of arrangements of political conflict and instability” (Honig Displacement 2). 
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political mobilised by Mouffe, Honig and Arendt61 is an acknowledgement that, 
in order for a contest to be a contest and not a war, competing hegemonic 
projects must approach one another as adversaries rather than enemies. The 
difference between the two is crucial, for where it behoves adversaries to 
recognise one another as competitors who bear a legitimate claim on the field of 
contest, enemies function in an essentially apolitical way, since they need not 
recognise one another’s claim at all. As Mouffe puts it, in the agonistic model 
“[a]dversaries do fight—even fiercely—but according to a shared set of rules, 
and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, are accepted as 
legitimate perspectives” (Political 52). And this is why, despite Hall’s celebration 
of democratic politics as “an absolutely, bloody-unending row” (“New and Old” 
65), 62 Left culturalism foreclosed the possibility of this agonism ever coming to 
fruition. In embracing disenfranchisement, it guaranteed its own illegitimacy by 
figuratively placing itself beyond recognition, outside the space of political 
contestation. And in performing another kind of displacement—of politics into 
culture—it did little to oppose the process of redefining politics as a site of 
procedure that was a key hegemonic strategy of the New Right.63 
                                                 
61 It should be acknowledged that Mouffe and Honig disagree to the extent to which Arendt’s concept 
of political space can be described as agonistic: Mouffe argues that Arendt’s thought “envisage[s] 
the political as a space of freedom and public deliberation” rather than one of “power, conflict and 
antagonism” (Mouffe Political 9); however, Honig suggests that attempts to place Arendt’s thought 
in the deliberative camp “overlook the importance of [her] debt to elements of the Nietzschean 
project, in particular, her treatment of action as an intrinsic rather than instrumental good, her 
identification of action with a virtuosity that is individuating but not subject-centered, her 
antifoundationalism, and, most important, her commitment to the agonistic dimension of political 
action” (Honig Displacement 233). 
62 Intriguingly, this characterisation is articulated during a discussion of the Greater London Council, 
an institution that epitomises the kind of formal politics Left culturalism eschewed. Hall suggests 
that we think of democracy “[w]e think of a nice, polite, consensual discussion; everybody 
agreeing”. The GLC was, by contrast, “what democracy is really like […] People hammering the 
table, insisting, ‘Do not ask me to line up behind your banner, because that just means forgetting 
who I am’. That row, that sound of people actually negotiating their differences in the open, behind 
the collective program, is the sound I am waiting for.” (Hall, “Old and New” 65) 
63 As will have become clear during the footnoted discussion throughout this chapter, it is not as if the 
assault on politics went unnoticed by key Left culturalists. Hall and Jacques, for instance, identify 
it as one of the more important consequences of the “transition from ‘Fordism’, which defined the 
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* * * 
 
Perhaps this is why virtually every one of Kureishi’s fictions after The Black 
Album is characterised by political anaemia. Certainly, the vast majority of these 
are still set in the city, and this is in keeping with British fiction of the period 
more broadly: for, despite the apparent evacuation of political potential from 
urban space, London continues to be an important focus for many contemporary 
writers.64 At the same time, the capital—especially its central districts—has 
served increasingly as the location for narratives of disenchantment which 
                                                                                                                                          
experience of modernity in the first two-thirds of the 20th century, to ‘post-Fordism’” (Hall and 
Jacques New Times 12). The problem was that the Right—at least in the British context—
appeared to respond to the circumstances of post-Fordism with far more radicalism than the Left: 
in the introduction to The Hard Road to Renewal Hall concedes that he has “spent more time […] 
trying to set out the essential starting points for my analysis of Thatcherism than I have to the 
crisis of the left: but this is because, analytically, the two cannot be separated […] Thatcherism [is] 
not simply a worthy opponent of the left, but in some deeper way its nemesis, the force that is 
capable in this historical moment of unhinging it from below” (Hall Hard Road 11). And a central 
component of this response was a vigorous assault, sometimes incidental, sometimes strategic, on 
democratic politics: as Hall acknowledges elsewhere, “At root, the New Right is concerned with 
how to advance the cause of ‘liberalism’ against ‘democracy’” (Hall and Held "Citizens and 
Citizenship" 179). 
64 This may have something to do with the fact that London still represents the postcolonial city par 
excellence, the place British writers must go if they wish to observe multiculturalism at work and 
thematise its successes, tensions, and failures. The examples hardly need enumerating; suffice it 
to suggest that the celebrated account of cultural hybridity in White Teeth probably would not 
have attracted so much attention if Smith had located her narrative in Tewkesbury rather than 
north London. The point here is not wholly facetious: we see from it that London continues to 
function in the vexed way it did in Kureishi’s early work, on the one hand as a “world city” 
possessed of its own dynamic culture, distinct from the dreary nation-state it serves as capital, 
and yet on the other as a synecdoche for that very same nation, to whose reductive and 
hypostatised ontologies it is supposed to offer an alternative. And perhaps this is why Zahid 
Hussain’s 2006 debut Curry Mile, set on a stretch of Wilmslow Road in Manchester known for its 
high concentration of south-Asian shops and restaurants, attracted so little attention compared to, 
say, Brick Lane. The implication seems to be that Nanzeen, the latter’s Bangladeshi protagonist, 
would far less likely have discovered the delights of multiculturalism had she immigrated to Ali’s 
home of Bolton, rather than the eponymous London street. 
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before the 1990s were more likely to have been situated in the faceless suburbs 
or, during the mid-century, in the exhausted industrial cities of the North. 
Kureishi is probably the best example of this tendency, and I think this has much 
to do with the way The Black Album changed his attitude towards the urban 
experience. Because, after 1995, he conspicuously shifts his focus towards 
disaffected city-dwellers whose political enthusiasm during the 1970s and 80s 
has led them at the turn of the century to an ideological impasse. Although it has 
attracted far less critical attention than his earlier material, the work of this 
period is at least as interesting in that it implicitly links the kind of contempt for 
crass materialism and vacuous spirituality many critics have celebrated in the 
work of French writer Michel Houellebecq to the contemporary urban 
experience in a way that the latter seems, sometimes bafflingly, to neglect. This 
approach is present in many of the short stories collected in Love in a Blue Time 
(1997) and Midnight All Day (1999), as well as in the novellas Intimacy (1998) 
and The Body (2003). The urbane characters who populate these narratives are 
often deeply unhappy, embarking on loveless affairs in order to escape their 
stultifying domestic lives and declining careers. More importantly, London is no 
longer the dynamic place of Kureishi’s early fiction.65 Despite its repopulation 
and physical renewal, it is nearly always represented as profoundly alienating. 
The music no longer rouses, the drugs anaesthetise rather than energise, and life 
in the Big Smoke appears to have settled down to a peculiarly tawdry, 
individualistic conformism. Indeed, we might say that in these fictions the petty 
suburban frustrations of The Buddha of Suburbia are no longer restricted to the 
outskirts of the city: they have insinuated themselves into the heart of London 
and poisoned the urban experience which had previously seemed so promising. 
The Black Album, as we have seen, represents the beginning of this process—it is 
the pin that bursts the bubble. But if that makes Kureishi’s novel pessimistic, it is 
nothing beside the fiction we turn to now. 
  
                                                 
65 2001’s Gabriel’s Gift can be read as a warm-hearted attempt to reclaim the vivacity of The Buddha of 
Suburbia, but while in the former London remains a site of significant artistic possibility, it lacks 
the political dynamism of latter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
POLITICS IS OVER: 
Culture and Co-optation in J.G. Ballard’s Terminal Zones 
 
 
 
 
If the first two chapters of this investigation sought to demonstrate how the 
cultural politics of disenfranchisement were thematised by one of the UK’s most 
celebrated contemporary novelists, and to expose their role in leading another 
towards ideological impasse, the following two will demonstrate that this 
political logic has continued to be engaged with in recent British fiction in 
relation to two distinct but connected issues. One of these is the tenability of 
urban culture as a site of progressive activity, a subject that will occupy our 
attention in the next chapter. Through a reading of two of the most critically 
discussed British novels of recent years, we will be investigating whether a 
progressive alignment of culture and the city is today conceivable in the way 
that it was for Hall and Gilroy, and Winterson and Kureishi. Before that, however, 
we are going to pursue the implications of the Left’s displacement of politics 
into culture at a time—the mid-to-late 1990s—when a general waning of the 
oppositional sensibility in Britain coincided with the gradual disappearance of 
agonistic public spaces and their replacement with the affectless surfaces of 
business parks and residential exclaves. And in order to do this we will be 
focusing on the work of Britain’s most famous investigator of alienating urban 
landscapes: J.G. Ballard.  
The so-called “sage of Shepperton” is conspicuous among the authors 
appraised here in that he is the only one who is no longer alive. Already in his 
mid-fifties when the first of Granta’s lists of the best young British novelists 
appeared in 1983, Ballard had been a published writer for at least three 
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decades, and his bibliography already included nine novels and fifteen 
collections of short stories. Two works in particular had bought him the kind of 
cult following only notoriety can afford. The first of these was The Atrocity 
Exhibition (1969), a series of “condensed novels” that explored the sixties’ 
mediascape; its televised violence and fixation with celebrity. The second was 
Crash (1973), a pornographic meditation on the centrality of the death drive to 
late-twentieth-century psycho-social experience, as expressed in the erotic 
possibilities of the car crash. But despite a cult status that begat huge 
international readership, he remained throughout his life something of an 
outsider to the literary establishment, and has been the subject of surprisingly 
few substantive appraisals. Nonetheless, Ballard is highly pertinent to this 
investigation, because while his early writing antedates the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement by at least two decades, it identifies—and celebrates—
something very close to them. And perhaps this is why his later work reflects on 
them with the wit of a man who is not sufficiently cynical to delight in the 
failures of the young, but old enough to understand why they failed. 
 
 
1. Aesthetics and Politics in the New Wave 
 
When Ballard started publishing in the late 1950s, his work was generally 
treated as genre fiction and deemed unworthy of critique by the literary 
establishment. This ensured that he was not fully engaged with until at least 
1979, when his preoccupation with the nascent media culture of postmodernity 
was becoming de rigeur. However, from his first forays into the novel form it is 
clear that Ballard self-consciously sought to formulate a style that frustrated 
expectations from both sides of the divide between cultural legitimacy and 
inadmissibility. Indeed, an important legacy of his role in the New Wave of 
British SF, which centred on Michael Moorcock’s editorship of New Worlds 
between 1964 and 1971, was an eagerness to reject many of the conventions of 
both literary realism and popular generic style, and to synthesise others. His 
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first considered offering is a case in point. The Drowned World (1962)66 is set on 
an Earth that is undergoing a massive ecological shift which has rendered 
everywhere but the planet’s poles uninhabitable. Global temperatures are rising 
along with sea levels, mammalian fertility is declining and the novel is heavy 
with the implication that humanity is in the process of becoming extinct: 
“[M]ankind was systematically pruning itself, apparently moving backwards in 
time, and a point might ultimately be reached where a second Adam and Eve 
found themselves alone in a new Eden” (Ballard Drowned 23). This excerpt aptly 
summarises the novel’s thesis that, contrary to bourgeois assumptions 
regarding humanity’s (or at least Western humanity’s) inevitable progress, given 
the appropriate circumstances we could become complicit in our own 
degeneration and death. Its protagonist, Kerans, is a government scientist and 
one of a platoon led by Colonel Riggs conducting an ecological survey around an 
abandoned city that turns out to be London. As the heat and humidity rise, the 
team is forced to retreat to its base in Greenland but Kerans insists on staying 
behind along with Bodkin, a military doctor, and his onetime lover Beatrice Dahl. 
The three are left alone at opposites ends of a tropical lagoon, unwilling to 
engage even with each other, and wait for their impending psychic devolution to 
open up a new mode of consciousness. Before long a treasure hunter named 
Strangman turns up with an entourage of subordinates who set about looting 
the city. Kerans is bemused by Strangman’s search for material goods that no 
longer bear any value, and the latter struggles to comprehend the scientist’s 
search for a new identity in his primordial past. Their relationship becomes 
increasingly suspicious, and when Strangman drains the lagoon in a bid to to 
expose the city’s streets and “rediscover” civilization they are brought into open 
conflict. Bodkin is shot dead and Beatrice is kidnapped; Kerans rescues her 
before being cornered by the treasure hunters, who are finally fought off by the 
returning platoon. Beatrice leaves with Riggs but Kerans rejects the offer of 
passage northwards, and the novel ends with him striking out south, alone, to an 
                                                 
66 Since this investigation concentrates on novels I will not be commenting on Ballard’s short stories, 
which are popularly perceived to represent some of his best work. By contrast, the first novel he 
published—1961’s The Wind From Nowhere—was written in two weeks and aimed solely at 
establishing a readership. It was later disowned by its creator. 
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inevitable death, “a second Adam searching for the forgotten paradises of the 
reborn sun” (175). 
 Most of Ballard’s appraisers view his career in terms of polyptychs of 
three or four novels that obsessively revisit similar landscapes in which near-
identical social and psychic avatars respond to similar circumstances in only 
slightly differing ways. This strategy is present from The Drowned World—
whose theme of ecological disaster and devolution is continued in The Drought 
(1965) and The Crystal World (1966)67—and it demands that any reader of 
Ballard’s fiction must treat the novels less as discrete narratives and more as 
one stage in a process of hermeneutic distillation. All of these novels offer a 
challenge to hierarchical orders of cultural legitimacy in that their characters 
possesses none of the complexity we customarily expect of realist novels.68 For 
instance, in The Drowned World, Strangman’s function as an avatar for 
imperialism is implied simply by emphasising his whiteness: the “man with the 
white smile” dressed in a “crisp white suit” (Drowned 90); similarly his second-
in-command is represented as “a bare-chested Negro in white slacks and a white 
peaked cap” (89). This representational strategy can strike the reader as lazy, 
even objectionable, as it relies on an instrumentalised approach to character 
which appears more mythic than novelistic—indeed, which the novel as a form 
is usually expected to challenge. Ballard’s readers are never asked to identify 
with complex characters who are subject to comprehensible motivations and 
react in predictable ways to commonplace occurrences that take place in 
recognisable settings. Instead they are offered a detached, almost forensic 
analysis of perversely reductive types, or symbols, or—most appropriately of 
all—specimens, who respond in barely fathomable ways to extraordinary events. 
At the same time, even as he relies on certain SF topoi—such as the embattled 
                                                 
67  After which Ballard’s obsession shifts towards the psycho-sexual barbarism of modern 
architectural and social technologies, which provides the subject matter for Crash, Concrete Island 
(1974) and High-Rise (1975). 
68 This is not to say that they do not address issues of subjectivity and consciousness; rather, they 
approach these issues in terms that are, as W. Warren Wagar suggests, “fundamentally 
topographic”, via “explorations of landscape, both external and internal” rather than character in 
the sense usually encountered in the realist novel (Wagar 53). 
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community subsisting in a post-apocalyptic mise-en-scène—Ballard deploys 
expository devices that had not been typical in SF genre writing up until that 
time, such as a self-consciously dense prose style and a heavy use of allusion, 
both literary and scientific. Upon publication the novel was compared to Heart 
of Darkness (1902), an analogy that has stuck: as Patrick McCarthy writes, “[T]he 
resemblances between Conrad’s story of atavistic regression in the Congo and 
Ballard’s vision of a world reverting to a prehistoric ecology are so striking as to 
suggest at least an indirect connection between these narratives” (McCarthy 
302). Indeed the connection goes beyond their superficially similar settings. The 
prevalence of symbols, the reliance on environment as a means of manipulating 
mood and meaning, the emphasis on topographies of mind and landscape (as 
well as an erosion of the boundary between the two)—all of these Conradian 
strategies are present in The Drowned World, and imply a bid to escape 
conventional realist modes of representation as well as an attempt to reach 
beyond the confines of generic SF.69 
 There is a substantial body of criticism dealing with SF’s cultural 
legitimacy, and much of this hinges on its relationship with postmodernism. 
Roger Luckhurst’s contributions to this debate are particularly useful, as he is 
keen to single out Ballard as a figure who frustrates “literary/institutional 
determinations of [...] acceptable taste” (Luckhurst “Border Policing” 358). For 
instance, Luckhurst dismisses in quite cutting terms the suggestion by Brian 
McHale that SF should be seen as postmodernism’s “noncanonised or ‘low art’ 
double” (qtd. 361), an essentially pulp genre that mirrored but in no way 
facilitated the shift in “legitimate” culture away from a modernist preoccupation 
with epistemology towards postmodernism’s ontological concerns.70 But while 
                                                 
69 In a 1975 interview Ballard claims not to have read Heart of Darkness before writing The Drowned 
World (McCarthy 302), but while the Conradian influence must be kept in perspective, McCarthy 
identifies other references to Dante, Shakespeare, Defoe, Keats, Eliot, Joyce and even Kierkegaard. 
Far from being putative influences, he claims that many of these figures are baldly invoked and 
evidence Ballard’s highfalutin aspirations. 
70 Luckhurst parries: “This reaffirmation of the low status of SF is nevertheless disturbed by one 
name: J.G. Ballard. Ballard is seen [by McHale himself] to lead SF out of the ‘subliterary’ and into 
the mainstream. The Atrocity Exhibition, with its ‘ontological’ concerns, is a ‘postmodernist text 
based on science fiction topoi’. This is something of a quantum leap, for McHale characterizes 
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he resists the argument that SF and postmodernism developed similar interests 
in complete isolation from one another, he does not appear to disagree that they 
share an interest in the ontological. And in light of Ballard’s reductive approach 
to characterisation this raises some challenging questions regarding the latter’s 
politics—specifically his identity politics.71 Put bluntly, we might ask whether 
the representation of Strangman and his entourage satirises the West’s (then 
ongoing) colonial enterprises with sufficient trenchancy; whether Beatrice 
Dahl’s portrayal early on as the object of Kerans’s libido and latterly as a damsel-
in-distress is not just a little problematic. These questions are answered in part 
                                                                                                                                          
Ballard’s early work as definitively SF, although with some mainstream pretensions; The Atrocity 
Exhibition has become a mainstream text with SF residua. Given that McHale absolutely insists on 
SF and postmodernism’s ‘parallel development, not mutual influence’, Ballard’s sudden leap is 
nothing short of extraordinary” (Luckhurst “Border Policing” 362). What is most relevant here is 
not the critique of McHale’s antiquated attitudes where canon-formation are concerned, or his 
insistence that SF developed alongside postmodernism but never directly affected it. Rather it is 
the suggestion that Ballard’s presence in the post-war literary landscape cannot be fully 
appreciated if we force his work to cohere with vertically ordered conceptions of generic 
legitimacy. This applies to all of his work, including the two novels in which Ballard most 
conspicuously adopts a realistic mode: Empire of the Sun (1984) and The Kindness of Women 
(1991).  
71 The question of politics in postmodern SF has been visited many times, and one of the genres that 
has received a great deal of attention is cyberpunk. Despite the genre’s ostensible focus on 
outcasts and resistance, Nicola Nixon still feels the need to ask the question, “[I]s cyberpunk 
realizing a coherent political agenda? Is it indeed, ‘preparing the ground for a revolution?’” (Nicola 
Nixon 221). Her answer is less than enthusiastic: “In Gibson’s fiction [and the “Sprawl” trilogy in 
particular] there is […] absolutely no critique of corporate power, no possibility that it will be 
shaken or assaulted by heroes who are entirely part of the system and who profit by their mastery 
within it, regardless of their ostensible marginalization and their posturings about constituting 
some kind of counterculture [...T]he idea that computer cowboys could ever represent a form of 
counterculture is almost laughable; for computers are so intrinsically a part of the corporate 
system that no one working within them, especially not the hired guns of Gibson’s novels, who are 
bought and sold by corporations and act as the very tools of corporate competition, could 
successfully pose as part of a counterculture, even if they were sporting mohawks and 
mirrorshades” (230-231). This appraisal could be accused of missing the point somewhat, as one 
of the most challenging political questions to emerge out of the 1980s was whether resistance is 
still possible in increasingly totalised social systems. In situating their heroes in compromised 
positions relative to the corporate power they wish to resist, Gibson’s novels could be argued to 
articulate this question in a productive way. 
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by Ballard’s repeated suggestion that seeing the assumptions of his parents’ 
expatriate community in Shanghai shattered with the onset of World War II—
during which he was imprisoned in the Lunghua Civil Assembly Centre—
equipped him with an unshakable belief that reality was entirely mutable. To an 
extent, this short-circuits any critique that focuses on his reductive approach to 
characterisation, because any such accusation is forced to admit of the existence 
of essentialism even if it seeks to condemn it, where Ballard’s fiction rejects the 
possibility of a stable reality altogether. This places him at odds with the likes of 
Winterson and Kureishi, whose fiction—even as it explores the interstices of 
reductive binaries and unconditionally celebrates cultural indeterminacy—can 
still be argued to rely on a binary politics that opposes contingency to 
essentialism and subjugates the latter to the former. By contrast, in Ballard’s 
work there is nothing beyond the contingent; it is simply presumed, without 
having any moral or political value attached to it. 
 However, even if this explanation softens the charges above it still 
renders his fiction profoundly ambivalent, and goes some way in explaining why 
he is sometimes perceived to resist progressive appraisal. As W. Warren Wagar 
writes: 
 
Critics on the left are not happy with messiahs such as Ballard. 
While applauding his satirical jabs at modern bourgeois existence, 
they cannot take satisfaction in his evident lack of sympathy for, or 
interest in, working people. His failure to develop a political line, 
to speculate about social and economic structures, to see the 
possibility of anything but inward, psychic transformations, leaves 
them understandably cold. (Wagar 65) 
 
If nothing else, Ballard’s admiration for Thatcher—frequently articulated in the 
most unpalatable of terms—is enough to make anybody approaching his work 
from a leftist perspective shudder.72 And one such appraiser, Peter Fitting, barely 
                                                 
72 In interview Ballard once announced, “I’m in love with Margaret Thatcher—I want her to be my 
mistress!” (qtd. in Wager 63). Elsewhere he states, “In England I support Margaret Thatcher 
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stops short of condemnation. Situating developments in SF within the socio-
political history of the mid-century, Fitting suggests that the various 
emancipatory movements of the 1960s provided the New Wave with a powerful 
impetus that manifested itself in two distinct ways. The first revolved around 
“the belief that the present sorry state of affairs [was] due exclusively to the 
bankruptcy of the established moral and ethical values of our society, a 
bankruptcy which [could] only be resolved on the individual and spiritual level”. 
The second “took the form of […] a new aesthetics—the search for new literary 
forms and techniques adequate to dealing with what was perceived as the 
changed reality of the 1960s” (Fitting 66). Fitting chooses J.G. Ballard as 
representative of this second inclination and argues that the strategies deployed 
in his fiction, such as those outlined above, evidence a dangerous tendency to 
aestheticise the challenges of the 1960s in a way that was politically fruitless. He 
focuses on The Crystal World (1966), which is set in a former French-African 
colony where the jungle is undergoing a process of crystallisation that effectively 
freezes time. The novel’s narrative arc is nearly identical to that of The Drowned 
World: a scientist visits a site of ecological catastrophe only to become 
fascinated by and ultimately complicit in his own psychic devolution and death. 
And, witnessing once again what he perceives to be Ballard’s implication that 
“human problems will be solved not through resistance, but through an 
acceptance of the aesthetic and reconciliatory dimensions of the cataclysm”, 
Fitting objects that “both the hero’s emotional problems and the larger racial 
tensions of the African continent are understood finally as aesthetic problems—
as ‘problems of lighting’” rather than problems of human society, polity and so 
forth. As such, he argues, “the ‘speculative’ nature of much of [Ballard’s] writing 
lies not in the exploration of new social and human possibilities, but in the 
discovery and uses of various modernistic literary techniques” (67). 
                                                                                                                                          
immensely... for sexual reasons. I admire her for mythological and sexual reasons. When I say this, 
people are totally fazed—they can’t understand what I’m talking about”. With scant regard for the 
facts, he goes on: “[H]er economic liberalism has led to the regeneration of British industry—
there’s no doubt about that […] The economic ‘Thatcher miracle’ has brought terrific economic 
prosperity, simply because all the bureaucratic restraints have been lifted” (Ballard to Vale and 
Reuther 308, emphases in original). 
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 Such a reading lends resonance to the parallels that have been drawn 
between Ballard and Conrad; however, while the tendency of some modernist 
figures to aestheticise political problems has been the source of critical anxiety, 
the rigid distinction Fitting locates between aesthetics and politics within the 
New Wave has not gone unchallenged. For instance, Wagar considers Fitting’s 
use of Fredric Jameson in order to explore the utopian impulse in post-war SF to 
be particularly problematic. Jameson argues that attitudes towards utopianism 
have “undergone a dialectical reversal”: where Engels once denounced the 
utopian impulse as “a diversion of revolutionary energy into ideal wish-
fulfillments and imaginary satisfactions”, in a time characterised by capitalist 
hegemony “the Utopian concept […] embodies the newest version of a 
hermeneutics of freedom”; “practical thinking”, by contrast, now “represents a 
capitulation to the system itself” (Jameson qtd. in Fitting 59).73 To the extent 
                                                 
73 It should be acknowledged that Jameson’s comments on the relationship between SF and utopia are 
a little more complex than this. To Jameson it is no coincidence that the growth of SF coincided 
with the precise moment when the historical novel “ceased to be functional” as a form that 
provided cultural ballast for the concept of progress, which was a sine qua non of the development 
of capitalism during the nineteenth century (Jameson “Utopia” 150). Prior to the rise of 
capitalism, cultural forms had tended to consider the past to be “essentially the same as the 
present”; the historical novel thus served an important role in meeting capitalism’s demand for “a 
memory of qualitative social change, a concrete vision of the past which we may expect to find 
completed by that far more abstract and empty conception of some future terminus which we 
sometimes call ‘progress’” (149). When the historical novel lapsed into nostalgia this commitment 
to progress fell into doubt, and SF stepped into the space it left behind, providing “mock futures” 
that serve to transform “our own present into the determinate past of something yet to come” 
(152). However, rather than simply replicating the obfuscatory strategies of the historical novel, 
SF contained within it a certain amount of subversive potential, since it served “to defamiliarize 
and restructure our experience of our own present” in a way that actually drew attention to the 
politically necessary relationship between capitalism and the concept of progress (151, emphasis 
in original). It thus functions counterintuitively not “to keep the future alive, even in the 
imagination”; rather “its deepest vocation is over and over again to demonstrate and to dramatize 
our incapacity to imagine the future” (153). Likewise, Jameson argues, the “deepest vocation” of 
utopia “is to bring home, in local and determinate ways, and with a fullness of concrete detail, our 
constitutional inability to imagine Utopia itself” (153); to this extent, the content of utopian 
fictions—unlike the historical novel—is often a “perpetual interrogation of its own conditions of 
possibility”, and these fictions thus “find their deepest ‘subjects’ in the possibility of their own 
production, in the interrogation of the dilemmas involved in their own emergence as utopian 
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that it anticipates this shift, Wagar suggests that Ballard’s work is more 
amenable to a radically left-wing reading than Fitting realises. Ballard always 
resisted the suggestion that his fiction is dystopian, claiming instead that it “is 
optimistic because it’s a fiction of psychic fulfillment” (qtd. in Wagar 56), and as 
far as his earlier work is concerned this would seem to be an accurate 
description: his protagonists’ desire to be subsumed within whichever 
captivating ecological upheaval happens to be taking place is always finally 
indulged, and this invariably leads them away from a psychic and social order 
that is represented as increasingly antiquated and calcified. Wagar reads this as 
a “perceptive analys[is] of the collapsing moral world of late capital”; however, 
far from being nihilistic, he urges that Ballard’s fictions “are utopias, and utopias 
of a post-capitalist landscape in which technocrats and tycoons alike would be 
out of work” (Wagar 67). To this extent his work is radical—even 
revolutionary—as it completely rejects the prevailing order of bourgeois 
capitalism in favour of one that appears to present at least the possibility of 
transcendence. Wagar identifies aesthetics as the vehicle for this radical 
transcendence and places Ballard’s fiction within a framework that allows of a 
dialogical relationship between aesthetics and politics, with utopianism 
mediating between the two. Ballard might have argued that “[r]evolutions in 
aesthetic sensibility may be the only way in which radical change can be brought 
about in the future” (qtd. in Wagar 66); however, contrary to Fitting’s boolean 
approach to the New Wave, in which fictions fall into either the political or the 
aesthetic category, Wagar suggests that the kind of “psychic transformations” 
that Ballard’s aesthetic project explores “may be legitimately viewed as a means 
to a social end”. This end is “concrete, real, world-historical”, but it has been made 
possible in the first instance “by ‘seismic shifts’ in consciousness”—which is to 
say, by the kind of utopian impulse whose new political promise, Jameson 
suggests, resides in its relative immunity to capitalist co-optation (Wagar 68, 
emphases in original).74 
                                                                                                                                          
texts” (156). 
74 Wagar is not alone among Ballard’s appraisers in arguing that, far from the kind of “managed 
decline” that Fitting perceives in the early novels, the latter are marked by a real sense of a coming 
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 While at first sight Ballard’s fiction appears quite distinct from that of the 
two writers who have previously occupied us, the discussion between Fitting 
and Wagar opens up an interesting parallel. The disagreement that separates the 
two critics appears, at root, to concern the question of praxis. Fitting argues that 
the aesthetic aspirations of the New Wave represented an attempt to respond to 
the challenges of a political milieu—the emancipatory movements of the 
1960s—which sought to critique existing social reality from a radical 
perspective. Ballard’s response was “mistaken and unrewarding” (Fitting 66) by 
comparison with that of other writers because it tended to aestheticise the 
political challenges of the time instead of “us[ing] SF to criticize [...] society by 
means of a more thorough and explicit identification of the social and political 
nature of capitalism” (68).75 In the last analysis this aesthetic strategy seems to 
lead inevitably to dissolution and decay, even if it does reject a slowly atrophying 
bourgeois social order. Wagar responds by challenging Fitting’s too-easy 
separation of aesthetics and politics, and insists that in Ballard’s fiction the 
protagonists’ rejection of the prevailing social order functions as a prelude to a 
kind of political transcendence that will allow for the construction of new 
“landscapes of justice” (Wagar 68). But while the first aspect of this rejoinder 
might be valid, the kernel of Fitting’s argument still obtains. Even if the search 
for transcendence is successful, and manages to deliver radical material change, 
it remains the case that the aesthetic project undertaken in Ballard’s early work 
hardly represents a politics of resistance; indeed, it is more appropriate to speak 
                                                                                                                                          
social and psychic revolution. Andrzej Gasiorek, for instance, suggests that “Ballard’s early novels 
and short stories portray the period of waiting” that seems to characterise Kerans’s situation “not 
as dead Beckettian time in which nothing happens but rather as the necessarily prelude to far-
reaching change” (Gasiorek 11). 
75 Fitting is by no means unique among Ballard’s critics in being uncomfortable with his tendency to 
ignore material reality and to find political salvation in abstraction: discussing his embrace of new 
media technology during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Michel Delville argues that the fiction 
Ballard produced around this time evidences “a line of theoretical speculation whose radical and 
progressive premises are liable to culminate in sheer idealism, mainly because they fail to truly 
account for the social and cultural specifics of our time. What is conspicuously absent from 
Ballard’s argument is a concern with the material conditions of production and consumption of 
mass-media artefacts” (Delville 89). 
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of a politics of rejection, or recalcitrance. When Kerans declines the offer of 
passage to Greenland and heads south the reader does not perceive this as an 
attempt to locate a new politically fruitful and sustainable mode of being in the 
drowned world. The old order may be irrelevant (Riggs) and even barbaric 
(Strangman) but Kerans’s eschewal of it—and of human polity altogether—is an 
act of negation rather than affirmation; a retreat from politics rather than a 
concerted attempt to fashion reality after a new political model. And whether or 
not the novel’s resolution bequeaths its protagonist the kind of “psychic 
fulfillment” that Ballard spoke of when defending himself against charges of 
pessimism, it remains shot through with the certainty of death. The best Kerans 
can hope for is the kind of death-in-life implied by his late encounter with the 
blind, necrotic but still living character of Hardman, who earlier in the novel left 
the base in a foreshadowing of Kerans’s own journey into the jungle, and is now 
“a dying beggar […] no more than a resurrected corpse” (171). What is more, 
this is a conclusion to which Ballard returns elsewhere in his apocalyptic 
triptych: a similar act of negation is used to resolve The Crystal World, when its 
protagonist finally rejects the fading colonial town of Mont Royal and heads into 
the jungle, towards an endless, solitary future of crystallised stasis. 
 It is in this way that Ballard’s early work has more in common with the 
narrative this investigation seeks to trace than might be suspected. In both The 
Drowned World and The Passion potential is located in an act of voluntary exile 
that leads the subject away from the realm of political action. The vehicle for this 
act of negation is not the kind of agency that is recognised by and operates 
within a polity that lends meaning to actions; rather, in response to the pressing 
political questions of their circumstances, both Winterson and Ballard validate a 
cultural or aesthetic strategy that hinges on a rejection of any such milieu. As 
Wagar argues of The Drowned World, it is in the utopianism of this response that 
the novels’ radicalism consists: they seek to transcend the world as it is 
currently configured in order to change it, and hope by these means to locate 
new “landscapes of justice” in which alternatives to the status quo may be 
realised. But for all the promise of this strategy, Fitting’s argument forces us to 
remember that in both novels the landscape that is revealed by the act of 
 
124 
negation is a deeply ambivalent zone of morbidity in which the boundary 
between life and death can no longer be determined, as even this ontological 
certainty has been rendered indistinct. 
Ballard’s early fiction is thus quite relevant to the present discussion, as it 
can be seen to provide a rudimentary thematisation of the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement. This is perhaps not so much the case where the issue of 
space is concerned, since it could be argued that while Wagar suggests that 
Ballard’s first few novels are “fundamentally topographic” this is not quite the 
same as saying that they are centrally concerned with space—and certainly not 
urban space—as are The Passion and The Black Album. Indeed, given that the 
earlier novels are characterised by an obsession with devolution it might be 
more appropriate to approach them in terms of time. However, the way in which 
Ballard’s consideration of exile, outsiderness and resistance develops as his 
concerns shift away from the temporal and towards the spatial provides some 
insight into the strategy of resistance we witnessed in The Passion. In the latter 
novel, Winterson imputes to the Napoleonic regime a totalising tendency which, 
I have argued, evidences a real anxiety over the spatial project of the New Right. 
In opposition to this she constructs a Venice whose spatial mercuriality reflects 
the cultural and political indeterminacy of its denizens, and it is out of this 
cornucopia of contingency that resistance emerges. But if in The Black Album 
Kureishi begins to doubt the ability of flexible spaces and identities to resist the 
arrogative and hypostatising spatial logic of late capitalism, in Ballard’s late 
novels the latter has become so flexible, so capable of co-opting dissident 
behaviour, that the possibility of resistance—whether of an aesthetic or political 
kind, or both—has vanished completely. It is therefore this milieu, as 
represented in Ballard’s late novels Cocaine Nights (1996) and Super-Cannes 
(2001) that will occupy us for the rest of this chapter. Because, to the extent that 
these texts build on Ballard’s growing interest in architectural determinism, 
they allow us to observe the role of space in changing his attitude towards the 
cultural politics of disenfranchisement. In combination with the early novels, 
they provide an insight into the latter from two perspectives: one of twenty-five 
years before its appearance—which in many ways anticipates its emergence—
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and one of soon afterwards, reflecting on its devastating impact. 
 
 
2. Spatial Totalisation and the Social 
 
The shift in Ballard’s preoccupation from time towards space from Crash 
onwards comes to a kind of apotheosis in his late work, which is obsessed with 
the affectless and atemporal spaces of a hegemonic but increasingly complacent 
capitalism. The latter’s totalisation has produced a social system in which every 
conceivable human faculty has been subordinated to the imperative of economic 
efficiency. Difference is elided as the class system is compressed into a social 
singularity, the progressive aspirations of identity politics are first co-opted, 
then perverted and finally rendered void, and resistance proves largely 
impossible. Into this situation Ballard inserts his provocative thesis: that social 
systems actually require disorder if they are to function efficiently. And so he 
sketches out a series of worlds in which disorder, dissent and difference are 
represented as vital—but, far from being the fount from which resistance 
springs, they are systematically appropriated to serve the interests of consumer-
corporate capital. Cocaine Nights offers us the Spanish retirement resort of 
Estrella de Mar, whose citizens are so enervated that they are encouraged to 
play the rapist, the prostitute, the porn star, in order to salvage anything 
resembling bourgeois civil society. In Super-Cannes the French Riviera plays host 
to Eden-Olympia, a high-tech business park where CEOs work so tirelessly to 
advance the interests of corporate capital their health begins to decline and they 
are prescribed a programme of regulated psychopathy which involves 
alternately patronising and terrorising drug dealers, child prostitutes and the 
local immigrant community. In Millennium People a wealthy London suburb is in 
the middle of a revolution whose ostensible objection—that the middle class has 
become the new proletariat—masks a deeper and more violent logic. And 
Kingdom Come, Ballard’s last novel, offers us the motorway town of Brooklands, 
where football tribalism provides the façade for a new form of consumer fascism 
that will ensure the the suburbs keep spending. These are worlds in which, as 
 
126 
Andrzej Gasiorek argues, “the struggle for freedom [takes] the form of 
celebrating criminality and psychopathology, in blithe ignorance of the extent to 
which these supposedly oppositional practices are the alienated products of the 
social realm they supposed to subvert” (Gasiorek 175); where “[d]eviance [is] a 
commodity under jealous guard”, “[c]rime […] ha[s] become one of the 
performance arts” and “transgressive behaviour is for the public good” (Ballard 
Cocaine 135, 146, 181). 
In their Ballardian manifestation the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement cannot be said to be properly spatial, as they are in 
Winterson’s novel, and are certainly not committed to the urban milieu. 
However, as Ballard’s interests shift towards the urban spaces of postmodernity 
some interesting connections begin to present themselves, and one notable 
example can be found at the outset of Cocaine Nights. Charles Prentice is driving 
through Gibraltar en route to Marbella, where he is due to visit his brother 
Frank, who has been jailed on suspicion of starting a fire that killed five people. 
“Crossing frontiers is my profession”, he says, before singing a paean to “[t]hose 
strips of no-man’s land between the checkpoints” which “always seem such 
zones of promise, rich with the possibilities of new lives, new scents and 
affections” (9). As an overseas territory that is nominally self-governing, but 
whose sovereignty is under constant question, Gibraltar enjoys a kind of 
political indeterminacy that Charles finds compelling. However, this promise has 
“nothing to do with peace, order and the regulation of Her Majesty’s waves”. 
Quite the opposite: he is titillated by the petty criminality of the place, the 
“raunchy bars”, the “money-laundering and the smuggling of untaxed perfumes 
and pharmaceuticals”. And if he is pleased by the Rock’s rejection of the British 
imperial project, he takes similar pleasure in its refusal to cow to Spanish claims 
of sovereignty; in the fact that it “stick[s] up like a thumb, the local sign of the 
cuckold, in the face of Spain” (10).  
This representation of Gibraltar might be seen as redolent of Winterson’s 
Venice, whose own political situation is equally ambiguous, and which is 
represented as similarly ungovernable, and hence peculiarly resistant to the 
totalising spatial project of Napoleonic imperialism. Indeed, a similar opposition 
 
127 
exists in Cocaine Nights, for Charles finds quite a different kind of spatiality 
when he reaches Estrella de Mar, the “residential retreat for the professional 
classes of northern Europe” where most of the novel is set (35). Empty and 
silent, the resort appears—at least at first glance—to be entirely devoid of any 
of the imbroglio and recalcitrance of Gibraltar; rather, it is an “eventless world” 
full of “memory-erasing architecture” (34) where there is “no past, no future and 
a diminishing present” (35). Tellingly, Gibraltar is barely mentioned again once 
we are introduced to Estrella de Mar: the unseemly outcrop of rock which “the 
Brussels bureaucrats are trying to close […] down” (180) appears to represent 
the losing side in a battle with a homogeneous and deterministic spatiality that 
is the focus of Ballard’s inquiry in all of his later novels. Indeed, it is worth 
pointing out that Super-Cannes, Millennium People and Kingdom Come feature no 
comparable outposts of disorder to the one that opens Cocaine Nights.76 Thus as 
the reader works her way through Ballard’s subsequent explorations of 
postmodern hypercapitalism she comes to remember Charles’s fondness for 
Gibraltar as mere nostalgia rather than a determined expression of faith in its 
resistant potential: it belongs to the past, and Charles is mourning it. 
 For Super-Cannes only sees the determinism of Estrella de Mar 
intensified. Arriving at Eden-Olympia, a high-tech business park for the world’s 
largest corporations, Paul Sinclair finds a similarly highly-regulated space of 
“glass and gun-metal office blocks […] set well apart from each other” (Cannes 
7); a place where “[i]ntimacy and neighbourliness were not features of everyday 
life”, where 
 
[a]n invisible infrastructure took the place of traditional civic 
                                                 
76 The only space that is vaguely redolent of it is Guy’s Hospital in Super-Cannes, where Paul 
convalesces after a flying accident: “Guy’s was a city under siege, filled with the sick, the lost and 
the confused, a shuffling host perpetually on the move in a vast internal migration” (39). Though 
Paul demonstrates a kind of nostalgia for Guy’s, and the hospital can be associated with sexual 
possibility to the extent that it is where Paul meets his wife, it hardly represents the kind of bawdy 
liminality of Gibraltar. La Bocca, the former industrial town that features prominently in Super-
Cannes, might be compared to Gibraltar, but—as we shall see shortly—it speaks more readily of 
capitulation and control than resistance. 
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virtues. At Eden-Olympia there were no parking problems, no 
fears of burglars or purse snatchers, no rapes or muggings. The 
top-drawer professionals no longer needed to devote a moment’s 
thought to each other, and had dispensed with the checks and 
balances of community life. There were no town councils or 
magistrates’ courts, no citizens’ advice bureaux. Civility and polity 
were designed into Eden-Olympia, in the same way that 
mathematics, aesthetics and an entire geopolitical world-view 
were designed into the Parthenon and the Boeing 747. 
Representative democracy had been replaced by the surveillance 
camera and the private police force. (38) 
 
It is not hard to locate echoes of Campbell’s foray into the “New Times Towns” in 
this passage. Just as in Basingstoke, in Estrella de Mar and Eden-Olympia privacy 
and defensibility are valued over all else: “Razor-glass topped almost every wall, 
and security cameras maintained their endless vigil over garages and front 
doors” (Cocaine 135). This is exactly the kind of postmodern space we are by 
now accustomed to hearing decried by the likes of Harvey, Soja, Jameson and 
Davis. Indeed, the latter claims to be excavating the future with his investigation 
of postmodern Los Angeles, and Ballard—who was a keen reader of Davis77—
appears to echo this when he claims that in Estrella de Mar “[t]he future had 
come ashore” (33) and that Eden-Olympia is “a huge experiment in how to 
hothouse the future” (Cannes 15). Using language that could have been lifted 
from Jameson’s Postmodernism, Ballard writes that the Costa del Sol is “as 
depthless as a property developer’s brochure” (Cocaine 16). The vernacular 
European style that all four theorists consider to be prevalent in the postmodern 
architecture of California has returned home and is simultaneously mingling 
with and destroying the originals it mimics: as Charles passes a new apartment 
block he considers its “mock-Roman columns and white porticos apparently 
                                                 
77 In interview with Graeme Revell in 2003 Ballard says, “I’ve been reading Mike Davis’s latest book. 
You know—the City of Quartz man? […] Brilliant writer in his way. His latest book is Dead Cities 
[…] He’s absolute steeped in the social history of California, but he hates big corporations—he 
feels they’ve destroyed LA and large areas of California” (Ballard to Revell 71). 
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imported from Las Vegas after a hotel clearance sale, reversing the export to 
Florida and California in the 1920s of dismantled Spanish monasteries and 
Sardinian abbeys” (16). And as Harvey would no doubt insist, the logic of these 
spaces is not predicated on rigidity. Quite the opposite: while their denizens 
might find it “irritating to be reminded of the contingent world” (Cannes 19), 
flexibility is an absolute condition of their existence. This is something that 
previous appraisers of Ballard’s late novels have noted: as Gasiorek writes, while 
in these novels 
 
[t]ime has contracted down to a depleted present stretching out 
towards a blank future [...] change is ceaselessly and ever more 
rapid [… and] takes place within a globalised, technology-driven 
system that seems uncannily adaptable and fearfully resolute. This 
is postmodernity as end-game and terminal zone, the site of a late 
capitalist colonisation so complete that temporality has been 
evacuated from it and can only be conceived in terms of spatial 
extension: more buildings, roads, airports, shopping malls, car 
parks […] This is the future as more of the same, the future as 
post-history. Flexible, decentralised, and geared to the reinvention 
of its institutions and bureaucratic structures, thus ensuring that it 
survives by way of mutation, late capitalism is in these texts 
shown to be both reflexive and static. (Gasiorek 20, emphasis 
added) 
 
In other words, the totalising tendency that Winterson imputes to the 
Napoleonic regime, which is indicative of the spatial logic of late capitalism, can 
now have its cake and eat it. As Harvey and Jameson argue, far from combatting 
totalisation and homogenisation, flexibility begets these qualities, and—as we 
shall see—performative disorder only serves to strengthen them. 
 However, it is worth exploring the relationship between the homogeneity 
of these spaces and the societies that exist in them a little more, because this 
will allow us to determine how Ballard’s representation of postmodernity 
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differs from the analyses of Marxist critics who, initially at least, seem most 
suited to its appraisal. The novels we are discussing here do evidence Ballard’s 
late and characteristically idiosyncratic engagement with Marx, but it is 
interesting that this engagement appears to lead him, by and large, to reject the 
fundamental tools of Marxist criticism. While for most of his career Ballard was 
clearly interested in social hierarchies, in keeping with the narrative strategies 
developed in his early writing these were usually perceived in terms of 
typologies based on psychic disposition and/or professional activity rather than 
in terms of a shared social experience dictated by class status.78 Indeed, the idea 
of class only begins to make itself explicitly apparent in his late fiction—and 
most notably by its absence, or at least its eclipse. While Millennium People 
advances the thesis that the middle-class is “the new proletariat” (Ballard 
Millennium 64) and Super-Cannes explores the oligarchy that presumably rules 
over them, it must be noted that, despite the ostensible emphasis on class, in 
each novel Ballard represents one social stratum to the exclusion of all others. 
The dynamics between these strata are never demarcated and their operational 
logics are virtually identical, since all function as part of a homogeneous late 
capitalist society that is struggling with economic lassitude, and so must co-opt 
disorder and sublimate it as a performance in order to inspirit its citizenry and 
ensure it remains productive. As such, Ballard seems to engage with the issue of 
class only to the extent that he no longer believes it to exist in the Marxist sense: 
the social strata of the past have been compressed into a singularity, a kind of 
undifferentiated mass. This reading is bolstered by the novels’ treatment of the 
relationship between labour and leisure under consumerism. Recognising 
                                                 
78 This is to say that he was more interested in caste than class, something that is most obviously 
manifest in High-Rise, which tells the story of a massive social breakdown in an affluent apartment 
building. This is no Langian metropolis in which the proletariat subsists underground and is 
systematically exploited by a bourgeoisie that resides up in the skies. The floor on which each 
character lives is, as we might expect, determined by the relationship between property prices 
and personal wealth; however, none of these characters is, properly speaking, proletarian. The 
architect of the block may own the penthouse while a psychiatrist lives about half way up and a 
lowly film technician on the first floor, but this hierarchy exists in order to explore the social 
vagaries produced by a particular architectural environment, rather than as part of a Marxist 
critique of post/industrial class society. 
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Ballard’s tendency to embark on broad imaginative investigations across a 
number of works, reviewers of Super-Cannes identified it as a kind of 
“companion piece” (Royle par. 3) to Cocaine Nights. This is an approach Gasiorek 
challenges when he argues that “[w]hereas the built environment of Estrella de 
Mar is soporific, a lotus-eaters’ paradise, Eden-Olympia is a streamlined 
microcosm that arrogates to itself the functions previously allocated to society” 
(Gasiorek 175). However, while superficially true, this perspective does not fully 
appreciate that in the social, political and economic milieus of these novels 
production and consumption, labour and leisure, work and play can no longer 
be comfortably separated. The leisure society of Estrella de Mar, enjoying a 
renaissance under the programme of psychopathy and criminality that marks all 
of Ballard’s late fiction, is now a hive of service industries. We are told that the 
resort is “as serious in its pleasures as a seventeenth-century New England 
settlement” (Ballard Cocaine 116), something confirmed in the fact that nearly 
every one of its residents has a job which shores up the leisure economy. At the 
funeral of Bibi Janssen, one of the fire’s victims, we meet Blanche and Marion 
Keswick, who run the “Restaurant du Cap, an elegant brasserie by the harbour” 
(60), Elizabeth Shand, who owns the Club Nautico and is the community’s “most 
successful businesswoman” (62), and “a retired Bournemouth accountant and 
his sharp-eyed wife who [run] a video-rental store” (67). For a retirement 
enclave Estrella de Mar thus seems bizarrely hard-working, and this is because 
the boundary between labour and leisure has been almost totally obscured. 
Super-Cannes achieves a similar effect using an inverted logic: Eden-Olympia is 
the most inhuman of workhouses; here “the concept of leisure [is] dying” as it is 
perceived as “the mark of the shiftless and untalented” (Cannes 46). Yet this 
over-emphasis on labour is, like the emphasis on leisure in Estrella de Mar, less 
than straightforward. As Wilder Penrose explains, “Work is the new leisure. 
Talented and ambitious people work harder than they have ever done, and for 
longer hours. They find their only fulfilment through work” (254, emphasis 
added). Although, to the extent that it is in work and not relaxation that the 
malaise originates, the situation of Super-Cannes is diametrically opposed to that 
in Cocaine Nights, the logic of the two texts is identical. In the latter it is an 
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excess of leisure that leads to lassitude where in the former it is an excess of 
labour, and the solution in both cases is to make the one activity consist in the 
other, thereby eliding the distinction between the two. Wilder Penrose might 
argue that “[a]t Eden-Olympia work is the ultimate play, and play the ultimate 
work” (94), but he could just as easily be speaking of Estrella de Mar. Considered 
in the light of Ballard’s habit of obsessively revisiting the same imaginative 
terrain over a number of different works, it seems clear that Cocaine Nights and 
Super-Cannes arrive at precisely the same conclusion: that under late capitalism 
human agency has become so instrumentalised the divisions we customarily 
draw between different types of social activity—and the different classes that 
perform them—have been largely erased. 
 A reader of Aldous Huxley might be a little baffled by this conclusion, for 
how can the instrumentalisation of social functions—witnessed also in Brave 
New World (1932)—lead to the eclipse of caste and class, which are so central to 
the social system imagined in that novel? The answer to this question, I think, 
lies in the fact that where Huxley’s system expresses the kind of rigidity 
characteristic of Fordism, Ballard’s late dystopias confront a post-Fordist world 
in which flexibility is the watchword of an international capitalism that has 
ascended to global hegemony. It is in this respect that Harvey, Soja, Davis and 
Jameson provide the most appropriate framework for approaching these novels 
in the first instance, as they demonstrate very effectively that at the heart of late 
capitalism’s celebration of flexibility is a logic that seeks ineluctably to expand 
and totalise. And their critique goes some way towards revealing the wholesale 
embrace of indeterminacy and contingency by the likes of Hall, Jacques and 
Gilroy as a capitulation to this logic rather than as the foundation of a new 
model of resistance. It is perhaps for this reason that, where Ballard’s early 
novels locate a glimmer of promise in an aesthetic project of self-exile that seeks 
to transcend political challenges—a project familiar from The Passion and other 
celebrations of the cultural politics of disenfranchisement—in his late fiction 
even this possibility is denied. Confronting the totalised hypercapitalism of 
Estrella de Mar and Eden-Olympia renders a fuller engagement with the 
ambivalent utopia of The Drowned World politically untenable, and so Ballard 
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eschews it and the rudimentary politics of disenfranchisement that it endorses. 
 This said, I think it would be a mistake to believe that the longstanding 
fundaments of Marxist critique are sufficiently capable in themselves of 
illuminating Ballard’s late worlds to the fullest extent. They may challenge the 
Left culturalist strategy of endorsing play and pleasure as the loci of 
oppositional activity, but they do this not by demonstrating that the 
productivism of late capitalism is too powerful an opponent to be effectively 
resisted in this way. Nor do they suggest, as more rearguard Marxist elements 
might, that it is the waning of faith in orthodox tools of analysis and the decline 
of class consciousness that have led to capitalist hegemony. These novels 
provide visions of a world so uniform and overdetermined that it is completely 
impossible to differentiate between the basic faculties of society using a critique 
that admits of human pluralism in any form whatsoever—whether it consists in 
the culturally determined realm of identity or in the economically determined 
realm of class. Whereas the reactionary might argue that through collectives of 
social circumstance popular will may win out, in his construction of an entirely 
atomised social milieu Ballard denies the possibility of any such collective 
emerging. Whereas the Left culturalist directs the focus of resistant activity 
away from work and towards play, Ballard’s hypercapitalism appropriates both 
and is all the more productive—as well as violent, oppressive and exploitative—
for it. It is certainly the case that the prognosis for human society in Cocaine 
Nights and Super-Cannes is gloomier than in the early apocalyptic fiction, 
because the political resolution—no matter how ambivalent—that marked the 
latter is no longer tenable. But in order to understand Ballard’s late dystopias 
fully we require a theoretical model that is not merely capable of explaining 
neoliberalism in terms of the flexible post-Fordist economy; it must also address 
the specifically political dimensions of his vision and shed light on the new form 
of totalitarianism which he sees emerging. And such a model will not be found 
within Marxist approaches that subjugate the realm of culture to the diktats of 
economics, or vice versa. It will only be located in an analysis that recognises the 
primacy of politics. 
 In this respect I think that Arendt’s thought—and specifically her 
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formulation of “the social”—are very helpful. Arendt claims that the 
phenomenon of the social emerged in the West during the eighteenth century 
and came to elide entirely the distinction between the private realm of the 
household and the public realm of the polis, resulting in a tendency to “see the 
body of peoples and political communities in the image of a family whose 
everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide 
administration of housekeeping” (Arendt Human 28). In the ancient world the 
latter activity belonged properly to the private realm, where “men lived together 
because they were driven by their wants and needs” (30); housekeeping was 
thus the process by which the necessities of life in its barest sense—food, shelter 
and so on—were guaranteed in the private realm. Because it was always run as a 
kind of despotism, governed by force by a single figurehead (usually the 
patriarch), this realm was inevitably apolitical. By contrast in the public realm of 
the polis citizens met one another as equals, but only because of the assurance 
that their “wants and needs” were being met elsewhere: as Arendt writes, “[I]f 
there was a relationship between these two spheres it was a matter of course 
that the mastering of life in the household was the condition for freedom [in] the 
polis” (30-31). It is in this way that Arendt can argue against libertarian models 
that politics is equivalent to freedom, for it is in the fact that citizens are free of 
the need to labour perpetually after their own survival that their freedom 
consists, and the exercise of this freedom is politics. To both the private and the 
public realms Arendt opposes “society”, whose exemplar she identifies in the 
eighteenth-century salon. “Society”, she writes, “expects from each of its 
members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all 
of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members, to make them behave, to exclude 
spontaneous action of outstanding achievement” (40). She submits that the 
development of economics—perceived by the ancients as “relat[ing] to the life of 
the individual and the survival of the species” and therefore “a non-political, 
household affair by definition” (28)—into a complete way of understanding the 
world during the eighteenth century prepared the way for the elision of the 
distinction between the private and the public realms, and the supersession of 
both by society. This was because “economics […] could only achieve a scientific 
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character when men had become social beings [who] unanimously followed 
certain patterns of behavior, so that those who did not keep the rules could be 
considered to be asocial or abnormal” (42). Such a means of measuring human 
activity provided society—which was similarly conformist—with “an irresistible 
tendency to grow, to devour the older realms of the political and private” (45), 
and generated the totalising and expansionist phenomenon she labels “the 
social”. Class was a central feature in this development, since society was always 
connected to class status;79 however, as far as the social was concerned “it [was] 
immaterial whether the framework happen[ed] to be actual rank in the half-
feudal society of the eighteenth century, title in the class society of the 
nineteenth, or mere function in the mass society of today” (41). What was 
important was that the expansionist logic of the social ensured that whichever 
rank, class or function was in the ascendant, it would always seek to assimilate 
or abolish competing models of behaviour. Mass society can be seen as a 
culmination of this logic in that it demonstrates how the various social groups 
that preceded it “have suffered the same absorption into one society that the 
family units had suffered earlier; with the emergence of mass society, the realm 
of the social has finally, after several centuries of development, reached the 
point where it embraces and controls all members of a given community equally 
and with equal strength” (41). 
 Authority under the social has taken on a particularly insidious form, 
Arendt claims, because it has been diminished to a kind of vacuum, entirely 
removed from the populace it supposedly governs. In economics, as in society, 
the “one-man, monarchical rule” of the private sphere was transformed into “a 
kind of no-man rule”, as membership was determined by commitment to a 
shared principle rather than a person (as in the household) or a body of persons 
(as in the polis). However, “this nobody, the assumed one interest of society as a 
whole in economics as well as the assumed one opinion of polite society in the 
salon, does not cease to rule for having lost its personality”. This is because “rule 
                                                 
79 As Arendt writes in Origins, from the late eighteenth century on “[t]he relationship between the 
state and society was determined by class struggle, which […] supplanted the former feudal order. 
Society was pervaded by liberal individualism which wrongly believed that the state ruled over 
mere individuals when in reality it ruled over classes” (Arendt Origins 231). 
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by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain 
circumstances, even turn out to be one of its cruelest and most tyrannical 
versions”(40). Such a rule of nobody Arendt identifies as an important 
component of totalitarian government in Origins when she argues that “the 
principle of authority is in all important respects diametrically opposed to that 
of totalitarian domination”. Instead of authority, totalitarianism introduces a 
“Leader principle” not all that dissimilar from the “principles” around which 
society and economics revolve. While the Leader principle resides in a single 
person, it represents a void in the sense that it is entirely removed from the 
polity it nominally governs; that it “does not establish a hierarchy in the 
totalitarian state any more than it does in the totalitarian movement”. As such, 
“authority is not filtered down from the top through all intervening layers to the 
bottom of the body politics as is the case in authoritarian regimes” like 
monarchy, as well as the authoritarian private realm which resembles a 
monarchy (Origins 404). 
 In this way the emergence of the social contributed towards the evolution 
of totalitarianism, which for Arendt was at root a political phenomenon rather 
than an economic one. Marx occupies a position of implicit guilt in her history, 
as his belief “[t]hat politics is nothing but a function of society, that action, 
speech and thought are primarily superstructures upon social interest” is not a 
discovery of his own, but “on the contrary is among the axiomatic assumptions 
[he] accepted uncritically from the political economists of the modern age” 
(Human 33). His vision of a post-political society following the necessarily 
febrile revolutionary period was ultimately little more than a vision of society 
itself, expanded and totalised. Indeed, 
 
[a] complete victory of society will always produce some sort of 
“communistic fiction”, whose outstanding political characteristic is 
that it is indeed ruled by an “invisible hand”, namely, by nobody. 
What we traditionally call state and government gives place here 
to pure administration—a state of affairs which Marx rightly 
predicted as the “withering away of the state”, though he was 
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wrong in assuming that only a revolution could bring it about, and 
even more wrong when he believed that this complete victory of 
society would mean the eventual emergence of the “realm of 
freedom”. (44-45) 
 
Arendt’s implication that Marx’s legacy will inevitably reflect his initial 
appropriation of economism and is thus not ideally calibrated to providing a 
critique of politics qua politics is worth underscoring here. Because for all that it 
is expressive of an indomitable technocapitalism, Eden-Olympia is more than a 
little redolent of Marx’s “realm of freedom” as critiqued by Arendt. Paul Sinclair 
worries about the complete lack of civil society there, and of institutions of 
government, but Penrose has a response for every misgiving: “There are no 
clubs or evening classes” / “We don’t need them. They serve no role”; “No 
charities or church fêtes” / “Everyone is rich”; “No police or legal system” / 
“There’s no crime, and no social problems”; “No democratic accountability. No 
one votes. So who runs things?” / “We do. We run things” (Ballard Super-Cannes 
94). The result, Penrose insists over and over, is “[f]reedom […] We’ve achieved 
real freedom […] At long last, people are free to enjoy themselves […] You’re free 
here, Paul. Perhaps for the first time in your life” (95-97). Using Arendt to shed 
light on these exchanges suggests that, while delivered under the auspices of 
global capitalism, rather than communism taken to its ultimate, post-political 
end, it is at root the economism undergirding both social systems which has 
yielded the dystopian circumstances that are the subject of Ballard’s late novels. 
Eden-Olympia is exactly the kind of “communistic fiction” ruled by exactly the 
kind of “invisible hand” Arendt speaks of when she defines “rule by no-one”—
which is to say that rule is exercised by a principle that binds the business park’s 
denizens together in lieu of a hierarchically embodied authority. This principle is 
consumer-corporate capital; however, the logic by virtue of which it rules is in 
fact the social, produced by the fusion of society and economism, which Arendt 
argues laid the foundations of both capitalism and Marxism.80 In this way we can 
                                                 
80 This reading might appear to be complicated by Penrose’s assertion that it is “[t]he company [that] 
defines the rules that govern how you treat your spouse, where you educate your children, the 
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say that, despite his focus on global capitalism, the true object of Ballard’s 
critique is the way power functions under the social. And since Arendt argues 
that the latter is also inherent to Marxism, some doubt must be cast over the 
ability of traditional Marxist critical apparatus to answer the specifically 
political questions Ballard asks of a time dominated by a hegemonic form of 
capitalism. 
 None of this necessarily blunts the insights gained by applying the 
models of Harvey, Soja, Jameson and Davis to the spaces of Ballard’s late novels: 
they remain paradoxical places whose existence is predicated on flexibility, but 
                                                                                                                                          
sensible limits to stock-market investment” and “[t]he bank [that] decides how big a mortgage 
you can handle, the right amount of health insurance to buy” (95, emphases added). Some might 
read this passage as a comment on the growing power wielded by institutions of global capitalism, 
but this does not quite reach the heart of Ballard’s critique. The fact that we associate these 
institutions with global capitalism is only half the point; the key issue is that today power is so far 
removed from the individual that while it is becoming increasingly absolute it remains invisible, 
and thus impossible to hold to account. We might, slightly simplistically, describe the company 
and the bank as components of a paradigmatic axis: they may, after all, be substituted for one 
another without fundamentally changing the way power in Eden-Olympia actually works—that is, 
its syntax. To this extent, they mirror not just institutions of global capitalism, plugged into an 
international economy that wields massive but virtually incomprehensible power and floats free 
of any recognisable embodiment of the sovereign, but also the Council of People’s Commissars in 
the Soviet Union, or the State Council of China, both of which were or are ultimately subordinate 
to inscrutable party machines. In some ways China’s adoption of capitalism is a perfect example of 
how close, politically speaking, global capitalism is to state communism. As Slavoj Žižek writes, 
“What we have in China isn’t simply a combination of a private capitalist economy and Communist 
political power. In one way or another, state and Party own the majority of China’s companies, 
especially the large ones: it is the Party itself which demands that they perform well in the 
market”. Posed in the West, the question, “Who demands that companies perform well?” would no 
doubt be answered: “the shareholders”. However, this is a very long way from explaining how the 
system actually works, and though the people and/or organisations and/or logics that actually 
make it work are evident everywhere within this system, they remain curiously invisible. In this 
respect they are not dissimilar to the Communist Party in China. For as Žižek goes on, quoting 
Richard McGregor (whose book, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers he is 
reviewing): “It would seem difficult […] to hide an organisation as large as the Chinese Communist 
Party, but it cultivates its backstage role with care. The big party departments controlling 
personnel and the media keep a purposely low public profile. The Party committees […] which 
guide and dictate policy to ministries, which in turn have the job of executing it, work out of sight” 
(Žižek “Son” 8). 
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which are intractably carceral and highly deterministic. However, I think we 
stand to achieve a fuller understanding of these milieus if we use a theoretical 
model that refuses to collapse politics into either economics or culture, or both; 
indeed, which recognises the dire consequences of such a collapse for human 
freedom. As Bobby Crawford announces in Cocaine Nights: “Politics is over, 
Charles, it doesn’t touch the public imagination any longer” (Cocaine 245). In its 
place, Ballard seems to suggest, the social has become the true political logic of 
postmodernity, and in such a milieu freedom simply cannot prosper, as the 
possibility of anything resembling what Arendt calls “spontaneous action”—a 
necessity if politics-as-freedom is to exist at all—has been foreclosed. The social 
has virtually eradicated human pluralism, while the distinction between the 
public and the private realms has been completely eroded and institutions of 
housekeeping have been substituted for those of politics. The latter 
development is particularly evident in Super-Cannes: although hired as a 
paediatrician Jane soon finds that “[t]here aren’t many children” living in Eden-
Olympia, so she begins work on a new project that exploits the expansive 
telecommunications systems linking the clinic to the workers’ residences in 
order to develop a highly intrusive system of health management. She explains: 
“Every morning when they get up people will dial the clinic and log in their 
health data: pulse, blood-pressure, weight and so on. One prick on the finger on 
a small scanner and the computers here will analyse everything: liver enzymes, 
cholesterol, prostate markers, the lot” (Cannes 67).81 The similarity of this 
passage to Arendt’s concept of an “administration of housekeeping”—the 
culmination of the social—is so close it hardly needs to be extrapolated further. 
And the correspondence is only deepened by the fact that, despite Jane’s belief 
to the contrary, Eden-Olympia is full of children: the figure of the paediatrician is 
clearly intended to suggest that every occupant of the business park has been 
infantilised; that, in a sense, the CEOs whom Jane cares for are actually her 
children. Add to this the figure of Wilder Penrose—the business park’s “amiable 
                                                 
81 While she has her misgivings about the project—it is, she says, “so totalitarian only Eden-Olympia 
could even think about it and not realize what it means”—the prospect that “it might work” 
ensures that she continues to assist in its development (Ballard Cannes 67). 
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Prospero” who acts as Jane’s patriarchal counterpart, helping keep the workers 
sane while “turning them into children” (3, 293)—and we see that Arendt’s use 
of the family as an image for the triumph of the social also finds a correlative in 
Super-Cannes. What is more, quite to the contrary of Penrose’s assurances, this 
triumph has led the residents of Eden-Olympia to surrender their freedom for 
the principle of consumer-corporate capital. 
 However nightmarish this image of a totalised society might be, Ballard 
appears to suggest that its real victims are not likely to be the masters of the 
universe whose private lives are systematically invaded by the new technologies 
of the social. Rather, they are those people who fall on the wrong side of the only 
meaningful ontological distinction that remains: that between insiders and 
outsiders—or rather, those whose relation to the ‘inside’ is indeterminate. In 
Super-Cannes the latter feature prominently as the quarry of Penrose’s 
“ratissages”, or manhunts—the bullyboy games he prescribes to keep executive 
minds sharp and spirits high. And they are nearly always oppressed minorities 
determined by race, gender or sexuality: the victim of the first ratissage Paul 
encounters, for instance, is a “Senagalese trinket salesman” (71). Later on in the 
novel the industrial suburb of La Bocca serves increasingly as a ghetto for these 
outsiders: after dinner there one evening Paul follows two north African 
prostitutes around the backstreets and finds a hinterland of “[o]ff duty 
chauffeurs, Arab pushers and out-of work waiters fill[ing] the narrow bars” 
(157): 
 
In the nexus of narrow streets beyond the Boulevard d’Alsace 
congregated another constituency of the night: Maltese whores 
and their pimps, transvestites from Racife and Niteroi, runners for 
the dealers, waiting in their cars off the Avenue St-Nicolas, smartly 
dressed matrons who seemed never to find a client but returned 
evening after evening […] A blond transvestite with the body of a 
rugby forward stepped into a streetlight, huge feet in a pair of 
stiletto boots, thighs exposed by miniscule satin shorts. His eyes 
swept the street, and followed a cruising car driven by a middle-
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aged man with the face of a depressed bank manager. The car 
paused and a door opened, and the transvestite dived into the 
passenger seat, filling the car like a gaudy circus horse. (158) 
 
This is a vision of subversiveness, performativity and febrile indeterminacy that 
would not be out of place in Winterson’s Venice.82 We are told that La Bocca is “a 
long way from Cannes, but separated by a universe from Eden-Olympia” (152) 
and it is certainly easy to see that while the business park is, as Paul describes it, 
“the outpost of an advanced kind of puritanism, and a virtually sex-free zone” 
(155), La Bocca seems by contrast tantalising in its sexual subversiveness. 
However, we soon learn that it isn’t as far removed as we have been led to 
believe. As Paul barters over a child prostitute he intends to deliver into the 
hands of a nearby children’s refuge (but whom we suspect also appeals to his 
latent hebephilia) a group of men from Eden-Olympia arrive and “set upon the 
fleeing crowd” (162). Of course, La Bocca is prime hunting ground for the 
ratissages, and, as such, serves Eden-Olympia in the most important way 
imaginable: as an outpost of crime and disorder, it provides a location in which 
the “patients” of Penrose’s programme of psychopathy can indulge their need 
for violence, as the liminality of its inhabitants ensures that the police and 
political authorities care less about what happens to them than they would if, 
say, a prominent figure at the business park had been attacked. As this episode 
implies, the relationship between Eden-Olympia and La Bocca is more complex 
than it appears at first, and Paul quickly discovers that the suburb relates in an 
indeterminate way to the business park, which alternately patronises, terrorises 
and exploits it.  
 Like the population of Winterson’s Venice, then, these people might be 
said to exist in a kind of limbo in relation to the social system that bears power 
over them. 83 Indeed, I think it could be argued that, again like Venice, La Bocca 
                                                 
82 Especially when considered alongside the emphasis on gambling: Paul describes how the two sex-
workers “played at the fruit machines, their thighs rocking the pintables until the tilt-signs 
flashed” (Ballard Cannes 157). 
83 This is most unsettlingly communicated during an episode in which Paul visits a former children’s 
refuge in La Bocca where “a teaching order of African nuns” used to care for the “orphaned or 
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resembles something of a zone of morbidity, in which disease is rampant and 
only treated by representatives of Eden-Olympia because the homines sacri that 
populate the suburb are of use to the business park. The unmistakable 
difference between Ballard’s representation of homo sacer and that of 
Winterson, however, is that where the latter perceives this status as to some 
extent politically fecund, in Ballard’s late novels it is a position of profound 
exploitation. Any resistant potential that this figure may have possessed has 
been either co-opted or otherwise assimilated by Ballard’s hypercapitalism, and 
resistance is now largely impossible. In keeping with the novel’s vision of a 
world dominated by a logic that compresses human pluralism into a single 
social totality, difference does not yield emancipation. One exists either inside 
that totality—in which case, as we have seen, the logic of the social has entirely 
eroded any possibility of “spontaneous action” and therefore freedom-as-
politics—or outside it, in which case worldlessness forecloses the possibility of 
the latter ever emerging. In other words, irrespective of whether you are inside 
or outside, you are never free. 
 
 
3. The Uses of Disorder and the Impossibility of Resistance 
 
We have seen that in the novels Ballard wrote towards the end of his life the rise 
                                                                                                                                          
abandoned daughters of migrant workers” (Ballard Cannes 150). Before his shooting spree David 
Greenwood—the paediatrician Jane was hired to replace—provided medical care for the girls, 
who have since been sent to foster homes. But Paul quickly learns that Greenwood did not work 
alone at the refuge, or purely out of a charitable heart. He was aided by another of the business 
park’s physicians, Dominique Serrou, as well as two helpers and a cook; in fact, “[o]nly the 
generous funds donated by Eden-Olympia allowed the impoverished teaching order to educate 
the girls and provide them with books and a computer” (150). Eventually Paul learns that while at 
first Greenwood cared for the orphans and taught them English, he soon began to sleep with them 
and before long found himself as the head of a paedophile ring, arranging for the girls to be 
shuttled between the homes of Eden-Olympia executives and ensuring any sexually transmitted 
infections they contracted were treated properly. Serrou, meanwhile, acted as a “recruitment 
officer” for the institution, “tour[ing] the foster homes around Cannes and Nice, looking for likely 
talent. Girls with abusive ‘uncles’ or histories of VD” (348). 
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of late capitalism to a position of global hegemony is accompanied by a spatial 
logic whose totalising tendency, while manifestly facilitated by neoliberalism’s 
valorisation of flexibility, relies on more troubling workings which owe more to 
the eclipse of politics by what Arendt calls the social. The result of this eclipse is 
the same deeply homogenised and atomistic society that we witness in the 
critiques of postmodernity by the Marxist figures connected to the spatial turn; 
however, Arendt’s thought provides a means of better understanding the 
specifically political aspects of this situation. In addition, I think it may also 
serve as a way of concatenating the insights of the spatial turn with the general 
preoccupation with difference and otherness that has marked so many 
progressive responses to postmodernity. These two concepts find a kind of 
companion in what Arendt calls the unavoidable fact of plurality, which she 
argues is “the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, 
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever 
lived, lives, or will live” (Arendt Human 8). Plurality provides the imperative to 
act because it demands that we negotiate the sharply defined distance between 
ourselves and our fellow human beings; this, in turn, forms the basis of any 
politics, as, to the ancient Greeks, “[o]f all the activities necessary and present in 
human communities, only two were deemed to be political […] namely action 
(praxis) and speech (lexis)” (24-25). These two faculties—and thus politics in 
general—would be pointless if the need to recognise the fact of plurality did not 
exist; that is, “if men were endlessly reproducible repetitions of the same model” 
(8). But this has never been the case, and the implication is that any failure to 
recognise the distance that marks out one person as distinct from any other—or, 
more insidiously, any attempt to abolish it—can have worryingly dehumanising 
consequences. 
 Ballard’s late fiction provides a vision of exactly these circumstances, as 
the social systems he represents seek endlessly to deny the fact of difference and 
diversity—in other words, to abolish plurality. To this extent, Gasiorek is quite 
right to suggest that Zygmunt Bauman’s description of “the struggle to eliminate 
noise and randomness (in other words, autonomy and contingency) in [the] 
technological imaginary could have been written with Ballard’s Eden-Olympia in 
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mind”. Clearly the business park is engaged in a kind of “war on noise”, and this 
is more than evidenced by the “fully controlled life-world and complete 
heteronomy of the individual” that it seeks to bring about (Gasiorek 186). But it 
is also crucial to note that if Ballard’s late fiction has a single “thesis” it is that 
any social order that seeks entirely to eradicate noise and randomness also 
inevitably sows the seeds of its own destruction, for, without disorder of some 
kind, lassitude soon sets in and the system becomes imperilled. Thus if that 
system is to become truly totalised, disorder must first be co-opted and 
reconfigured before being deployed after a fashion that serves the system’s 
interests. Richard Sennett’s 1970 volume The Uses of Disorder may prove helpful 
in understanding this process. Certainly on a superficial level its interests 
coincide with our own, for Sennett seeks to establish a connection between the 
increase in “random” acts of violence in the post-war period and the particularly 
modern form of boredom he sees emerging as western society becomes more 
and more affluent and people are better able to “hide from one another”, thereby 
escaping “the full range of social experience” (Sennett 186). He claims that 
affluence has enabled us to indulge a desire for what he calls “purified identity” 
(7), a process that involves “build[ing] an image or identity that coheres, is 
unified, and filters out threats in social experience” (9).84 The result, he suggests, 
is a delusional and “adolescent” society that is dangerously incapable of 
accommodating disorder, as individuals come to believe in an emotional 
coherence with their community that simply “is not evidenced by their social 
experience” (32-33). In the service of this “myth of a purified community” (28) 
sameness comes to be mistaken for equality—something that Arendt also 
identifies as a dangerous strategy ranged against plurality—and this elision 
yields three dangerous consequences: first, a “loss of actual participation in 
community life”, since if everybody is equal we can take each other on trust 
alone and the need to relate to one another disappears (41); second, a tendency 
for communities to invest to ever greater degrees in the “repression of 
                                                 
84 Sennett writes that by means of this process the community ensures that “threatening or painful 
dissonances are warded off” and what is “preserve[d] intact [is] a clear and articulated image of 
oneself and one’s place in the world” (Sennett 11). 
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deviants”—those who challenge the sameness of society and need to be silenced 
(43); and third, a widespread belief in “[t]he myth of community solidarity” 
which “disposes men […] to escalate discord with other communities or with 
outsiders too powerful to be excluded to the level of violent confrontation” (44). 
It is because of this, Sennett believes, that we have witnessed, in our bored and 
“adolescent” society, a surge of violence: “the potential for ‘irrational crime’”, he 
writes, “for violence without object or provocation, is very great now. The 
reason it exists is that society has come to expect too much order, too much 
coherence in its communal life, thus bottling up the hostile aggressiveness men 
cannot help but feel” (181). 
 A little like Arendt—though with the accent on the affective rather than 
political dimensions of community and cohabitation—the aim of Sennett’s work 
is to remind us of the agonism that necessarily accompanies any attempt to live 
in propinquity with other human beings, something that requires us to 
recognise and engage with the fact of otherness, rather than to distance 
ourselves from it. Also like Arendt, Sennett sees the failure to recognise 
pluralism as having potentially violent consequences, and insists that societies 
must locate a way of accommodating disorder if they are to avoid them. Both of 
these perspectives find correlatives in Ballard’s fiction, which continues the 
author’s long-standing preoccupation with the outbreak of random violence in 
homosocial milieus. The societies depicted in Ballard’s late fiction are quite 
similar to the infantilised and “purified” communities that are Sennett’s subject: 
there is an analogous emphasis on “sameness”, on the infantilisation of human 
society, and—albeit to a greater extent in Super-Cannes than in Cocaine Nights—
on the loss of participation in community life. Moreover, these circumstances 
appear to arise out of a comparable desire to eliminate disorder. However, 
where Sennett suggests that disorder can be used constructively to introduce us 
to an “adult identity” that accepts the existence of “dissonances” as a corollary of 
the unavoidable fact of human plurality (118), in the societies of Ballard’s late 
novels it is being used bolster the repressive mechanics of the “purified 
community”. 
 This occurs in two distinct but connected ways, which together comprise 
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the programmes of “elective psychopathy”—the attempts to unleash the 
“energizing potential” of psychopathic behaviour (Ballard to Vale 100, emphasis 
in original)—that are the focus of all Ballard’s novels from Cocaine Nights on. 
The first concerns his visionaries’ observation that a limited indulgence of the 
random violence and criminality produced by overly-ordered societies actually 
serves to shore up the social system and further entrench the status quo by 
providing the illusion of emancipation. When Penrose opines that “[i]n a totally 
sane society, madness is the only freedom” (Ballard Cannes 264) “madness” does 
not, as Delville suggests, signify a liberatory bid to regain the “instinctual 
freedom” we have abandoned in favour of “delayed satisfaction, safer planning 
and greater efficiency in all fields of modern life” (Delville 86). Indeed, it means 
quite the opposite, which makes Ballard’s use of “freedom” here deeply ironic. 
For what Penrose represents as freedom is in reality nothing less than a 
complete capitulation to a social order in which that concept is entirely absent.85 
His programme of elective psychopathy cannot be perceived in any way as 
emancipatory, as it is aimed at vouchsafing the endurance of Eden-Olympia and 
the proliferation of its logic throughout the Côte d’Azur, Europe and the world. 
And while his means of achieving this are certainly violent, they hardly 
represent revolutionary violence—what Slavoj Žižek describes as “a radical 
upheaval of […] basic social relations” (Žižek Violence 183).86  
                                                 
85 Indeed, in an explicit contradiction of any notion of “instinctual freedom” Penrose urges that he 
sanctions “[n]othing too criminal or deranged”; that, in fact, he is in the business of distributing 
“carefully metered measure[s] of psychopathy” like “vitamin shot[s]”, aimed at optimising the 
business park’s performance (Ballard Cannes 259). 
86 Žižek claims that “the ultimate difference between radical-emancipatory politics and […] outbursts 
of impotent violence is that an authentic political gesture is active, it imposes, enforces a vision, 
while outbursts of impotent violence are fundamentally reactive, a reaction to some disturbing 
intruder” (Žižek Violence 179, emphases in original). If this is true, then the violence of Eden-
Olympia belongs firmly to the “impotent” category, as it is at root reactive and opportunistic. 
Disturbed by the imminent collapse of consumer capitalism under its own efficiency, Crawford 
and Penrose accelerate its logic in order to expose the systemic violence that resides underneath 
its apparently self-possessed facade, and dress up the indulgence of this violence as freedom. 
Žižek defines “systemic violence” as “not only direct physical violence, but also the more subtle 
forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and expoitation, including the threat of 
violence” (8), and is keen to impute it to so-called “tolerant” liberalism. “According to a well-
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The second way in which Ballard’s visionaries guarantee that the social 
laboratories they oversee can become fully totalised is to ensure the co-optation 
of any kind of disorder that might lead towards what Sennett terms an “adult” 
society, Delville is on surer ground on this point, deploying George Bataille’s 
theory of “unproductive expenditure” in order to demonstrate the nature of this 
co-optation. “In Bataille’s theories”, he writes “social waste […] transgresses the 
basic processes of production and consumption necessary for the survival of any 
given society” and extends “not only to art, games and leisure but also wars, 
religious cults, ritual sacrifice and perverse (i.e. non-genital) sexuality”. The 
totalised social systems of Ballard’s late fiction, however, investigate the 
possibility of a new “economy of the social whole” in which the “unproductive 
activities” Bataille identifies “can no longer be considered as an alternative to 
the homogenizing and commodifying processes of productive activity” (Delville 
85). To a limited degree, Delville’s characterisation of Bataille’s thought is 
redolent of Gilroy’s embrace of similarly unproductive activities involving 
pleasure and play, which form an important part of the strategy of resistance he 
seeks to mobilise against Thatcherism’s productivist imperative. To Gilroy—and 
Left culturalism more broadly—the point at which “unproductive activities” are 
enacted represents a moment of possibility, since it is at this moment that 
oppositional subjectivity is formed, thereby disrupting essentialising discourses 
that seek to fix identities which are, in reality, highly fluid. As such, the 
culturalist account of social action—and, by connection, of resistance—can 
readily be described as relying on a performative understanding of 
subjectivity;87 indeed, we saw in our analysis of The Passion how important the 
                                                                                                                                          
known anecdote”, he writes, “a German officer visited Picasso in his Paris studio during the 
Second World War. There he saw Guernica and, shocked at the modernist ‘chaos’ of the painting, 
asked Picasso: ‘Did you do this?’ Picasso calmly replied: ‘No, you did this!’ Today, many a liberal, 
when faced with violent outbursts such as the recent looting in the suburbs of Paris [between 
October and November 2005], asks the few remaining leftists who still count on a radical social 
transformation: ‘Isn’t it you who did this?’ And we should reply, like Picasso: ‘No, you did this! This 
is the result of your politics!’” (9-10). 
87 Arguing against liberal conceptions of political agency Alan Sinfield suggests that “[f]or agency to 
operate […] a ‘doer’ does not have to be in place first; rather, she or he is constructed through the 
deed. Identity develops, precisely, in the process of signification […] Identity is not that which 
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performative subculture was to its model of resistance. However, in Ballard’s 
late novels performance takes on quite another role, arising from his 
longstanding belief that “reality is just a stage set that can be pushed aside” so 
that “a very different set of rules can then apply” (Grave New World). His early 
work, as we have seen, is not particularly interested in providing us with 
characters that complicate reductive stereotypes, since it does not consider a 
stable world against which such “reduced” characters might be mapped to exist 
in the first place. This representational strategy means that the performative 
subject can quite easily be robbed of the resistant potential ascribed to it by Left 
culturalism (among many other schools of progressive thought), for the simple 
reason that, as far as Ballard is concerned, there is no stable, 
essentialised/hypostatised/reified “reality” for performativity to militate 
against in the first place. Consequently, the performative moment can end up 
representing merely another point of capitulation—even the point, above all 
others, at which a given social system’s determining influence over individuals 
becomes most overt.  
 This is especially true of the late novels, in which performance in the 
form of play-acting becomes the very means by which the system short-circuits 
any attempt to locate “unproductive expenditure”—art, games, pleasure, play—
as the locus of oppositional activity. It is most readily apparent in Cocaine Nights, 
in which Bobby Crawford seeks to revitalise civil society in Estrella de Mar by 
encouraging its residents to replicate the kind of licentiousness and petty 
criminality of Gibraltar while evacuating it of any dissident possibility. 
Expressing scepticism that Crawford’s programme of psychopathy will work, 
Charles argues that “[i]f you burgled my house I’d just call the police. I wouldn’t 
join a chess club or take up carol-singing”. Crawford counters: “Absolutely. You’d 
call the police. But suppose the police do nothing and I break in again, this time 
stealing something you really value. You’d start thinking about stronger locks 
and a security camera”. Charles argues that this gets Crawford’s project 
                                                                                                                                          
produces culture, nor even that which is produced as a static entity by culture: rather, the two are 
the same process” (Sinfield “Cultural Materialism” 811). In this way, he suggests a collective, 
subcultural agency is constituted in the moment of dissent. 
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nowhere, since “[w]e’ve returned to square one. I go back to my satellite 
television and my long sleep of the dead” (Ballard Cocaine 243). However, 
Crawford responds: 
 
“You’re not asleep. By now you’re wide awake, more alert than 
you’ve ever been before. The break-ins are like the devout 
Catholic’s wristlet that chafes the skin and sharpens the moral 
sensibility. The next burglary fills you with anger, even self-
righteous rage. The police are useless, fobbing you off with vague 
promises, and that generates a sense of injustice, a feeling that 
you’re surrounded by a world without shame […] The crime wave 
continues—someone shits in your pool, ransacks your bedroom 
and plays around with your wife’s underwear. Now rage and anger 
are not enough. You’re forced to rethink yourself on every level, 
like primitive man confronting a hostile universe behind every 
tree and rock. You’re aware of time, chance, the resources of your 
own imagination. Then someone mugs the woman next door, so 
you team up with the outraged husband. Crime and vandalism are 
everywhere. You have to rise above these mindless thugs and the 
oafish world they inhabit.” (243-244) 
 
Of course, this new-found solidarity with one’s neighbours is organised around 
a grand delusion, since the “crime wave” doesn’t exist—and, what is more, the 
residents of Estrella de Mar know it. That Crawford places himself in the role of 
the burglar throughout his explanation suggests not just that he is speaking in 
hypothetical terms; the more important point is the implication that Charles 
would know who the burglar is, and understand that he had not, properly 
speaking, been the victim of a burglary. Nonetheless, he would continue to play 
the part of the victim, just as Crawford plays the part of the burglar. In this way, 
we see that the disorder that Crawford understands as necessary in order for 
Estrella de Mar to remain stable and productive is nothing more than play-
acting. However, this play-acting represents a moment, first, in which his 
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programme of psychopathy co-opts disorder and renders it “safe”, and second, in 
which the very idea of performativity is evacuated of its dissident potential—in 
which, we might say, it becomes a simulacrum of itself. In this way we are able to 
observe that performativity in Cocaine Nights—as well as Ballard’s other late 
novels—does not subvert or agitate; it serves only to provide a semblance of 
disorder without challenging the social order in any meaningful way.  
 In certain instances, the disorder itself is relatively mundane: 
mischievous—while never exactly ludic—and not explicitly dangerous. 88 
However, much more hints at the oppression and systemic violence that 
undergirds it. Exploring the gutted mansion his brother is supposedly 
responsible for torching, Charles finds a pornographic film made by several of 
Estrella de Mar’s residents. It features as its amateur starlet Anne Hollinger, one 
of the fire’s victims, who plays the role of a bride seduced by her bridesmaid. 
This is exactly the kind of activity Crawford is keen for his followers to carry 
out—Paula, it turns out, is the camera operator—and it begins in a relatively 
benign way. The figures on film, Ballard writes, “played their roles like members 
of an amateur theatrical group taking part in a bawdy farce”. After a “parodic 
lesbian scene” a man arrives and the narrative runs its predictable course; 
however, not long after its conclusion two more men break in and the 
bridesmaids restrain Anne Hollinger while they take turns raping her. As Ballard 
writes: “The bride was no longer acting or colluding with the camera. The 
lesbian porno-film had been a set-up, designed to lure her to this anonymous 
apartment, the mise-en-scène for a real rape for which the bridesmaids, but not 
the heroine, had been prepared” (126). Troubling enough in itself, the reader is 
yet more unsettled when Ballard describes the victim left behind: with “a face 
full of spirit” Anne Hollinger “wiped her eyes with a pillow, and rubbed the torn 
                                                 
88 In one case Crawford steals a speedboat from Marbella harbour during the evening peak and 
motors out to sea, pursued by another craft. He sets the boat alight and swims ashore, where he is 
picked up by Paula Hamilton, Estrella de Mar’s resident doctor and Charles’s lover. Throughout 
the episode the emphasis on performance is unmistakable: “The harbour road,” Ballard writes, 
“was packed with cheering spectators who had stepped from the nightclubs and restaurants to 
enjoy the display” (Ballard Cocaine 144). Indeed, he concludes by describing how Paula waits for 
Crawford to reach the shore “like a chauffeur outside a stage-door after a performance” (145). 
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skin of her arms and knees. Mascara ran in black tears on to her cheeks, and the 
smudged lipstick slewed her mouth to one side. Yet she managed to smile at the 
camera […] a brave child swallowing an unpleasant medicine for her own good” 
(127). The reason this episode is so disturbing is because it blurs any distinction 
between what is real and what is performed in Crawford’s programme of 
elective psychopathy. Does Anne’s smile mitigate the assault in some way, and 
thus render the rape as much of a simulacrum as the rest of the film? Or is the 
latter, in Žižek’s words, one example of “the more subtle forms of coercion that 
sustain relations of domination and exploitation” (Žižek Violence 8), and thus 
demonstrative of the “systemic violence” that prevails at Estrella de Mar? In 
keeping with the emphasis on flexibility that pervades the spaces of Ballard’s 
late novels, the answer can only be that it is both, and it is for this reason that 
the social systems he explores can be said to be truly totalised—even 
totalitarian. The co-optation of disorder in the service of the abolition of 
pluralism means that opportunities for meaningful political action—and thus 
resistance—are effectively nil, and the complete inability to identify where this 
co-optation actually takes place means that systemic violence becomes the rule 
in every instance. 
 This is not to say that Ballard refuses to represent resistance; as Gasiorek 
points out, in all of the late novels the protagonists “eventual[ly] turn away from 
the psychopathic visions that have been vouchsafed them” and stand in some 
sort of opposition to the social system with which they had previously been 
captivated. But Ballard’s appropriation of the neo-noir detective narrative makes 
itself apparent here in the most pessimistic way. In all of Ballard’s late novels the 
narrative strategies we discussed in relation to The Drowned World are present. 
Each is best considered less as a discrete narrative and more as part of a 
whole—“Variations on a Theme of Late Capitalism”, so to speak—but this 
thematic project is also held together by a wider stylistic strategy. The latter 
evidences a similar amalgamation of high and low to that of Ballard’s first 
novels, but he goes farther than at any other point in his career in distancing 
himself from SF and instead appropriates the topoi of detective fiction in order 
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to explore the vacuity of late capitalism.89 In many such narratives the sleuth 
moves from a position of ambivalence in relation to “the job” to a position of 
implication and only at last—far too late—to a position of resistance.90 Ballard’s 
late novels reflect this structure: each protagonist treats the social order he is 
investigating with a certain degree of suspicion at the outset but becomes 
increasingly in thrall to it until at last being convinced of the need to bring it 
                                                 
89 This approach identifies Ballard’s late fiction as a comment on postmodernity even more clearly, as 
it mobilises a form that witnessed an astonishing revival over the course of the 1980s in texts such 
as Paul Auster’s New York Trilogy, which sought to engage the affectless spaces and identities of 
the late twentieth century in a fashion similar to Raymond Chandler’s exploration of the faceless 
modernity of Los Angeles forty years earlier. Given his appropriation of this form, it is hardly 
surprising that the later novels comprise Ballard’s most sustained commitment to first person 
narration, with the attendant figure of the complex, unreliable narrator. This might appear to 
represent a move away from the dispassionate “forensic” strategy of his earliest writing, but in 
fact the neo-noir style is entirely amenable to the reductive approach to characterisation that he 
developed early in his career. None of the characters in the late novels is especially complex and, 
as in his earlier work, Ballard’s focus is on obsessively exploring the only ever slightly variegated 
responses of his specimens to the late capitalist topography they inhabit. But where his earlier 
protagonists often strike the reader as vaguely messianic figures who are determined a priori to 
be “right for their time”, and whose actions are often left unjustified in terms of the plot, in Cocaine 
Nights, Super-Cannes and Kingdom Come the narrators relate to the originating act of violence 
through a family member’s involvement. This renders the connection between the protagonist 
and the violent event that kicks off the narrative both more urgent and more incidental, since the 
narrators are implicated only through an accident of consanguinity, but have an immediate and 
personal stake in the events preceding their involvement, and thus lends the plots a degree of 
exigency that is largely absent from Ballard’s earlier fiction. The emphasis on plot is in keeping 
with generic features of detective fiction; however, in Ballard’s later novels—as in much neo-
noir—this is put to ironic use, as the plot functions as a manifest reality which will eventually 
unfold to reveal a deeper, latent truth: the deeply nihilistic logic of late capitalism. 
90 Obvious examples include Roman Polanski’s Chinatown and Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner. In the 
latter, cynical police assassin Deckard is brought out of retirement to hunt down five bio-
engineered humanoids known as replicants that have landed illegally on Earth. As Deckard hunts 
down each in turn, his relationship with a female replicant named Rachel becomes romantic and 
the job weighs more and more heavily on his conscience. The conclusion is uncertain—not least 
because of the famously tortuous debates over which cut best represents Scott’s “authentic” 
vision—but in each it is implied that Deckard, having completed the job, has become both a 
persona non grata (and possibly a replicant himself), and has been manoeuvred into a position of 
oppositionality in respect to his former employers. 
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down. In every case, however, we doubt that resistance will truly prevent that 
order from regrouping and asserting itself once more. As Gasiorek argues, all of 
Ballard’s late novels 
 
end on a note of uncertainty because there is a strong sense that 
the narrators’ culminating protest […] will be ineffectual, and that 
the social forces ranged against them will prevail. Inasmuch as 
deterministic systems have always figured prominently in 
Ballard’s texts, in these late works the power of such systems 
appears to be all-embracing. The belatedly awakened subject 
becomes aware of the system’s criminality but is powerless to do 
anything about it; this personal knowledge, in short, makes no 
difference, precisely because the subject is figured as a puny entity 
whose interventions have no capacity to disturb the flows and 
exchanges of globalised multinational networks of power. The 
most chilling ending is to be found in Super-Cannes where it is 
clear that Sinclair’s rebellion will fail because he is a figure from a 
superseded past whose values will be no match for the 
streamlined supercharged networks of the future: his one-man 
uprising, a parody of male heroism, will be no match for the 
corporate world, and the text’s last image is of obdurate corporate 
power. (Gasiorek 174) 
 
The catalyst for Paul’s final act of resistance in Super-Cannes is two-fold: firstly, 
the plight and murder of the femme fatale figure Frances Baring, with whom he 
has been having an affair; secondly, the degradation of his wife. Jane’s gradual 
abasement and exploitation is a particularly troubling expression of Eden-
Olympia’s ability to anticipate and co-opt dissent before using performative 
disorder to deploy it after its own interests. Early in the novel Jane is 
characterised as doughtily ambitious, and in every respect the more assertive 
and successful party in her marriage. Twenty-seven when Paul—more than a 
decade older—met her at Guy’s Hospital following his flying accident, he 
 
154 
suspected at first that she was “some renegade sixth-form schoolgirl who had 
borrowed a white coat and decided to try her hand at a little doctoring” (Ballard 
Cannes 42-43). And it was this indomitable streak—as well as his fondness for 
adolescent-looking women—that attracted him to her. Indeed, early in the novel 
he conceives of her as Joan of Arc, an archetype of empowered femininity, and 
remembers how he was thrilled that she “smoked pot at the reception held at 
the Royal College of Surgeons in Regent’s Park, sniffed a line of cocaine in front 
of her mother […] and gave an impassioned speech describing how we made 
love in the rear seat of the Harvard, a complete fiction that even her father 
cheered” (44). The confiscation of Paul’s flying license following the accident is 
clearly intended to suggest that his masculinity has been compromised, but he 
appears at ease with this situation, and happy to defer to the demands of his 
wife’s career. However, her sojourn at Eden-Olympia signals an imminent 
assimilation: upon their arrival, Ballard notes ominously that “[t]he heroine of 
‘La Marseillaise’ was about to sheathe her sword” (45). While Penrose 
encourages Paul to engage with the violent masculinity of the ratissages Jane 
becomes increasingly passive as the less palatable aspects of her femininity are 
remoulded into a more acceptable form. She moves in with neighbours Alain 
and Simone Delage and embarks on a lesbian affair with the latter that is in no 
way provocative or political; instead it functions as a kind of homosocial 
domestic quietism, a period of incubation before Jane re-emerges into the world 
in a “safer” guise. And the scene in which this emergence takes place evidences 
the same confusion of performative disorder and systemic violence that we 
witness in the pornographic film episode of Cocaine Nights. Watching Jane climb 
out of the Delages’ Mercedes into the seedy backstreets of Cannes, Paul initially 
mistakes her for “a young prostitute in high-heels and a sequinned shift dress”. 
Recognising his wife he turns to Halder—Eden-Olympia’s chief of security, who 
has driven him into town—and asks “What’s she playing at? It looks like a stage 
act”; Halder replies, “I don’t think it is...” (381-382). Neither Paul nor Halder can 
determine whether or not this is a performance—and nor, indeed, can Jane: for 
when Paul intervenes and takes her away, she says, “Something went wrong. It 
didn’t feel like a game any more” (384). She recognises her own assimilation, but 
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her inability to determine when and how this took place—indeed whether it 
was a game or not—renders her incapable of resisting it. 
 
* * * 
 
Of course, the most important thing to note about this episode is that it takes 
place in La Bocca, in the suburb we characterised as a zone of morbidity. Why is 
Jane Sinclair—a senior member of Eden-Olympia’s staff—being encouraged to 
identify herself with the homines sacri of La Bocca? Could it be the case that the 
ontological divide we identified as the only meaningful social division in this 
milieu is not as meaningful as we first suspected? In performing the role of 
homo sacer, does Jane become that role? Such a suggestion would chime with 
Žižek’s recent proclamation that “[t]oday, we are all potentially homo sacer, and 
the only way to avoid actually becoming so is to act preventively” (Žižek 
“Beginning” 55). But we may want to question what “authentic” act is available 
to us in a social situation as pessimistic as that of Ballard’s late novels, in which 
any conceivable act of dissent only serves to bolster the system against which 
the dissenter seeks to militate. What is the meaning of acting “preventively” in a 
world in which the logics that would designate us homines sacri are virtually 
impossible to resist? This, from Violence, would appear to be Žižek’s answer: 
 
Better to do nothing than to engage in localised acts the ultimate 
function of which is to make the system run more smoothly (acts 
such as providing space for the multitude of new subjectivities). 
The threat today is not passivity, but pseudo-activity, the urge to 
“be active”, to “participate”, to mask the nothingness of what goes 
on. People intervene all the time, “do something”; academics 
participate in meaningless debates, and so on. The truly difficult 
thing is to step back, to withdraw […] If one means by violence a 
radical upheaval of the basic social relations, then [...s]ometimes, 
doing nothing is the most violent thing to do. (Violence 183) 
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And so we return to the politics of rejection with which Ballard concluded The 
Drowned World. For, faced with a social situation as pessimistic as that of his late 
novels, is Kerans’s journey into the wilderness—his act of negation, of stepping 
back and withdrawing—the only strategy that remains? If it is, it hardly gets us 
very far, as we seem bound still to take up the mantle of homo sacer—the very 
category Žižek’s “preventive” act is supposed to prevent. Thus, if we are right to 
detect in Ballard’s first novel a rudimentary form of the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement, it would appear he was a great deal more prescient than we 
gave him credit for at the beginning of our discussion. For Žižek’s imperative 
seems to convict these politics even as it lays the foundations for their 
redemption: in abandoning any stake in the political world it appears they have 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and we are now required to commit to them in 
earnest. Are we, like Kerans, to wander off into a realm of morbidity and death 
in the hope that through our demise we can transcend totality and locate new 
“landscapes of justice”, new polities, new politics? It may not be an appealing 
notion, but perhaps cataclysm alone contains the promise of the new. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
WHAT WE CAN’T HAVE NOW: 
Locating Urban Culture in 21st Century British Fiction 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between cataclysm and beginning anew will occupy our 
attention shortly, as we bring this investigation to a close. Before we do this, 
however, it behoves us to see what remains of urban culture—the primary 
vehicle for Left culturalism’s emancipatory project—after the profoundly 
gloomy conclusions of the previous chapter. We have seen how J.G. Ballard’s late 
novels explain the hegemonic position of neoliberalism within the postmodern 
city in terms of the depredation of politics by Left and Right alike. I have argued 
that the terminal zones of Cocaine Nights and Super-Cannes offer us a vision of 
complete capitulation to the forces of late capital, and suggested that, via a 
characteristic focus on deterministic social systems, Ballard’s work indicates that we 
must engage with the death of politics as a discrete kind of human activity if we want 
to arrive at a fuller understanding of postmodernity. The cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement may have begun as an idea; an experiment with freedom aimed 
at uncovering new kinds of left-wing praxis. However, in exploring Ballard’s utopian 
engagement with a similar (though more rudimentary) politics of withdrawal and 
rejection early on in his career, and discussing how he reappraised this project later 
on in his life, we have seen that the celebration of exile that undergirded the cultural 
politics of disenfranchisement dramatically foreclosed the possibility of resistance at 
the turn of the twenty-first century. 
In light of this I think it worthwhile now to revisit the animating component 
of Left culturalism’s experiment with freedom, in order to evaluate its place in recent 
British literature. Because only by discussing the relationship between culture and 
the city in our own historical moment will we fully understand how their 
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separation—first witnessed in The Black Album—remains a barrier to 
progressive aspirations. And only in this way will we be able to confront the 
intractable impasse Left culturalism faces today. In order to do this I intend to 
discuss two novels, both published in 2005, which have attracted a huge amount 
of popular and critical attention: Saturday by Ian McEwan and Never Let Me Go, 
by Kazuo Ishiguro. These novels, I want to suggest, demonstrate the way in 
which an alignment of the urban experience with a progressive understanding 
of culture is now largely impossible to represent. The utopian imagination that 
made such an alignment possible in The Passion now finds itself hamstrung to 
such an extent that the narrative choice today is between anachronism and 
quietism; a conservative recuperation of antiquated cultural politics or a 
despairing refusal to represent the city altogether. 
 
 
1. Rehabilitating the City: Ian McEwan’s Saturday 
 
We will begin with a more sanguine account of the city which is only the more 
compelling for being deeply problematic. Ian McEwan’s Saturday is notable, I 
want to suggest, because it represents an attempt to rehabilitate the city as an 
embodiment of the common good. The novel uses the city not merely to reflect 
on the way in which we currently live, or more vigorously to critique that way of 
life, but in its own way to celebrate the contingency and propinquity of urban 
existence as a fundamentally precious component of the status quo. And while 
this attitude clearly gestures towards conservatism, the significance of its 
articulation in a British context which remains prevailingly anti-urban should 
not be underestimated.91 
                                                 
91 To claim that Britain remains, culturally speaking—and even in terms of urban policy—stubbornly 
anti-urban might seem counterfactual when the current situation is compared to thirty years ago. 
However, while it is true that successive recent governments have tried to incentivise the 
development of medium- or high-density, mixed-use communities on brownfield sites close to 
urban cores calibrated to attract enterprises that might previously have operated out of business 
parks, much residential development continues to take place towards the outskirts of large 
conurbations or around commuter exclaves with ready access to the motorway network. The 
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 Saturday takes place over the course of a single day—15 February 
2003—when a million-strong march took place in London in protest over the 
imminent invasion of Iraq. The novel’s protagonist is Henry Perowne, a 
successful neurosurgeon, who lives with his wife Rosalind and son Theo in 
Fitzrovia. His daughter Daisy, a graduate student and poet, lives in Paris and is 
due home for a family dinner at which her maternal grandfather, Grammaticus, 
will also be present. In the morning, Perowne wakes early and looks out of the 
window to see a cargo plane descending into Heathrow on fire. He learns on the 
rolling news that the fire was caused by a technical malfunction rather than a 
terrorist attack, but the event explicitly locates the narrative in a post-
September 11 setting and serves as an ominous portent of violence and disaster 
which overshadows the rest of the novel. On his way to play squash Perowne’s 
car collides with another, a “series five BMW” which he “associates for no good 
reason with criminality” (McEwan Saturday 83). Three men climb out of the car 
and in the ensuing disagreement over who is responsible for the collision 
Perowne is punched to the ground. Diagnosing the gang leader’s tics and 
tremors as Huntington’s Disease, Perowne buys himself some time by 
persuading Baxter that there is a way of alleviating the disease before escaping 
largely unhurt. Later, when the family is assembled for dinner, Baxter and his 
gang force their way into the house and there follows a tense stand-off, during 
which Grammaticus is punched in the face and a knife is held to Rosalind’s 
throat. Perowne again tries to emolliate Baxter, promising him that he has a 
paper on an experimental trial to cure Huntington’s in his office upstairs, but 
Baxter refuses to be duped. He forces Daisy to undress, and, in the process of 
complying, she reveals that she is pregnant. Spotting her collection of poetry, My 
                                                                                                                                          
recent enthusiasm for so-called “eco-towns” must be appraised in this light: the draft Planning 
Policy Statement for eco-towns is strikingly similar to Ebeneezer Howard’s garden city concept, 
deemed fundamentally anti-urban by Jane Jacobs (Jacobs Death and Life 18). In short, despite the 
markedly metropolitan disposition of recent Labour administrations when compared to their Tory 
forebears, the urban agenda remains shot through with an imperative to put distance between 
oneself and city. And we don’t have to go very far to witness this attitude in contemporary British 
culture: daytime property programmes of the last decade have invariably sung the praises of 
swapping urban living for commuterville, an attitude epitomised by BBC Two’s Escape to the 
Country (2002-present). 
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Saucy Bark, on the table, one of the gang orders her to read out her “dirtiest one. 
Something really filthy” (220). Instead, Daisy recites Matthew Arnold’s “Dover 
Beach” from heart and the poem so impresses Baxter that he relents, announces 
he will take the Huntington’s trial and asks Perowne to show him the research 
paper in his office. Knowing that his lie is about to be revealed, Perowne slowly 
leads Baxter upstairs. While they are gone the family overpowers the other two 
assailants and Theo runs to help his father; together they toss Baxter down the 
stairs, where he is knocked unconscious on a skirting board. Later, Perowne 
receives a call from the hospital asking him to operate on “an extradural, male, 
mid twenties, [who] fell down the stairs” (232). Knowing that he will be saving 
the life of a man who attacked his family, Perowne operates successfully before 
returning home early in the morning and falling asleep next to his wife. The 
novel ends with a reproduction of “Dover Beach” in full. 
 Since John Banville’s scathing 2005 review of Saturday in the New York 
Review of Books, the novel has generated a significant body of negative criticism, 
much of which hinges on its failure to come to terms with the diversity of 
contemporary British society and the problematic role it carves out for culture 
within that society.92 The sheer volume of criticism suggests that the novel was 
received in exactly the way McEwan seems to have hoped: as an expression of 
the fractious post-9/11 zeitgeist. However, the tone of much of this material is 
                                                 
92 The first sentiment is most succinctly expressed by Elizabeth Kowaleski Wallace, who suggests that 
“McEwan’s novel continually glances at a multicultural and cosmopolitan society with which it 
resists engagement” (Wallace 467). And Frances Ferguson provides an eloquent summary of the 
second, which objects to “the emphasis on domesticity and art as the provinces of true love and 
cultivated understanding” (Ferguson 45). Of course, these two sentiments are hardly 
unconnected, and the link between them is nicely captured in Michael L. Ross’s implication that at 
root Saturday is a signal product of (neo)liberalism: “The ‘confused alarms of trouble and flight’ 
heard by Arnold in ‘Dover Beach’ permeate the London of Saturday. What they portend is a 
narrowing and hardening of the liberal vision that had once energized the Condition of England 
novel” (Michael L. Ross 93). McEwan’s intimate relationship with liberalism would seem fairly 
clear, considering his explanation of the shift that took place in his political sensibility while 
writing The Child in Time (1987): “From then on, I’ve never really been interested in anything 
other than trying to find connections between the public and private, and exploring how the two 
are in conflict, how they sometimes reflect each other, how the political invades the private world” 
(qtd. in Ross 76). 
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closer to frustration than dismissal, and I think this implies that Saturday might 
most appropriately be approached as a kind of ideological failure rather than a 
dreadful book from beginning to end.93 This is not to deny that there are 
objections to voice—and plenty of them. There is no denying that for the most 
part Saturday salivates over the Perowne family’s lifestyle—the professions and 
hobbies, house, car and bolt-hole abroad—while refusing to meditate on the 
material circumstances of its most disenfranchised characters.94 And plenty of 
problems arise if the novel is read as an allegory of the Third Gulf War, since it 
transparently represents a moral case for interventionism even as the high 
ground it seeks to secure is eroded by McEwan’s wonderment at the technology 
and terminology behind Perowne’s own (medical) interventions.95 Moreover, its 
                                                 
93 Take, for example, Wallace’s lament that “[m]ore powerfully than any previous novel by McEwan, 
Saturday evokes an all-encompassing cosmopolitanism that it then paradoxically marginalizes”. I 
wonder whether Wallace draws attention to this paradox not simply because it supports her 
(compelling) thesis that Saturday is symptomatic of the UK’s “postcolonial melancholia”, but also 
in dismay of the fact that it falls short of fulfilling a progressive potential which, early on, it seems 
to promise: “Saturday is unique in its failure to carry through on the very conversation it 
introduces: what does England become in the wake of its imperial greatness? How does it turn 
from a nineteenth-century understanding of nation and race with its vast inequities of social 
privilege and wealth, to a socially just, multicultural society in the twenty-first century?” (Wallace 
467). 
94 It needs to be acknowledged, however, that Perowne’s class status is often communicated by means 
of gentle satire, for instance when McEwan describes Perowne struggling to overcome his guilt at 
owning a Mercedes. When a trip to Scotland gives him an excuse to put his vehicle through its 
paces, Perowne is quickly convinced of its magnificence and his guilt replaced by an 
understanding of himself as “the owner, the master” of something possessing “Lutheran genius” 
(McEwan Saturday 75). Despite some critics’ objections to what they consider to be McEwan’s 
fawning representation of Perowne, it would be a little ridiculous to argue that this 
characterisation is entirely without irony. As Magali Cornier Michael argues, “McEwan’s strategic 
use of a third person limited perspective allows the text to represent Perowne’s actions and 
thoughts while simultaneously presenting and subtly criticizing Perowne as symptomatic of and 
complicit with the problems Western cultures and human beings face in the contemporary 
moment” (Michael 28). This is quite right, but the question remains, however, as to whether 
McEwan is ironic enough. 
95 Something I think we can interpret in terms of the somewhat less-than-moral technofetishism, the 
“shock and awe”, which ultimately accompanied the invasion of Iraq. Again, there is a dash of 
satire when McEwan focalises the narrative through his protagonist and writes using a falsely 
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gender politics are rather dubious: while it is true that Rosalind is at least as 
successful in her career as her husband, Daisy’s pregnancy can easily be read as 
the revenge of immanence on a female body which has hitherto been concerned 
rather too much with its own pleasure. And while the replacement of her “saucy 
bark” with Arnold’s sonorous Victorianism only compounds the offence,96 this 
moment also sees McEwan at his most atavistic on another matter. Because 
ultimately Saturday seems to keen for a Victorian moment in which culture 
provided moral ballast—a dose of Arnoldian “sweetness and light”—for a 
society whose futurity was predicated on scientific progress in the service of 
private profit. And this does indeed result in a tendency to “rationalize class 
privilege”, as Frances Ferguson puts it (Ferguson 45). 
                                                                                                                                          
modest, passive voice that “[i]t is said that no one opens up faster than Henry Perowne” (McEwan 
Saturday 251). However, the reader never really doubts his admiration for Perowne, and one of 
the ways this admiration manifests itself is in the latter’s ability to manipulate sophisticated 
equipment and command a rarefied vocabulary which, it is safe to assume, most of McEwan’s 
readers cannot. In places—especially towards the end—the novel begins to read a little like the 
teleplay for a daytime medical drama as the prose seems designed not just to ensure 
verisimilitude but to impress the reader through bafflement rather than edification. For instance, 
McEwan writes that Baxter was “drowsy in casualty, with a Glasgow Coma Score of thirteen 
dropping to eleven. Skull lacerations, no other injury recorded. Normal C-Spine X-ray. They did a 
scan, ordered a crash induction and sent him straight up” (249). And later: “Emily passes him the 
hypodermic she has prepared. Quickly she injects in several places under skin, along the line of 
the laceration and beyond. It’s not strictly necessary, but the adrenaline in the lignocaine helps 
reduce the bleeding” (251). Any reader who is getting a little fed-up with the barrage of jargon 
might at this point wish to draw an analogy between the lignocaine and McEwan’s use of technical 
vocabulary: it isn’t strictly necessary, and its heavy-handed deployment seems contrived to elicit 
awe for anybody who can decipher it—most of all Perowne. 
96 We will return to this issue shortly. In her dense but fruitful investigation into Saturday’s “neo-
Victorianism”, Molly Clark Hillard argues that the novel’s account of gender is problematic not just 
because of its representation of Daisy, but also because of how it invokes and then obscures its 
premier formal intertext, Mrs Dalloway. Hillard writes of the “Dover Beach” episode: “Matthew 
Arnold is recited, and then reprised, as if to say, ‘Do you hear? This is not Woolf’. Again, upon first 
reading, indeed, upon my own first reading, the ‘Dover Beach’ episode appears to elaborately 
establish male authority in order to disavow feminine influence [...] If this interpretation were 
correct, then McEwan with one stroke created a scene of richly layered chauvinism, in which the 
nation—rendered concomitantly as the female body shielded by male literary heritage—deflects 
an attack by forces rendered simultaneously philistine, anarchist, and terrorist” (Hillard 188). 
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 In the context of McEwan criticism (and the best tradition of “the 
Tradition”) the response would no doubt be that culture is ultimately vindicated 
as an important corrective to the hard-headedness of science and commerce.97 
And it is true that, at first glance, Saturday seems to qualify for such a defence. 
McEwan repeatedly identifies Perowne’s lack of any artistic faculty as a kind of 
failure, for instance in the novel’s penultimate paragraph: 
 
Daisy recited a poem that cast a spell on one man. Perhaps any 
poem would have done the trick, and thrown the switch on a 
sudden mood change. Still, Baxter fell for the magic, he was 
transfixed by it, and he was reminded how much he wanted to live. 
No one can forgive him the use of the knife. But Baxter heard what 
Henry never has, and probably never will, despite all Daisy’s 
attempts to educate him. (McEwan Saturday 278) 
 
However, even if we are able to overlook the essentially disparaging 
representation of poetry in this passage (it could have been “any poem” that 
Baxter “fell for”; he is, after all, only “one man”), the very notion of a corrective 
implies a relationship that is not dialogical but hierarchical. The corrective term 
in any given binary may complement the other, but it nonetheless remains 
necessarily subordinate to it, as well as, in turn, and in a more total way, 
corrected by it. The original corrective term is thus hardly corrective at all; it 
serves simply to legitimise the dominant term by providing the illusion of 
correction. According to this logic, Baxter (who is affected by Daisy’s recital) 
                                                 
97 An argument that is atavistic in the extreme: as any reader of Raymond Williams will know, this is 
really the grand problematic from which the complex term “culture” emerged, as a way of 
answering the threat of a complete mechanisation and commercialisation of the human faculties 
under industrial capitalism. “I wish to show”, Williams writes at the beginning of Culture and 
Society, “the emergence of culture as an abstraction and an absolute: an emergence which, in a 
very complex way, merges two general responses—first, the recognition of the practical 
separation of certain moral and intellectual activities from the driven impetus of a new kind of 
society; second, the emphasis of these activities, as a court of human appeal, to be set over the 
processes of practical social judgement and yet to offer itself as a mitigating and rallying 
alternative” (Raymond Williams Culture and Society xvii, emphasis in original). 
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might be read in the first instance as a kind of corrective to Perowne (who is 
not). On a social level, Baxter serves to remind Perowne that along with wealth 
comes a duty of care for those less fortunate, but this social reading is entangled 
with a more important epistemological inference: that for every rational, 
scientific world-view we require another—apparently, best provided by liberal 
humanism—which forces us to confront the unavoidable contingency of 
everyday life.98 And perhaps this is why Perowne ultimately saves Baxter: that 
the latter is affected by Daisy’s recital suggests he possesses a mode of thinking 
which Perowne does not, but which the neurosurgeon recognises as a necessary 
corrective to his own perspective on the world.  
This, at least, would be the generous reading of Saturday’s conclusion. Less 
generous would be to point out that, in addition to—or even rather than—
correcting Perowne’s epistemological position, Baxter also serves to legitimise 
it, which is why he must be kept alive. In this way Perowne’s selflessness comes 
to seem more calculated than at first, and Baxter’s moral debt can be read as an 
obscene legitimation of, on the one hand, a grossly iniquitous neoliberal logic 
which indentures and criminalises the poor while protecting the interests of the 
rich, and, on the other, the domineering binarism of Enlightenment 
epistemology which ensures the complete subordination of one binary term 
(culture) to another (science). After all, the novel’s conclusion hardly represents 
social and epistemological parity: while Perowne (who was not affected by 
Daisy’s recital) luxuriates in his bourgeois palace, the street-dwelling, drug-
peddling Baxter (who was) lies in a hospital bed, vegetative but—vitally—alive.  
                                                 
98 The epistemological dimension of the relationship between culture and science is given an 
optimistic reading by Susan Green, who enthuses that “[w]ith Saturday, McEwan has achieved a 
new form of science fiction, deploying the language and interests of science as narrative 
technique, and promoting a cultural shift in ideas about consciousness. McEwan is successfully 
using the popular, accessible genre of the novel as a vehicle by which to communicate serious, 
contemporary concerns, thereby constructing Saturday as a meta-text to shift attention to exactly 
how it is that we know what we know—as well as to explore what we do not yet understand” (70-
71). The implication is that McEwan goes some way towards bridging the divide between the “two 
cultures” of science and the humanities identified in 1959 by C.P. Snow, which Green cites at the 
beginning of her essay along with the debate that took place in 1882 between Matthew Arnold 
and T.H. Huxley, which revealed a similar schism. 
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And unless he is being devilishly ironic, McEwan seems content for this ending 
to be received happily, as providing political as well as narrative closure. 
 It should be clear from this reading that, like many other critics, I do not 
consider Saturday to represent a laudable step forward. This said, I think the 
significance of the city to its broadly optimistic conclusion—optimistic, at least, 
when taken on its own terms—gives us reason to pause, and to some degree this 
is because of the repeated, explicit situation of the narrative in the inner-London 
neighbourhood of Fitzrovia. The area is well-known for accommodating 
numerous political and artistic personalities and institutions over the centuries, 
including Thomas Paine, George Bernard Shaw, George Orwell and various clubs 
connected to the counter-cultural movements of the 1960s and punk in the 70s. 
At the very least we can read this as a recognition of the urban neighbourhood 
as an important site for the exchange of radical ideas, and if we were feeling 
more generous we might suggest that McEwan’s painstaking and largely positive 
evocation of a place closely associated with the oppositional sensibility might 
serve to mitigate the novel’s less than palatable cultural politics. Of course, if we 
were in a gloomier mood the location might serve simply as grist to the mill, a 
further sign of McEwan’s unwelcome erasure of any recent cultural endeavour 
he finds discomfiting or irrelevant to the demands of the contemporary 
period—indeed, that Saturday self-consciously arrogates to itself the literary 
style of Fitzrovia’s most famous resident, Virginia Woolf, might serve only to 
make this strategy more outrageous. But if we resist the temptation of this 
gloominess for a moment, I think we might recognise in McEwan’s endorsement 
of the city something worthwhile. For, despite the critique outlined above, the 
novel does seem in its early pages to perceive the unavoidable contingency and 
pluralism of urban existence as something remarkable and worth preserving. 
Describing Perowne gazing out on Fitzroy Square in the early hours of the 
morning, McEwan writes that while his protagonist “likes the symmetry of black 
cast-iron posts” and “the lattice of cobbled gutters”, while he considers his “own 
corner” to be “a triumph of congruent proportion”, the essential disarrangement 
of the square contains a value that equals or even exceeds those of order and 
symmetry. “The overfull litter baskets”, he writes, 
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suggest abundance rather than squalor; the vacant benches set 
around the circular gardens look benignly expectant of their daily 
traffic—cheerful lunchtime office crowds, the solemn, studious 
boys from the Indian hostel, lovers in quiet raptures or crisis, the 
crepuscular drug dealers, the ruined old lady with her wild, 
haunting calls. Go away! she’ll shout for hours at a time, and 
squawk harshly, sounding like some marsh bird or zoo creature. 
(5) 
 
Although Fitzrovia may have its origins in Georgian architectonics and the 
attendant preference for orderly planning and a muted approach to 
ornamentation, it pleases Perowne that over the course of three hundred years 
Charlotte Street, the neighbourhood’s main thoroughfare, has been transformed 
into “a foreshortened jumble of façades, scaffolding and pitched roofs”. What 
began as an insentient, rationalised space of the type fetishised by architects 
from Wren to Woods Elder and Junior, Haussman to le Corbusier, has evolved 
into the kind of place that exists solely by dint of daily rituals of inhabitation. 
The passage above implies an intimate relationship between the urban 
environment and the people who use it: the disorderliness of the former also 
serves to characterise the latter; the pluralism of the latter also inheres in the 
former. And McEwan is explicit in identifying this living urbanism as the root of 
Perowne’s belief that “the city is a success, a brilliant invention, a biological 
masterpiece—millions teeming around the accumulated and layered 
achievements of the centuries, as though around a coral reef, sleeping, working, 
entertaining themselves, harmonious for the most part, nearly everyone 
wanting it to work” (5). 
 This sanguine characterisation of the urban experience readily recalls the 
“structured chaos” that is so crucial to Sennett’s model of urban civilization, as 
well as Jane Jacobs’s celebration of the diverse New York neighbourhood in The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities,.99 It calls to mind a communitarian 
                                                 
99 Indeed, some of the most famous passages from Death and Life can be read as perfect expressions 
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understanding of the city which is capable of accommodating pluralism and 
contingency without inevitably neutralising them. In other words, it is a model 
of urban living which, once upon a time, was perceived as quite amenable to 
progressive appropriation, in which the city is conceived of as a series of 
contiguous places that are defined particularly, cumulatively and collectively, 
and which stands at odds with the atomising and dispossessory logics of both 
edge-city expansionism and inner-city gentrification. This marks out Saturday’s 
representation of contingency from the rest of McEwan’s oeuvre in quite an 
important way. For while we might be inclined to agree with Michael Wood that 
the novel accords with McEwan’s career-length obsession with evaluating the 
impact of violent contingency on the modern (white, male) subject, we must 
also acknowledge that, unlike much of the rest of his fiction, Saturday begins 
from a point at which contingency is already accepted as an inevitable—and, to 
a limited but nonetheless significant extent, welcome—component of everyday 
urban experience. Wood writes that “[i]n different ways, most of Ian McEwan’s 
novels and stories are about trauma and contingency, and he is now best known 
as the great contemporary stager of traumatic contingency as it strikes ordinary 
lives”. He goes on to list some of the agents of contingency to appear in 
McEwan’s fiction and concludes, logically enough, with Baxter, whom he 
                                                                                                                                          
of this model—perfect in both their consonance and eloquence—and invite comparison with the 
excerpts from Saturday quoted above. One example is the so-called “Ballet of Hudson Street”, in 
which Jacobs describes a day in the life of her Greenwich Village neighbourhood, and which 
begins: “Under the seeming disorder of the old city, wherever the old city is working successfully, 
is a marvelous order for maintaining the safety of the streets and the freedom of the city. It is a 
complex order. Its essence is intricacy or pavement use, bringing with it a constant succession of 
eyes. This order is all composed of movement and change, and although it is life, not art, we may 
fancifully call it the art form of the city and liken it to the dance – not to a simple-minded precision 
dance with everyone kicking up at the same time, twirling in unison and bowing off en masse, but 
to an intricate ballet in which the individual dancers and ensembles all have distinctive parts 
which miraculously reinforce each other and compose an orderly whole. The ballet of the good 
city pavement never repeats itself from place to place, and in any one place is always replete with 
new improvisations” (Jacobs Death and Life 50). There is a flip side to using this passage as an 
intertext when approaching Saturday, as the New Urbanism on which Jacobs’s writing had such a 
formative influence has sometimes been identified as a key agent of gentrification in the 
postmodern city.  
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describes as “contingency personified” (Wood par. 1). Considered in light of the 
critical reading advanced above, which dismisses Saturday’s narrative as a 
strategy of containment, this characterisation of Baxter seems quite right. 
However, to reduce the novel’s account of contingency to Baxter alone is to 
overlook the concept’s centrality to McEwan’s fundamentally optimistic 
representation of the city. Because, unlike his early material—in particular The 
Comfort of Strangers (1981)—whose oppressive foreboding begins at the outset 
and never relents, and unlike Enduring Love (1997), whose opening passages 
are so pastoral, so halcyon, that the ensuing disruption seems inevitable—
dialectical, rather than random—Saturday begins with an enthusiastic account 
of how contingency is a necessary and important part of the contemporary 
urban experience. 
 Thus we might actually say that there are two kinds of contingency 
represented in Saturday: the first by the city, the second by Baxter. The 
concatenation of the two is vital, since it is largely because of McEwan’s 
insistence on containing the latter that his endorsement of the former fails. 
However, critics have tended not to distinguish between them at all, treating 
Baxter too straightforwardly as a metonym for the threatening urban landscape 
beyond the Perownes’ front door. This is perhaps because—due to the formal 
properties of the literary novel, and the continued belief that subjectivity is the 
most profitable site of political contest—they have preferred to subordinate the 
novel’s account of space to its representation of character. But while this 
hermeneutic strategy has enabled valid criticisms of the novel, it has also led to 
appraisals that are insensitive to its complex account of the city. For instance, 
Wallace points out that the Perownes’ house is emblematic of a paranoid, 
embattled urban bourgeoisie which fears the diverse and dangerous metropolis 
beyond its door: “[T]he family home in London”, she writes, “is heavily fortified 
against anything that might disturb its peace”, and while “Henry himself marvels 
at the house’s security system […] McEwan does nothing to suggest that this 
hardware is meant to be ironic” (Wallace 473). The point is well-taken; however, 
Saturday is a novel that delights in recording details, and we are entitled to ask 
for what purpose each detail is recorded. In this instance I think that McEwan’s 
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laborious description of the security system functions not just to signify the 
family’s fear of invasion, but also to anticipate the invasion that actually takes 
place at the end—particularly the ease with which Baxter’s gang circumvents 
the family’s attempts at spatial fortification. As such, the passage Wallace 
describes is absolutely ironic: Perowne thinks that the security hardware makes 
him safe but McEwan knows that he is fooling himself and quietly communicates 
this to the reader, in the process gently satirising his protagonist.  
To be clear: I am not suggesting that critics are mistaken in claiming that 
Baxter is represented as a threat. Rather, I am trying to suggest that the city is 
not reducible to this one character; that it exceeds him and thus cannot be read 
in a straightforwardly allegorical way. Indeed, at one point in her critique, 
Wallace seems to acknowledge this when she writes that Baxter is “[n]ot a fully-
fleshed villain […] too one-dimensional to engage the reader’s attention or to 
matter much to Henry”. Yet this does not inspire her to revise her reading of the 
novel. As she observes: 
 
If indeed [Baxter] stands in for a larger and more persistent 
menace—the militant poor, the citizens of the developing world, 
or even an Arab extremist—then McEwan’s fantasy becomes 
especially facile. Could his point really be to suggest that, when 
confronted by those who hate us, the West need only resort to its 
wits, its encyclopedic knowledge of science, and to hold out hope 
of a “cure” in order to distract those who would otherwise seek to 
harm us? That, in the end, we will easily overpower those who 
invade the sanctity of our homes, and that it will then be our 
obligation and duty to “fix” whatever injuries they’ve received in 
the process? (476) 
 
The answer to this question is, I think, yes. And, read in this way, Saturday’s 
conclusion is every bit as problematic as this reading suggests. But if we shift 
away from character and towards space—specifically urban space—as a way of 
explaining its undeniably problematic ending, we see that it is a good deal more 
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complex than Wallace allows. Because I think that it is important to 
acknowledge that in certain ways the novel does attempt to retain its early 
endorsement of the city right up to its conclusion. Explaining to Rosalind why he 
is going to the hospital to operate on Baxter, Perowne says, “I had a scrape in the 
car with him this morning […] And a stupid showdown on the pavement […] I 
have to see this through. I’m responsible […] If I’d handled things better this 
morning, perhaps none of this would’ve happened […] I feel I ought to go. And I 
want to go” (McEwan Saturday 238-240). Taking the novel on its own terms 
here, this is the only point at which Perowne occupies an explicit position of 
guilt; when McEwan actively encourages his audience to judge his protagonist—
and, moreover, find him accountable. Of course, anybody committed to social 
justice must object that Perowne’s crime exceeds the charge levelled at him by 
quite a degree, and that his admission of guilt hardly engenders Dostoevskian 
levels of self-recrimination; indeed, viewed in this way, expiation does not cost 
him very much at all. But rather than focusing solely on the magnitude of 
Perowne’s punishment and seeking justice for the crimes he supposedly gets 
away with, it is worth drawing attention to the way in which this judgement is 
constructed, because the city plays an important role in it. As Wood argues, what 
brings Perowne and Baxter together in the first place is “that most random of 
urban events, the car crash” (Wood par. 1). And as the contingency and 
propinquity of urban living precipitated the “scrape”, Perowne does not shrink 
from acknowledging that, if this model of living is to be tenable at all, he must 
attend to his obligation to those with whom he shares urban space. Read in this 
way, Perowne’s treatment of Baxter seems less an act of selfishness, or of 
charity, than a duty demanded of him by the city.100 And acknowledging this 
                                                 
100 Ferguson even goes so far as to suggest that the operation on Baxter represents a kind of love: 
“Nothing in the novel or the news offers us a cure for dementia or Huntington’s Disease or the 
possibility of escaping ageing and death. But as Henry describes the moment in neurosurgery 
when ‘the patient’s identity is restored, when a small area of violently revealed brain is returned 
to the possession of the entire person’ and speaks of it as marking ‘a return to life’, he also ‘feels he 
could almost mistake it for tenderness’. Baxter, the man whom Henry had once described—in the 
wake of their traffic accident—as ‘the only person in the world he [hated]’—has become the 
beneficiary not of love but of something that ‘could almost’ be mistaken for it. Professionalism 
may have its privileges, but in Saturday it appears as a way of converting an impersonal 
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might encourage us to concede that McEwan’s celebration of urban living at the 
novel’s outset forms part of a much grander narrative whose purpose is to 
rehabilitate the city as an embodiment of virtues that have an important place 
within the progressive imagination, such as pluralism and contingency.   
I do not think he succeeds in this enterprise. The critical reading offered 
above still stands and Saturday’s conclusion remains, from a progressive 
perspective, reprehensible. However, as suggested earlier, its capacity to 
infuriate resides first and foremost in the implication that culture must be 
subservient to science and, above all, humanist in character. For it is ultimately 
from this issue that I think the novel’s other problematic characteristics spring, 
including its—connected, and undoubtedly questionable—social commentary. 
We might say that Saturday’s response to the challenges of the new millennium 
is to offer us an understanding of the good—inevitably a politically-charged 
concept, as Arendt reminds us101—that is incoherent. On the one hand, 
McEwan’s notion of the good can be read through his representation of the city, 
which, as we have seen, is in some ways fairly laudable. But it can also be read 
through his representation of culture, and it is here that the novel becomes most 
problematic, because the model of culture it attempts to recuperate is entirely at 
odds with its commitment to the plural and contingent nature of the urban 
experience.  
Matthew Arnold is without doubt one of the most freighted names in 
cultural discourse, his notorious definition of culture as “the best which has 
been thought and said in the world” (Arnold Culture 190) consistently 
associated with patriarchal, heteronormative, Eurocentric and other 
exclusionary world-views. As such, McEwan’s decision to use him as an 
                                                                                                                                          
relationship into something with the feel of love” (Ferguson 51). 
101 Discussing Plato’s understanding of ideas in the Symposium and the Republic, Arendt writes that in 
both the philosopher is “defined as a lover of beauty, not of goodness”. However, in moving 
between the former to the latter, a “transformation was necessary to apply the doctrine of ideas to 
politics, and it is essentially for a political purpose […] that Plato found it necessary to declare the 
good, and not the beautiful, to be the highest idea”. This purpose is to enable the philosopher to 
become the “philosopher-king, who wishes to be the ruler of human affairs because he must 
spend his life among men and cannot dwell forever under the sky of ideas” (Arendt Human 226). 
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ambassador of “culture” who successfully contains the “anarchy” that threatens 
to erupt onto Saturday’s pages right from the novel’s outset is dubious to say the 
least. Indeed, there is virtually no way McEwan can escape the charge of 
anachronism, given the way he mobilises “Dover Beach” during the standoff 
between Baxter and the Perowne family. This charge relates not just to the effect 
Arnold’s poem has on Baxter, who is so astonished by it that he backs down; it 
also relates to Daisy and the status she occupies as a woman poet. Daisy’s own 
collection of poems, My Saucy Bark, confronts her readers with such a fervid and 
libidinous voice that it embarrasses Henry and renders her mentor, 
Grammaticus, somewhat envious. But in parroting Arnold she is robbed of this 
powerfully disruptive capacity to speak for herself. And this not simply because 
Arnold’s voice replaces her own, but also because the idea of using a “classic” to 
defuse the situation actually belongs to her patrician grandfather, who covertly 
suggests that she recite a poem he taught her rather than one from her own 
collection (McEwan Saturday 220). Problematic enough in itself, the recital 
becomes yet more objectionable when we remember that it immediately follows 
the point at which Daisy is forced to undress and reveals that she is pregnant. 
This transforms her from an “independent young woman, gazing back […] with 
head cocked” (182) into a far safer image of femininity: mute and naked; “[h]ead 
bowed […] unable to look at anyone”; the “weighted curve and compact swell of 
her belly” speaking potently of her status as man’s concubine and vessel (218). 
Thus it can be argued that, by capitulating to Grammaticus’s suggestion and 
serving as a conduit for the grand poetic truths of liberal humanism, Daisy does 
not just echo an understanding of culture as “the best that has been thought and 
said”; she actually enacts the very worst aspects of its world-view, since in this 
moment she disappears as a subject of history and becomes once again the 
latter’s object.102  
Given that McEwan is probably aware of Arnold’s infelicitous position in 
                                                 
102 Indeed we might (with only a little flippancy) suggest that Daisy’s presence in Saturday mirrors 
women’s place in history more broadly: absent for much of the novel, she finally arrives with 
confidence, looking her father in the eye and telling him quite straightforwardly that he is 
wrong—at least where the invasion of Iraq is concerned. But no sooner has the reader met her 
than McEwan consigns her once more to silence, and Arnold has much to do with this process. 
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cultural discourse—he is, after all, a writer who has spent much of his career 
assessing the role of culture in contemporary society—the reader is entitled to 
wonder why (and whether) he thinks concluding his novel in such an 
anachronistic way might represent a step forward. This is especially the case 
when we recall that Saturday ends with a reproduction of “Dover Beach” in full. 
In a sense this could be argued to validate Perowne’s scepticism over the anti-
war demonstrations by celebrating Arnold’s characterisation of England as a 
fortress of “[g]limmering and vast” cliffs, protecting the speaker’s tranquillity 
while, ominously, “on the French coast the light / Gleams and is gone” (Arnold 
“Dover Beach” lines 4, 3-4). But even if we do not subscribe to this particular 
reading, it is still the case that, confronted with the gloomy prospect that the 
world “Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light / Nor certitude, nor peace, nor 
help for pain” (lines 33-34) the novel falls back on traditional platitudes about 
the vulnerability of (female and unborn) life and the (male) obligation to protect 
it as a way of justifying its attempt to contain the more violent possibilities of 
contingency. It is thus precisely to the extent that it mobilises the writing of a 
figure inextricably associated with liberal humanism that it can be read as 
profoundly conservative. And the sum of this is to argue that, for all Saturday’s 
self-conscious attempts to rehabilitate the city and many of the more 
progressive virtues that latter symbolises, it fails because the way it 
understands culture to operate in that rehabilitated city is so obnoxious. In 
short, while the “urban” part of its model of urban culture is not 
straightforwardly contemptible, the “cultural” part remains completely beyond 
countenance. 
 
 
2. Damn it All! Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go 
 
In contrast to Saturday, the representation of culture in Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never 
Let Me Go—or, more specifically, the novel’s challenge to culture—deserves 
engagement, but its conspicuous refusal to link this challenge to the city 
forecloses the possibility of delivering on any potential it may possess. This 
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failure lends the novel its great strength as well as its principal weakness: it 
contains a warning about our imminent and total disenfranchisement that is 
stark and compelling, but it struggles to turn this warning into anything 
positive; it identifies a means by which we might escape our present impasse, 
but cannot locate the ground on which this means might be mobilised. As a 
consequence, it concludes on the same note of despair and quietism that has 
characterised much of Ishiguro’s work. 
 In order to explore this ambivalent accomplishment a little further it 
might be useful to return to Slavoj Žižek’s enigmatic warning, quoted at the end 
of the previous chapter, that “[t]oday, we are all potentially homo sacer, and the 
only way to actually avoid becoming so is to act preventively” (Žižek “Beginning” 
55). This statement comes at the end of a 2009 essay published in the New Left 
Review entitled “How to Begin at the Beginning”, in which Žižek identifies four 
sites of antagonism that demand attention from anybody seeking to expose and 
remedy the emerging injustices of a globalised twenty-first century. These are 
“the looming threat of ecological catastrophe; the inappropriateness of private 
property for so-called intellectual property; the socio-ethical implications of 
new techno-scientific developments, especially in biogenetics; and last, but not 
least, new forms of social apartheid—new walls and slums” (53). Žižek urges his 
readers to recognise in the last of these categories the harsh distinction between 
included and excluded—since without this realisation “all the others lose their 
subversive edge” (54)—and suggests that the dangers we now face threaten to 
exclude all of us in one form or another. Indeed, he argues, this complex nexus of 
threats might be considered to produce a new kind of proletariat to which we all 
might conceivably belong, and which “in contrast to the classic image of 
proletarians who have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’” is “in danger of losing 
everything” (55). Žižek’s analysis is relevant to the present study in a number of 
ways. The latter clearly echoes his interest in the distinction between inside and 
outside, and the first site of antagonism Žižek identifies—ecological 
catastrophe—will shortly occupy our attention. We are also clearly engaged 
with the idea of acting preventively, and this is one of many reasons why Žižek’s 
comments are useful in approaching Never Let Me Go. The novel plainly reflects 
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his identification of emerging biogenetic technologies as a potential site for 
ethical consternation and political exclusion. However, I also think it echoes his 
warning that very soon the political ontology that best approximates our own 
may be that of homo sacer, and it does this by explicitly situating its readers 
within the same regime that oppresses its protagonist, Kathy H, while bestowing 
upon them a kind of class consciousness. To this extent, the novel might be read 
as an incitement for the new proletariat—to wit, us—to learn once more how to 
act in a collective and specifically political manner. In so doing, it asks some 
important questions about whether existing praxes—namely, those organised 
around culture—continue to bear potential, and urges us to begin from the 
beginning: with a working praxis that is apt for confronting the political 
challenges of the present day. 
 Superficially, at least, Ishiguro’s novel belongs to the “alternative history” 
subgenre of speculative fiction exemplified by Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the 
High Castle (1962).103 It takes place in a late-1990s England which has spent 
forty years developing a socio-scientific regime in which human clones provide a 
source of spare parts that are used to cure “many previously uncurable 
conditions” in the rest of the population (Ishiguro Never 257). Lacking parents, 
the clones are reared collectively in institutions as far away from public sight as 
possible, before beginning work as “carers” and providing palliative care for 
other clones as the latter are steadily dispossessed of their vital organs. After an 
apparently arbitrary period of time, each carer receives notice that she is to 
become a donor herself, and is steadily cannibalised until, some time in her 
early thirties, she “completes”, or dies. The morbidities that historically affected 
the whole of human civilization are thus borne exclusively by members of an 
abject and dehumanised social stratum whose domination consists not just in 
the commodification of their life processes, but also in their assignment to a 
supporting role within the system of domination itself.  
                                                 
103 That the divergence between our the history of our own world and Never Let Me Go’s took place 
“after the war” (Ishiguro Never 256) might even be read as tacit acknowledgement of Dick’s 
influence: the central conceit of The Man in the High Castle is that the Axis powers won World War 
II, and that America is subservient to the German and Japanese empires. The phrase “after the 
war”—repeated a page later—also lends the narrative a certain post-apocalyptic flavour. 
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Our guide to this chilling social system is Kathy H., who recounts her happy 
upbringing at a privileged, boarding-school style institution called Hailsham. 
Here she was looked after by a group of teachers, or “guardians”, who sought to 
resist the cloning system by using their students’ artwork to prove that clones 
had souls and therefore qualified as human. The novel revolves around a love 
triangle that develops at Hailsham between Kathy, Tommy and their 
domineering friend Ruth. Tommy is a social misfit who is artless on two counts: 
first, the artwork he produces in class—fantastical pictures of imaginary 
animals—is widely dismissed as childish; second, where the other students 
learn to dampen their emotions and enforce a status quo through subtle and 
often vindictive manipulation, he is prone to tantrums that upset this status quo 
and render him subject to ridicule. Ruth’s relationship with Tommy belittles him 
while causing friction with Kathy, who secretly loves him, and this leads to the 
group’s eventual estrangement from each another. When Kathy becomes Ruth’s 
carer and engineers a reunion with Tommy, Ruth regrets that she stopped them 
from pursuing a relationship and provides the address of a guardian, Madame, 
who was responsible for administering the art programme at Hailsham. There is 
a rumour that this guardian can suspend the donation process if two clones 
prove that they love one another and their artwork shows that they “match”. 
Ruth insists that, after she has completed, Kathy and Tommy must apply for a 
“deferral” (173), and so, after she dies, they visit the house Madame shares with 
Hailsham’s former headmistress, Miss Emily, on the Sussex coast. This climactic 
scene turns out hollow, however, as the guardians reveal, first, that deferrals 
don’t exist and, second, that all their philanthropic efforts have met with failure. 
Now the political landscape has changed and nobody wants to prove that clones 
have souls anymore; Hailsham has been closed down and the artwork is 
gathering dust in their home. After this devastating meeting, Kathy and Tommy 
go their separate ways and the novel ends shortly after Tommy’s fourth 
donation—during which he completes—with Kathy deciding to become a donor. 
 Ishiguro himself has suggested in interview that Never Let Me Go 
represented a departure for him in that it is less interested in self-consciously 
undermining its protagonist—in providing the reader with reasons not to trust 
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her—than his previous works had been. Never Let Me Go, he has said, isn’t 
concerned with the kind of “self-deception” that was the theme of his earlier 
novels, and so “[a]n unreliable narrator here would just have got in the way” 
(Interview).104 And with all the necessary caveats regarding authorial intention 
in place, it is worth pointing out that this self-professed eschewal of a narrative 
device for which Ishiguro’s earlier fiction is so well known lends a unique social 
and political charge to the novel. Most significantly for our purposes, it inflects 
the relationship between reader and narrator in an intriguing way. For when, 
reminiscing about her childhood at Hailsham, Kathy says, “I don’t know how it 
was where you were” (Never 13), we are placed in a unusually intimate 
proximity with her—not just in the sense that we, like Kathy, suddenly become 
clones (though without necessarily realising it), but also due to the arresting 
familiarity of the latter’s language. As Shemeen Black has suggested, by using 
the second person address Kathy “assumes a readership who understands what 
it means to be a ‘carer’”; in this way we are “cast as characters with whom [she] 
shares a frame of reference, and this reassuring gesture invites us to return the 
favor” (Black 790). It is important, as Black implies, that the reader is not 
addressed with a narrative voice saturated with self-consciousness, but as a 
subject belonging to—and, presumably, with a common stake in—Kathy’s world. 
She is not a witness putting forward evidence, and we are not jurors attempting 
to determine her credibility; the emphasis is not so much on testimonial 
integrity but on the affective, social and ontological affinity shared between 
addresser and addressee.105 This is something that permeates the language of 
                                                 
104 This is not to say that the novel represents a complete departure from the issues that have 
featured in Ishiguro’s work over the course of his career: the representation of memory continues 
to be important in Never Let Me Go, just as it is in all of Ishiguro’s work between A Pale View of 
Hills (1982) and The Unconsoled (1995). However, the way the 2005 novel explores the role of 
memory within its economy of gratification promised and unfulfilled has an interesting impact on 
narrative time: Mark Currie, for instance, points to Ishiguro’s use of the “proleptic past perfect” in 
representing Kathy’s recollection of anticipation (Currie 91). 
105 The concept of testimonial integrity features prominently in Georgina Heydon’s Language of Police 
Interviewing (2004), in which she studies the police procedures surrounding the murder of 
Stephen Lawrence in southeast London in April 1993. During the ensuing investigation the 
testimonies of particular witnesses were granted a degree of credibility that was not advanced 
 
178 
the novel: Kathy’s narration is replete with phatic expressions that serve little 
purpose except to maintain rapport with the reader and her diction is expertly 
chosen by Ishiguro to reflect the familiarity and functionality of everyday 
conversation (“I was, as I say, watching the situation closely”; “I’m pretty sure I 
got it right”; “But I’ve gone off a bit” (Ishiguro Never 21, 38, 86)). And this, I 
think, has the effect—discomfiting for any postmodern—of reducing social 
distance, of eliding difference, even of drawing us into a social commonalty.  
The point here isn’t that in Never Let Me Go irony never comes into play: 
dramatic irony—who knows what and when—is enormously important. I am 
not suggesting that the distance between Kathy and narrative voice has 
collapsed, or that the novel’s artifice is somehow transparent. And I am certainly 
not arguing that it dupes us into suspending our faculty of judgment in its moral 
and political, as well as epistemological, sense. But I do think that the 
relationship between reader and narrator in Never Let Me Go has rather more to 
do with association than it does with confrontation, and that this 
associationalism constitutes a narrative strategy which is aimed at drawing the 
reader into the very same nexus of domination that oppresses Kathy. As Black 
puts it: “Our own comfortable sense of empathetic solidarity with Kathy 
ultimately constitutes the horror of the novel’s rhetorical technique” (792, 
emphasis added). There would undoubtedly be some disagreement about this 
issue, especially as the cultural and narratological implications of sincerity have 
recently attracted a lot of critical attention.106 For one, Bruce Robbins is more 
ambivalent about our relationship with Kathy, arguing that her 
 
ability to understand the emotions of those around her and to 
make things right between them, leaving her own needs and 
desires out of play, has been one of her genuine attractions both as 
                                                                                                                                          
others on the basis of cultural and racial markers, and Heydon argues that this constituted a kind 
of epistemological affront to the latter. 
106 For instance, the “New Sincerity”, a term that has been used to describe a tendency in 
contemporary culture to militate against postmodern irony. David Foster Wallace’s essay “E 
Unibus Pluram” (1993) is sometimes seen as a key expression of the New Sincerity in American 
literature. 
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a character and as a narrator. It certainly makes her as convincing 
as she is. But in this sense it is her very reliability as a narrator 
that Ishiguro seems to be asking us to question. Could she be so 
reliable, locally, if she were not so shockingly indifferent to the 
larger, more distant context that looms beyond the children, their 
emotional entanglements, and their school—a context that makes 
anger and self-contradiction inevitable, that sheds different light 
on their emotions? Could she be so self-effacingly calm and 
believable if she did not accept the fundamental rightness of the 
system? (Robbins 300-301) 
 
The point is well-made, but it does not necessarily preclude the possibility of an 
associational relationship between Kathy and the reader. The very fact of our 
affective connection with Kathy—which Robbins himself acknowledges—
prevents our judgment of her from becoming a principle of distanciation, since 
Ishiguro’s rhetorical technique ensures that any judgment on her is also a 
judgment on ourselves. What is really at stake in Robbins’s critique is not so 
much Kathy’s “reliability as a narrator”—that is, her testimonial integrity—but 
our political judgment of her, and part of Never Let Me Go’s genius is the way in 
which it places its readers in a position from which we cannot judge Kathy 
without simultaneously judging ourselves. In short, the moment we consider 
her to be unreliable in Robbins’s sense is the moment at which the 
circumstances of our own collective disenfranchisement, as well as our inability 
or refusal to resist, are marked out most sharply. 
 The associational aspect of Never Let Me Go has been noted by other 
critics: for instance Lisa Fluet, who argues of Ishiguro’s work in general that 
 
while seldom using the term, [his] characters choose to speak for, 
and even defend, something like class consciousness, particularly 
as their very different forms of “we” resonate with certain 
contemporary theoretical models for comprehending the 
collective consciousness of those whose labor is largely, as Michael 
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Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued, based in knowledge-work 
and hence “immaterial”. (Fluet 267) 
 
If it is correct to speak of class consciousness in the context of Ishiguro’s 
work,107 then the associational relationship between reader and narrator in 
Never Let Me Go could very well be argued to gesture towards an extension of 
this consciousness towards us, the novel’s readers. And given the horrifying 
position the clones occupy, it could be considered to reflect both our 
agglomeration at Žižek’s hands into a new proletariat, and his warning that as 
part of this proletariat we may—all of us—someday soon find ourselves in the 
position of homo sacer.108 It is interesting, considering this, that Fluet should 
mention Hardt and Negri while suggesting that many of Ishiguro’s characters 
evidence something akin to class consciousness, since Žižek too cites them in 
the process of highlighting the dispossessory logics he considers to be a key 
component of the rampant development of the life sciences. These logics, he 
writes, threaten to rob us of “the commons of internal nature, the biogenetic 
inheritance of our humanity”. And this is not the only commons to be suffering a 
steady erosion: others include “external nature, threatened by pollution and 
exploitation” and “culture, the immediately socialized forms of cognitive capital: 
primarily language, our means of communication and education, but also shared 
infrastructure” (Žižek “Beginning” 53). Clearly the last of these three commons 
                                                 
107 And Fluet is not the only critic to identify class as a key concept in approaching Never Let Me Go. 
Robbins, for instance, argues that “[t]he organ-donation gulag, tucked away from public view and 
yet not kept secret, has its obvious real-world counterpart in what we call class. Doesn’t class 
divide just as effectively, allowing some of us to expect a reasonable return on our career 
investments while deviously ensuring that little will come of any expectations the rest may have?” 
(Robbins 292). 
108 Black writes: “Like homo sacer, Ishiguro’s students can be killed but not sacrificed; their deaths by 
organ removal create no source of transcendent meaning for them or for their community […] 
Never Let Me Go can be read as a meditation on a world shaped by the eugenic fantasies of Nazi-
era incarceration. Hailsham, the English boarding school-like institution where Ishiguro’s 
characters grow up, provides precisely such a shadowy territory beyond the admissible political 
life of the realm it inhabits and enables. Such a space strips its inhabitants of their claims to any 
forms of political identity; denuded of citizenship and culture, they represent a form of life that 
challenges traditional definitions of what it means to be human” (Black 789) 
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has, like the first, relevance to Never Let Me Go (and the second will also occupy 
our attention before long), whose representation of culture has caused a certain 
amount of head-scratching among critics. One of the responses to the novel’s 
representation of artistic activity has been to treat it as a sort of faultline, in the 
sense coined by Alan Sinfield and explicated in the introduction to this 
investigation. According to this reading, the fact that for much of Never Let Me Go 
the clones do not fully understand their non-human status—and, moreover, are 
never really allowed to—is one of the conditions of their oppression. And 
despite being a philanthropic project aimed at ameliorating the conditions of its 
students’ existence by encouraging them to express themselves artistically,109 
Hailsham functions as an instrument of this oppression since it mobilises the 
category of the human in a deeply dubious way. Not even Madame can truly 
believe it to apply to her students, considering the revulsion she demonstrates 
in their company, and even if we assume the guardians’ good faith, their attempt 
to prove that the students have souls ultimately does nothing to change the 
system of domination; indeed, it vouchsafes its perpetuation by masking the 
true circumstances of the clones’ oppression, thereby preventing them from 
organising themselves into a political community.110 The institution is thus an 
effective metaphor for the kind of humanist ideology celebrated in Saturday, 
whose end in that novel is the social and epistemological containment of 
Baxter.111  
                                                 
109 We might consider what Engels would think of such a project: “Philanthropic institutions forsooth! 
As though you rendered the proletarians a service in first sucking out their very life-blood and 
then practising your self-complacent, Pharisaic philanthropy upon them, placing yourselves 
before the world as mighty benefactors of humanity when you give back to the plundered victims 
the hundredth part of what belongs to them!” (Engels 278). 
110 Such an absence of self-realisation militates against the concept of class-consciousness introduced 
by Fluet, since the latter is produced at precisely the moment that ideology is demystified and the 
relations of production are revealed for what they truly are: logics of class oppression. In other 
words, without self-realisation, there can be no class-consciousness. As such, the clones might 
very well form a socio-economic class, even a proletariat; however, in failing to recognise the fact, 
the possibility of resistance vanishes. The role of space—more particularly, the absence of urban 
space—in preventing self-realisation is quite important, as will become clear. 
111 Ishiguro seems to gesture explicitly towards Hailsham’s ideological function when he writes: 
“Tommy thought it possible that the guardians had, throughout all our years at Hailsham, timed 
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This project is the reason why Miss Lucy is forced to leave Hailsham, after 
explaining the students’ political situation to them too frankly and insisting that 
“[i]f you’re to have decent lives, you have to know who you are and what lies 
ahead of you” (Ishiguro Never 80). But it is also why, to Black, the moment at 
which Kathy and Tommy’s non-human identity is confirmed by Miss Emily 
signifies a point of rupture, when the humanistic ethos undergirding Hailsham is 
revealed to be bogus and the ontological straightjacket which, as she puts it 
“mask[ed] their own mechanical condition and serve[d] to prepare them for 
lives of exploitation” is removed (Black 790). This analysis ultimately allows her 
to argue that because “the world of Hailsham is a world of cultural sameness, a 
normative ideal of white, middle class culture […] Never Let Me Go affiliates 
postethnicity not with promise but with peril” (797). However, I think that here 
Black runs the risk of offering the most comfortable reading available where 
another, more challenging one is present. First, she substitutes a platitudinous 
warning against cultural homogeneity for an interpretation which recognises 
that, in fact, the novel attaches a certain value to sameness—specifically, to class, 
an understanding of sameness that has in the past served leftist ends rather 
well. More deleteriously, however, she treats the moment of cultural 
disruption—the confrontation with Madame and Miss Emily—as in itself 
sufficient to facing down the dire threat faced by the clones, without 
acknowledging that this moment singularly fails to alter their existential and 
political situation. True, Tommy’s art—intricate pictures of animals that don’t 
look like animals at all, which Kathy likens to “what you’d get if you took the 
back off a radio set” (Ishiguro Never 184)—is validated as bearing more truth 
about this situation than anybody had previously realised. And this could be 
                                                                                                                                          
very carefully and deliberately everything they told us, so that we were always just too young to 
understand properly the latest piece of information. But of course, we’d take it in at some level, so 
that before long all this stuff was there in our heads without us ever having examined it properly. 
It’s a bit too much like a conspiracy theory for me—I don’t think our guardians were that crafty—
but there’s probably something in it. Certainly, it feels like I always knew about donations in some 
vague way, even as early as six or seven. And it’s curious, when we were older and the guardians 
were giving us those talks, nothing came as a complete surprise. It was like we’d heard everything 
somewhere before” (Ishiguro Never 81, emphasis in original). 
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read as a small act of reappropriation, a quiet seizure of what Žižek might 
identify as their “means of communication and education”—which is to say, the 
commons of culture. But we should be cautious of attaching too much 
significance to this act, since to do so would be to overlook the fact that in Never 
Let Me Go culture conspicuously fails to do what Left culturalism expects it to do: 
facilitate resistance. At the end of the novel, with Ruth dead, Tommy dead, and 
Kathy alone and exhausted, still a carer, still colluding, still driving off to 
wherever she is “supposed to be” (282), Tommy’s art—and the truth it 
exposes—provides only the most anaemic succour. As much as culture might 
represent a vitally important commons, realising this is not enough; artistic 
action is not political action. 
 This apparent rejection of the connection between culture and resistance 
is notable considering the novel’s ambivalent relationship with a popular 
cultural form—SF—that has recently been identified as an important vehicle for 
voicing dissent in the British cultural context. Never Let Me Go’s focus on 
systemic domination and exploitation clearly positions it as an inheritor of 
twentieth-century SF from Brave New World through Nineteen Eighty-Four and 
The Handmaid’s Tale (1985), right up to Ballard’s late novels. At the same time, 
while the narrative borrows some of its generic semantics from SF, it is 
important to recognise that in other ways it wholly eschews the genre, and 
remains self-consciously a literary novel. Highlighting this careful balancing act, 
I think, allows us to place the novel in a reflexive relationship with the so-called 
“British SF Boom” of the late 1990s. Roger Luckhurst identifies the origins of 
this boom in the general election of 1997, which resulted in the victory of New 
Labour under Tony Blair. As Luckhurst argues, New Labour treated “global 
capitalism as an accomplished fact” and sought to represent itself as a “post-
hegemonic, even post-political” party, making quite a show of casting off its 
origins in state socialism. Since “Thatcherism had proved that markets alone did 
not foster social trust or cohesion”, it was necessary to continue the latter’s 
cultural project while adapting it for a (purportedly) progressive age (Luckhurst 
“Cultural Governance” 422). Thus where previously the heritage factories of 
Blenheim Palace and Leeds Castle had provided the basis for Britishness, now 
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the Britpop of Blur and Oasis, the readily containable iconoclasm of Young 
British Artists such as Damien Hirst and Tracy Emin, would form the 
foundations of a new, urbane Britishness which militated against the Tories’ 
drab heritage fixation while achieving precisely the same end.112 However, 
despite Labour’s insistence that hierarchical conceptions of cultural legitimacy 
should no longer obtain, it continued to articulate cultural value using “precisely 
the classic measure of properly ‘high’ culture: transcendence” (423).113 And, as 
critics since Raymond Williams have consistently pointed out, quite opposed to 
the democratisation it is sometimes deemed to promote, transcendence tends to 
obscure the disruptive particularism of cultural production in favour of a 
universalist approach which dehistoricises culture, neutralises it as a site of 
political contest and effectively claims it for the status quo. (Hence why 
McEwan’s “transcendent” invocation of Arnold so ostentatiously undermines his 
early commitment to the contingency of the urban experience.) The SF boom, 
Luckhurst contends, should be read as a strategic response to this muddled 
understanding of cultural legitimacy. The literary genres which underwent 
                                                 
112 As Luckhurst argues, while this superficially inclusive cultural strategy might have enabled “a 
rhetoric of devolution and the dispersal of power”, in fact New Labour’s “model of governance 
enforce[d] conformity to the market” as “[c]ultural-political questions about form and content or 
resistance and incorporation are annulled by economism” (Luckhurst “Cultural Governance” 422-
423, emphasis in original). Indeed, in some ways the urbane, New Labour conception of culture 
was capable of going much farther than its Thatcherite progenitor in reducing culture to 
economism, especially in the city: where the most high-profile contribution of Thatcherism to the 
urban landscape is probably the finance-oriented Docklands development, New Labour 
incorporated culture as a fundamental component of regenerative frameworks in deprived areas 
of London (the Millennium Dome), Manchester (the Lowry and Imperial War Museum North) and 
Tyneside (the Sage and Baltic). 
113 Luckhurst quotes then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport Chris Smith to support this 
point: “‘Let us not be sidetracked, either, by arguments about whether it is “high culture” or “low 
culture” that is important here’, [he] soothed. Anxious to avoid the accusation that Blair had been 
a cynical populist, Smith continued: ‘The Prime Minister did indeed invite Oasis to No. 10, but a 
few days later was at the Cottesloe Theatre being deeply moved by Richard Eyre’s production of 
King Lear’. Smith declared that high/low distinctions were irrelevant to an inclusive vision of the 
arts. ‘What matters is not the imposition of an inappropriate category, but the quality of the work 
and its ability to transcend geography and class and time’” (Luckhurst “Cultural Governance” 
423). 
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“inventive hybridization and regenerative ‘implosion’—Gothic, sf, and fantasy—
experienced such a revitalization in the 1990s because they could still find 
spaces outside the general de-differentiation or ‘mainstreaming’ effect sought by 
the strategy of cultural governance” (423). In their plurality and their vexatious 
position at the threshold of cultural legitimacy—occasionally demonstrating 
their influence on more mainstream products, but mostly frustrating attempts at 
co-optation—the texts Luckhurst identifies in his exploration of the SF boom 
therefore represent a kind of cultural oppositionality. Though—or rather, 
because—its constituent texts may not “provide a consistent political line” the 
boom “is vibrant and absorbing […] precisely because it avoids such obvious 
didacticism. ‘Political’ readings, instead, come from attending to the ways in 
which generic tropes are reconfigured by context” (425).  
 It is astonishing how closely the conceptual apparatus of this 2003 essay 
matches that of Left culturalists such as Hebdige, Hall and Gilroy.114 Luckhurst’s 
analysis of the British SF Boom treats popular culture as “a product of 
resistance” to a co-optive cultural hegemony, and suggests that its constituent 
genres combine to form “an energetic cultural-political scene” which deploys 
“the generic apparatus of sf to explore [a] contemporary ferment” which is 
dominated by an institutional tendency towards cultural governance (432). But 
were we to revise this last sentence, substituting “subcultures” for “genres” and 
“style” for “SF”, we really could be talking about the political sensibility of 
twenty-five years ago, one of whose gifts—the cultural politics of 
disenfranchisement—has occupied us for much of the present investigation. As 
an analysis of a particular cultural moment Luckhurst’s argument is persuasive; 
however, it is worth noting that we are not required to extrapolate far before we 
are confronted with the persistent and problematically ineluctable equation of 
culture and resistance. It is as if Thornton never identified rave culture as the 
moment at which the all-pervading assumption of the Birmingham School for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies—that a highly variegated but always 
                                                 
114 Though not too surprising: the essay begins with a lengthy discussion of Hall’s “analysis of the 
increasing centrality of culture to any understanding of contemporary social formations” 
(Luckhurst “Cultural Governance” 418). 
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horizontally ordered popular culture inevitably serves as the vehicle for 
resistance across numerous politics, numerous rubrics of identification—was 
exploded; as if a decade of lassitude and pessimism never happened. And while 
it is surely preposterous to suggest that Ishiguro wittingly invokes Luckhurst, I 
think it is nonetheless instructive to consider the novel alongside the latter’s 
insights into the SF boom. Never Let Me Go can fairly easily be seen to hybridise 
two of the cultural forms Luckhurst identifies as bearing resistant potential—SF 
and Gothic—but it does so precisely while disinvesting this potential from 
expressive culture. Tommy’s artwork is clearly located below the threshold of 
cultural legitimacy, a threshold that also serves to locate the clones outside the 
realm of the human, thus guaranteeing their continued exploitation. Contained 
within this artwork are important truths that must be observed if the latter are 
to realise what is being done to them. But by pointedly refusing to connect this 
realisation—which, according to Black, is communicated precisely through the 
clones’ awareness of their cultural illegitimacy—with any kind of meaningful 
emancipation, Never Let Me Go challenges attempts to use such a boundary as in 
itself the measure of subversive possibility. In short, the novel recognises that if 
culture and resistance once dovetailed into a discrete kind of oppositional 
praxis, the connection between them has been severed, and this praxis is no 
longer capable of delivering on what it once promised. 
Significantly, this abandonment of culture as a site of resistant activity 
coincides with a total absence of any kind of public space that might constitute a 
commons—such as the city.115 But this is not to suggest that the spaces of the 
                                                 
115 The only significant urban area to be named is Dover, a port town on the Kent coast with a 
population of about 30,000, and it is notable that the novel’s climax—during which Kathy and 
Tommy confront Madame and Miss Emily—takes place in the tiny coastal resort of Littlehampton, 
rather than in the nearby city of Brighton. In fact, virtually all of the spaces Ishiguro represents are 
windswept, evacuated and shot through with lonely melancholia. The most memorable of these is 
the marshland in which Kathy, Ruth and Tommy search for the stranded boat. After Ruth’s second 
donation, Kathy and Tommy take her to see an empty boat that is stranded in “open marshland” at 
the edge of a wood: “The pale sky looked vast and you could see it reflected every so often in the 
patches of water breaking up the land. Not so long ago, the woods must have extended further, 
because you could see here and there ghostly dead trunks poking out of the soil, most of them 
broken off only a few feet up. And beyond the dead trunks, maybe sixty yards away, was the boat, 
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novel are all private; rather, they are located in the penumbra between public 
and private, while being evacuated of the characteristics of both. Apropos of this 
it is important to remember that private spaces do not, as liberalism holds, 
increase the integrity, autonomy and privacy of the individuals who occupy 
them. They merely extend circuits of power which in the commons can be 
directed and controlled in a collective fashion into the private sphere, where the 
individual is largely powerless to resist them. A result of the disintegration of 
the commons is thus often a perversion of the private realm, and—as we have 
seen in our discussion of Ballard’s late novels—when these two previously 
separate spaces become impossible to differentiate the resulting social totality 
can appear chillingly totalitarian.  
Hailsham might be seen to reflect this confusion of public and private. 
Describing a pond area in the grounds of the school, Kathy says: 
 
[O]nce you came out to the pond, you’d find a tranquil atmosphere 
waiting, with ducks and bulrushes and pond-weed. It wasn’t, 
though, a good place for a discreet conversation—not nearly as 
good as the lunch queue. For a start you could be clearly seen from 
the house. And the way the sound travelled across the water was 
hard to predict; if people wanted to eavesdrop, it was the easiest 
thing to walk down the outer path and crouch in the bushes on the 
other side of the pond. (Ishiguro Never 25) 
 
Hailsham functions here as a sort of panopticon, and so the temptation might be 
                                                                                                                                          
sitting beached in the marshes under the weak sun” (Ishiguro Never 219-220). There are many 
other spaces like this; indeed, the novel ends with a dead, vacant landscape littered with rubbish 
and barbed wire. After Ruth and Tommy have died, Kathy drives up to Norfolk on a whim and, 
climbing out of her car, lost and alone, “imagine[s] this was the spot where everything I’d ever lost 
since my childhood had washed up”: “There was a fence keeping me from stepping into the field, 
with two lines of barbed wire, and I could see how this fence and the cluster of three or four trees 
above me were the only things breaking the wind for miles. All along the fence, especially along 
the lower line of wire, all sorts of rubbish had caught and tangled. It was like the debris you get on 
a seashore: the wind must have carried some of it for miles and miles before finally coming up 
against these trees and these two lines of wire” (281-282). 
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to appeal to Foucault in order to read it. However, given the extent to which 
Never Let Me Go so hauntingly represents a world in which the life process has 
been incorporated into the workings of politics, it might be more useful to 
appraise it using Arendt’s concept of the social: the totalising logic which 
subordinates politics to the life process and collapses the public and the private, 
producing a flat, unvariegated space in which action is rendered meaningless. In 
fact, the social could quite easily be regarded as key to Never Let Me Go’s central 
conceit. Since the clones possess neither their vital organs, nor the life process 
that is required to nurture them, the latter becomes subject to rigorous 
institutional regulation; it also explains why, as Kathy puts it, the clones “had to 
have some form of medical almost every week”. That the room in which these 
medical examinations take place is located “at the very top of the house” not 
only lends them a Gothic aspect; it also conveys a sense of the massive distance 
between the clones and those who rule over them (13). Indeed, this sense of 
political dislocation pervades Never Let Me Go: the authority figures of its first 
half—the guardians—remain aloof and inaccessible, and towards its conclusion 
are revealed, like the Wizard of Oz, to possess no real power anyway. Moreover, 
even in the process of this revelation, Ishiguro refuses to sketch out the true 
workings of power in his imagined England, and what was a sense of dislocation 
between the subjects and executors of power becomes a void, an unimaginable 
(and unbridgeable) chasm. This is important, I think, because the virtual 
invisibility of true political authority in the novel echoes the way in which the 
latter functions in the social, which Arendt argues to be characterised by a sense 
of “rule by nobody”. This is not, she urges, “no-rule; it may indeed, under certain 
circumstances, even turn out to be one of [the] cruelest and most tyrannical” 
kinds of domination; what is “decisive”, however, is that on “all its levels” the 
social “excludes the possibility of action” (Arendt Human 40, emphasis added). 
And this goes some way towards explaining many critics’ discomfiture at the 
clones’ quietism; their apparently ready acceptance of their own abjection. For, 
as one critic wrote for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “[I]f you were scheduled to 
have your organs plucked out any day now, but in the meantime were permitted 
to wander around the British countryside pretty much as you chose, wouldn’t 
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you decide at some point, ‘This is a really bad deal, and I’m moving to France’?” 
(qtd. in Black 791). 
 The function of power in the social allows us to answer this perfectly 
reasonable question, as does the novel’s conspicuous eschewal of urban 
landscapes. For, despite the apparent eclipse of the city as a site of resistance, it 
would yet be impossible to imagine Ishiguro’s narrative taking place in an urban 
locale without stretching the novel’s ending—in which Ruth and Tommy head 
stoically to their deaths and Kathy looks forward to following them—beyond 
credibility. This is because, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we have 
become far too accustomed to witnessing oppressed subjects rising up against 
their masters in urban contexts—whether the Fordist citadel of Metropolis 
(1927) or the cyberpunk sprawl of Akira (1988)—for the kind of quietism that 
characterises Never Let Me Go’s conclusion to be located there. Urban resistance 
movements need not always be represented as successful; nevertheless, given 
the historical role of the city in cultivating resistance and revolution, it would 
have been difficult for Ishiguro to situate the kind of systemic violence endured 
by the clones in an urban setting without also representing at least some kind of 
attempt to resist it. In this way, the spatial disparateness of Never Let Me Go 
takes on an important narrative function: plausibility. However, its keenest 
implication is political, and profoundly gloomy. There are, presumably, huge 
numbers of people just like Kathy, Ruth and Tommy—how else could the 
government guarantee replacement parts for the general public?—but Ishiguro 
refuses to name a single one who didn’t attend either Hailsham or the Cottages. 
Upon becoming donors, they are distributed to recovery centres in different 
parts of the country which always seem to be rural. And in this way, any sense of 
community they may have shared quickly evaporates, contributing to a sense of 
dissipation which is only reinforced by Kathy’s endless car journeys. Thus we 
might say that the clones occupy a similar situation to that of the agricultural 
class Marx describes in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852): 
 
In so far as millions of [agricultural] families live under economic 
conditions that separate their mode of life, their interests and 
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their culture from those of the other classes, and that place them 
in an attitude hostile toward the latter, they constitute a class; in 
so far as there exists only a local connection among these farmers, 
a connection which the individuality and exclusiveness of their 
interests prevent from generating among them any unity of 
interest, national connections, and political organization, they do 
not constitute a class. Consequently, they are unable to assert their 
class interests in their own name, be it by a parliament or by 
convention. They can not represent one another, they must 
themselves be represented. Their representative must at the same 
time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an 
unlimited governmental power, that protects them from above, 
bestows rain and sunshine upon them. Accordingly, the political 
influence of the allotment farmer finds its ultimate expression in 
an Executive power that subjugates the commonweal to its own 
autocratic will. (Marx 145-146) 
 
The guardians at Hailsham seem to embody just such an autocratic will (though, 
as we have seen, their power is entirely illusory); however, what is more 
significant is the emphasis Marx places on the role of distance in preventing the 
agricultural class from organising into a political collective capable of 
representing itself. The spatial distribution of the farmers is central to this 
failure, and, just as Engels implies in The Condition of the Working Class in 
England, the lesson is that without propinquity—which is to say, without the 
city—class-consciousness cannot emerge. 
To this extent, Never Let Me Go might be argued to foreclose the debate it 
opens up by gesturing beyond culture. And it is this that makes the novel’s 
representation of an emerging class consciousness so unsettling, coming as it 
does at a moment when commons so fundamental to the way in which we live 
our lives are coming under such concerted attack. After all, we might ask, what 
conceivable use might class consciousness have without a public space through 
and in which it can take on a politically meaningful and, one would hope, 
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transformative role? The novel issues a political warning about new modes of 
oppression while urging that existing (cultural) modes of resistance are no 
longer useful; however, in rejecting the spatiality that enables political 
collectives to be formed, it cannot conclude with anything but quietism. It justly 
challenges the immanent connection between culture and resistance, but then—
even as it meditates on the political significance of class-consciousness to its 
characters (and its readers)—forecloses any possibility of the city-as-commons 
that could substitute for this. Certainly, this strategy may be read as provocative, 
but the note of despair on which the novel ends implies that, where its 
representation of culture is welcome, its abandonment of the city is not. 
 
* * * 
 
So what does all of this mean for urban culture in Britain at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century? We have seen that, contrary to much existing critical 
opinion, McEwan’s London represents a great deal more than a threat that must 
be tamed by reducing it to a site of procedure and contractarianism: it is fraught, 
even febrile, but in a way that the author appears to consider valuable. However, 
something in the model of urban culture presented to us in The Passion, as well 
as in Kureishi’s early work, plainly strikes McEwan as inadequate. And so, in 
observing how this politicised spatiality interacts with culture, he attempts to 
revive what might described as a “liberal imagination”, and this profoundly 
anachronistic move ultimately serves to render the novel a political failure. John 
Frow has observed how the liberal imagination was unsuited to mass society for 
precisely the same reason Williams identifies in his early writing: since it 
functioned perfectively, in opposition to the crassly material processes of 
industrial capitalism, it was “ill-prepared to give an account of a fully 
commodified culture”. The neoliberal imagination, by contrast, “locat[ed] its 
vision of freedom in an expanded realm of economic transactions rather than a 
separate realm of culture”, and thus “has less of a problem […] in coming to 
terms with a form of citizenship grounded in consumption rather than in the 
sphere of political judgment” (Frow 425-426). These comments are helpful in 
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giving the lie to any attempt to dismiss Saturday as a neoliberal polemic, since 
they reveal the novel to be far more anachronistic than this description allows. 
At the same time, Frow’s analysis also explains why, in attempting to recuperate 
the liberal imagination, the novel fails so utterly, and this is because the 
likelihood of reviving the Tradition as a guarantor of the good in an age of mass 
society is so meagre. Such an understanding of culture is simply unable to “make 
sense of a public sphere which is mass mediated, other than by a reaffirmation 
of those values of rationality and citizenship which, rather than being 
undermined, are simulated by [the] new form of publicness” operating today 
(426, emphasis in original). Thus while Saturday’s representation of the city 
might gesture towards a re-engagement with urban space as a locus in which 
pluralism and contingency are enacted, its insistence on reviving a liberal 
understanding of culture provides nothing but a fig-leaf for the economistic 
logic of our neoliberal present. 
Unlike McEwan, Ishiguro seems quite aware that such a revival is likely to 
result in an obfuscation of the true dynamics of oppression rather than an 
honest and vigorous engagement with them. For while the guardians at 
Hailsham mobilise the liberal imagination as part of their philanthropic project 
to prove their students’ humanity, these endeavours serve simply to mask the 
latter’s true, abjectly disenfranchised status, and to prevent an authentically 
collective response from emerging. Never Let Me Go is thus quite frank in 
acknowledging the futility of attempting to rehabilitate this liberal imagination 
at a time when its political foundations are being rendered increasingly 
irrelevant by emerging post-human ontologies and the total economisation of 
the subject. However, the implications of Ishiguro’s novel are more far-reaching 
than this, because it suggests that, today, no model of culture is capable of 
providing a basis for political community or collective action. Cultural 
expression might play an important role in articulating political truths—
Tommy’s mechanical animals say more about the clones’ status than all of the 
artwork in Madame’s gallery combined—but these truths do not necessarily 
bind together the subjects they describe, and are in no way adequate to facing 
down political circumstances in which state, capital and biopower are combined 
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in a chillingly totalitarian regime. In this way, Never Let Me Go presents us with a 
double bind: it denies the possibility of a metaphysical good that might 
compensate for the subject’s alienation from her own biological existence, while 
simultaneously rejecting the idea that material cultural processes might serve as 
a real—if historically contingent—foundation for self and community. In the 
context of the broader narrative we have been tracing, the novel represents a 
moment when Kureishi’s incipient sense that cultural or subcultural activity will 
no longer do the work of the Left is articulated in the most despondent terms. In 
Ishiguro’s novel, the connection between culture and resistance that was 
tentatively established by the New Left in the 1960s and reinforced over the 
course of the 70s and 80s by second-generation Left culturalists such as 
Hebdige, Hall and Gilroy is finally severed. But also in contrast to Saturday, it 
avoids representing the urban experience as politically fecund—by refusing to 
represent it at all. By reorienting the axes of social determination away from 
culture and complexity and back towards the cruel but similarly indistinct line 
between inclusion and exclusion, it appears to rehabilitate class as a meaningful 
political concept. But even as it achieves this—and in the process extends its 
warning about new forms of systemic violence to the reader—it forecloses the 
possibility of this concept serving as the basis for resistance by forsaking the 
spatiality that has historically served to crystallise collective self-consciousness 
and spur it into action.  
Thus while we began this investigation with an intellectual moment that 
was full of enthusiasm for the potential that existed at the intersection of 
politics, culture and space, we appear to be concluding it at a time when the 
existence of a progressive relationship between the three is all but 
unimaginable. The fact that both Saturday and Never Let Me Go were published 
in 2005 is surely enough to justify placing them in critical proximity to one 
another, and to this extent it does not seem inappropriate to conclude that in the 
first decade of the new millennium, the internal coherence of “urban culture” as 
a political concept is very much in doubt. Indeed, in these two novels the 
constituent terms of this concept appear to be mutually incompatible. Either we 
engage with the city as a spatiality that bears political promise and accept an 
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anachronistic model of culture that neutralises this promise almost as soon as it 
is instantiated, or we attempt to move beyond culture altogether and attempt to 
confront the (neo)liberal imagination by other means, but without a public 
space that renders our actions meaningful. In the final analysis, neither option 
seems particularly palatable. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
BEGINNING WITH THE END: 
Maggie Gee’s Apocalyptic Natality 
 
 
 
 
It is difficult, given the conclusions of the previous two chapters, to end this 
discussion on an optimistic note. The reading of McEwan and Ishiguro advanced 
in the previous chapter suggests that urban culture simply will not serve 
progressive ends any longer, and Ballard’s late work leaves us in a deeply 
depressing situation, with practically no agency whatsoever and only a tiny 
space in which to exercise it anyway. Indeed, some pessimistic readers might 
wonder whether Ballard’s work befits a last chapter rather more than a third, 
since the late dystopias seem to represent more a conclusion than a provocation, 
a full stop than an ellipsis. But to have situated his work in such a way would 
have been to foreclose even the possibility of beginning anew, and to arrive at 
the gloomiest of evaluations rather too prematurely. Because while today there 
undoubtedly remains a great deal of anxiety over our capacity to initiate change, 
the opening decade of the twenty-first century has not witnessed a simple 
continuation of the narratives that came to prevail during the 1990s—
domination and totalisation, political entropy and ideological impasse. On a 
world-historical level, the “end of history” has been superseded by the so-called 
“clash of civilizations”,116 and international capitalism has only recently emerged 
                                                 
116 Indeed, this discourse began very shortly after Fukuyama published The End of History and the 
Last Man, when Samuel P. Huntington published his thesis regarding emerging international 
tensions in a post-Cold War world, first in the 1993 article “The Clash of Civilizations?” and 
subsequently in the 1996 volume The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. 
While controversial, it would be churlish, given the geopolitical fallout from the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 to dismiss Huntington’s analysis out of hand. This said, the global situation is 
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from a near-catastrophic convulsion which gave left-wing economists around 
the world license to sing the praises of J.M. Keynes without being ridiculed.117 
The point to emphasise here is not so much that the demise of neoliberalism as 
a political and economic project—or, rather, as an economistic project aimed at 
extinguishing politics—is yet conceivable. It is simply that, despite the defeatism 
and quietism that have taken hold of the Left over the last four decades, history 
still exists. Moreover, it is still the case that, under the right circumstances, each 
of us possesses the ability to exercise political action to some degree.  
The optimism of this assertion might seem laughable in light of the 
discussion we have been staging. With the notable exception of The Passion, the 
                                                                                                                                          
clearly more complex than Huntington imagined: while he predicted one of the most serious 
conflicts would take place between the West and China, Perry Anderson contended in 2010 that 
while “Sinophobia has by no means disappeared […] another round of Sinomania is in the making” 
(Perry Anderson par. 2). 
117 A notable Keynesian voice in the UK has been David Blanchflower, until March 2009 a member of 
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee and a staunch opponent of a neoliberal 
response to the global debt crisis. Despite Blanchflower’s misgivings, however, the result of the 
crisis in the UK has been a project of fiscal retrenchment unprecedented in postwar history, 
whose purported necessity has been well-exploited by the coalition government to mask its 
essentially ideological foundations. As Susan Watkins points out, at least in Europe, fiscal 
conservatives appear to have been the net beneficiaries of the crisis: “[E]ach European 
government”, she writes, “can use the crisis to push through capital’s wish list of structural 
reforms: in Germany, softening up the labour force by cutting unemployment benefits; in Spain 
and France, stripping out the gains—‘rigidities’—of older employees; in Italy, slashing the 
Mezzogiorno public sector. The widely proclaimed end of neo-liberalism looks more and more like 
the continuation of its agenda by other means” (Watkins “Blue Labour” 14). Žižek is depressingly 
accurate in summarising the popular response to this agenda, especially in Greece: “[T]he 
protesters’ story bears witness yet again to the misery of today’s left: there is no positive 
programmatic content to its demands, just a generalized refusal to compromise the existing 
welfare state. The utopia here is not a radical change of the system, but the idea that one can 
maintain a welfare state within the system” (Žižek “Economic Emergency” 86). In a short but 
highly pertinent aside, Watkins seems to acknowledge that the eclipse of politics that enabled the 
emergence of a neoliberal hegemony has much to do with this lack of vision: “As unemployment 
mounts and public-spending cuts are enforced”, she writes, “more determined protests will 
hopefully emerge; but to date, factory occupations or bossnappings have mostly been limited to 
demands for due redundancy pay. That neo-liberalism’s crisis should be so eerily non-agonistic, in 
contrast to the bitter battles over its installation, is a sobering measure of its triumph” (Watkins 
“Shifting Sands” 20). 
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texts we have examined imply that in the space of less than twenty years the 
British novel has come to be marked indelibly by structures of failed utopianism 
and frustrated emancipatory experiments (The Black Album), capitulation and 
fruitless oppositionality (Cocaine Nights, Super-Cannes), and even withdrawal 
and quietism (Never Let Me Go). Moreover, the only novel characterised by 
anything even vaguely resembling hopefulness—Saturday—is so hobbled by 
anachronism that it serves more than any other text as a cause for despair. 
Nonetheless, even in this scenario the question “how do we begin anew?” does 
not have to be heard solely as an expression of despondency. It can also be 
engaged with in a more sanguine way; as part of a project aimed at uncovering 
the ground on which the Left might base new praxes aimed at delivering the 
emancipatory ideals that have so eluded it in recent history. It is with this mood 
that we will conclude our investigation; however, in bringing this discussion to a 
close we are forced to ask not just “how do we begin anew?” but also, “how do 
we begin at all?” Because at a time when the concept of “worldlessness” is 
attracting more and more critical interest—whether in the thought of Arendt or 
Agamben, Jamie Skye Bianco or Jacques Rancière—it seems appropriate that the 
existential aspect of beginning should be engaged with as much as its political 
dimension; indeed, that the two should be regarded as deeply implicated with 
one another. In keeping with this attempt to locate new beginnings, it also seems 
appropriate that our investigation will conclude with a brief discussion of a 
writer—Maggie Gee—who, despite a strong reputation among reviewers and 
other British novelists, sits outside the canon of contemporary British writers 
and has received just a handful of noteworthy appraisals.118  
Throughout her career, Gee has persistently revisited two themes: the 
existential imperative to bear and raise children and the possibility of world-
destruction through various forms of apocalypse. Of course, the former only 
serves to throw the latter into relief, and in combination they seem inevitably to 
push her work into a relationship with science fiction. However, just like 
Ballard—a frequent reviewer of her books—Gee has a complex relationship 
                                                 
118 That none of these appraisals is a book-length study demonstrates the magnitude of this critical 
neglect. 
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with SF, and often uses generic tropes to challenge the boundary between 
legitimate and popular styles. Some titles, like The Ice People (1998)—in which a 
couple confronted by social entropy brought on by rapid fluctuations in global 
temperatures become increasingly estranged as they fight over how best to 
bring up their son—mobilise SF paradigms in a knowing and even satirical 
fashion. Whereas others, such as Where Are the Snows? (1991)—in which a 
passionate but deeply selfish couple abandon their teenage children in order to 
travel around a world which, at the end of the novel, faces a similar cataclysm—
broadly conform to the structural or syntactic expectations of mainstream 
fiction, but undermine realist aesthetics by introducing generic tropes that can 
strike the reader as incongruous. Common to virtually all of Gee’s writing, 
however, is a preoccupation with the potential embodied by children and young 
people, the world they may (or may not) inherit, and the politically onerous 
position of their parents, who have a responsibility to both.  
In this respect she might be said to engage with one of the most 
compelling ideas in all of Arendt’s writing: natality. Simply put, this term 
describes “the birth of new men” and “the new beginning, the action they are 
capable of by virtue of being born” (Arendt Human 247). It might therefore be 
argued to form the basis for all Arendt’s thought, since it is a prerequisite for the 
life of free action—the vita activa—which can, under the right conditions, be 
realised inside the polis. As she writes in The Human Condition, “the new 
beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the 
newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, acting” 
(9). Natality is thus simultaneously an existential fact and a political potentiality; 
however, it is also a promise of the perpetuation of the two in combination, since 
it represents, in Patricia Bowen-Moore’s words, both “the source of the power to 
begin” and “the factual presence of the power to continue to begin” (Bowen-
Moore 28). Only in combination can these two things—the power to begin and 
the power to continue to begin—be called natality, because only then do they 
promise the possibility of free human action in the future.  
Because of this promise Arendt can argue that, to the extent that “action 
is the political activity par excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the 
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central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical, thought” 
(Arendt Human 9). This said, it is not as if mortality possesses no political 
significance whatsoever. For while death might well be argued to form the 
“central category” of metaphysical enquiry, it also occupies an implicit but 
notable place in Arendt’s political philosophy—though it relates not so much to 
the individual as to what she calls the “world”, and not so much to the certainty 
but the threat of the latter’s demise. The world is a recurring term in Arendt’s 
writing, one that refers not to the kind of expressly political space that has 
occupied our attention until now, but to the entire fabric of our shared physical 
and sensory experience.119 And while she focuses on the necessarily positive 
nature of our engagement with it, there is everywhere in her thought a sense of 
its fragility; a feeling that it might easily be destroyed. It thus requires us to care 
for it, and we do this in two different ways: we are concerned for it because it 
provides the phenomenal and material prerequisites for the vita activa, and we 
express our hope for it in introducing new human beings into it.120 But even 
                                                 
119 From her analysis of different kinds of human activity in The Human Condition it is clear that 
Arendt considers the world to be the product of work, of homo faber. “[W]here God creates ex 
nihilo”, she writes, “man creates out of given substance”, and the result of this act of fabrication is 
the world (Arendt Human 139). Presumably, if God’s creation were destroyed it would mark the 
return of the very nothingness out of which it was made in the first place; likewise, “if we do not 
use the things of the world”—that is, the things we have fabricated for ourselves—they will 
“eventually decay, [and] return into the over-all natural process from which they were drawn” 
(136-37). In this way, Arendt makes it clear that animal laborans—man as perpetuator and 
protector of the life process—plays no direct role in creating the world, since the latter is a 
fabricated rather than a natural phenomenon. But she also implies elsewhere that the world is 
distinct from the vita activa—the life of free action—since the deprivation of the latter is the loss 
of “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective” rather than the 
loss of the world itself. It is, in other words, the expulsion from a realm in which one's actions are 
recognised as bearing political meaning (Origins 296, emphasis added). 
120 On the one hand, Arendt argues that “at the heart of politics lies concern for the world”, since 
without the latter the vita activa could not exist (Arendt Promise 106); hence one of the 
responsibilities of the latter is to ensure that the world which forms its material prerequisite 
remains intact. As Hauke Brunkhorst suggests, the “relation of dependence between the world of 
action and of artificial things may be illustrated by a simple example: we cannot have so-called 
‘roundtables’ on public issues if we have no actual tables, which are created through fabrication” 
(Brunkhorst 182-83). On the other hand, the world will one day be inherited by subsequent 
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while the latter sentiment is a key aspect of natality, and thus expresses our 
belief in the possibility of human action in the future, it is nonetheless highly 
fraught. Certainly, natality represents a good—even a miraculous—thing: 
Arendt argues that “whenever something new occurs, it bursts into the context 
of predicable processes as something unexpected, unpredictable, and ultimately 
causally inexplicable—just like a miracle” (Promise 111-112). But this irruption 
is also dangerous, precisely because of its unpredictability, and so it behoves 
parents to contain and control it. Hence the latter are charged with a double 
task: “[T]he child requires protection and care so that nothing destructive may 
happen to him from the world. But the world, too, needs protection to keep it 
from being overrun and destroyed by the onslaught of the new that bursts upon 
it with each generation” (Between 185-86).  
To this extent, we might say that the very concept of natality is shot 
through with fear over the potential destruction of the world.121 But while it 
might be described as disruptive it is also existentially and politically necessary, 
and a threat to natality is a threat, first, to the simple fact of human life, and 
second, to everything it makes possible—including the world itself and above all 
                                                                                                                                          
generations of human beings, and what “saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its 
normal, ‘natural’ ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is ontologically 
rooted". As we have seen, natality relates to the vita activa as a potentiality, but it can only fulfil 
this potentiality by being born and introduced to the world in the first place. Thus it is out of hope 
for the world that we introduce new generations into it, a hope which, according to Arendt, finds 
“perhaps its most glorious and most succinct expression in the few words with which the Gospels 
announced their ‘glad tidings’: ‘A child has been born unto us’” (Arendt Human 247). 
121 This places Arendt’s political thoughts in opposition to the private sentiments of Walter Benjamin, 
whose works she edited and published in German in 1955 before they were translated into 
English and published as Illuminations in 1968. In her introduction to the latter volume, Arendt 
daws attention to a letter Benjamin wrote in Paris in 1935, in which he confesses: “Actually, I 
hardly feel constrained to try to make head or tail of this condition of the world. On this planet a 
great number of civilizations have perished in blood and horror. Naturally, one must wish for the 
planet that one day it will experience a civilization that has abandoned blood and horror; in fact, I 
am […] inclined to assume that our planet is waiting for this. But it is terribly doubtful that we can 
bring such a present to its hundred—or four-hundred-millionth birthday party. And if we don’t, 
the planet will finally punish us, its unthoughtful well-wishers, by presenting us with the Last 
Judgement” (Benjamin qtd. in Arendt Illuminations 42, emphasis in original). 
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the vita activa, its ultimate and greatest promise. One such threat—that of 
nuclear annihilation—seems never to have been far from Arendt’s thoughts 
from the late 1950s right through to the years preceding her death in 1975.122 
Indeed, Bowen-Moore goes so far as to argue that 
 
[n]othing stands in such contrast to Arendt’s philosophy of 
natality as […] nuclearism. Under the cloud of the possibility of 
nuclear extinction, the worldly attitude of amor mundi [love for 
the world] and its concomitant imperative volo ut sis [I will that 
you be] seems a weak, if not superfluous recommendation to a 
world seemingly bent on its own destruction. In light of the fact 
that human beings themselves, we, have made this ominous 
possibility our present reality says something about our failure to 
appropriate the meaning of natality and its bond with the common 
world. (Bowen-Moore 130) 
 
What is more, Bowen-Moore argues, to Arendt the political crisis represented by 
“nuclearism” represents only the concluding passages of a narrative that 
stretches back past Soviet gulags, Nazi extermination camps and the colonial 
outposts of European empires to the revolutionary tribunals of the Great Terror. 
It is merely the last ravings of a historical consciousness that has persistently 
refused to grasp the lessons of natality; the logical end to an entire “tradition of 
philosophical and political thought” that has “failed to grasp, and thus to sustain, 
the true nature of political action and freedom” (131). 
                                                 
122 Her most famous comments on the subject occurred in On Violence (1970), in which she suggests 
that, were a person to ask two simple questions of the post-war generation—”How do you want 
the world to be in fifty years?” and “What do you want your life to be like five years from now?”—
the answers would likely be preceded by “Provided there is still a world” and “Provided I am still 
alive” (Arendt On Violence 17-18). But her anxiety over the possibility of nuclear apocalypse is 
evidenced more than a decade earlier in her comments on the Hungarian Revolution: at one point 
she argues that the “threat of destruction to the existence of mankind, even to the existence of 
organic life on earth” renders “all past political thought about war, its possible justification for the 
sake of freedom, its role as an ultima ratio in foreign affairs, perfectly obsolete” (“Totalitarian 
Imperialism” 20-21). 
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Gee’s novels reflect a similar sense of the fragility of the world, and a 
feeling that we are failing in our responsibility to ensure its perpetuation. And 
nowhere is this more apparent than in The Burning Book (1983), which focuses 
on two generations of a working-class family from Wolverhampton and uses 
postmodernist strategies alongside more conventionally realist (even kitchen 
sink) techniques to explore how their lives are shaped by alcoholism and 
domestic violence, immigration and racism, the legacy of World War II and—
overbearingly—the perpetual threat of nuclear conflict between Russia and 
America. The character who most urgently expresses the paranoia and 
existential terror that accompany the latter is Angela: bookish, left-wing—a CND 
campaigner from an early age—and, as she becomes an adult, increasingly 
fearful of what she sees as the inevitability of the world’s destruction. Lying 
beside her boyfriend as a young woman, she points to the bleakly rational basis 
for her fear, given the sheer amount of destructive potential ranged against the 
world: “You talk about being reasonable”, she says, “Well being terrified is. What 
do you think he was really saying, that old man on the bus last night? Cheer up, it 
may never happen. What do they mean by it? I feel it is going to happen. I feel 
we’re all going to die” (Gee Burning 228, emphases in original). This fear is 
thrown into relief a few pages later when she recalls an argument with her 
mother, Lorna, after the latter walked in on her reading The Diary of Anne Frank 
as a teenager and shouted, “You’re obsessed with war [...] I can’t understand it, 
what’s the matter with you? Why can’t you be like other girls your age?” (237, 
emphases in original). That Anne Frank provides a link between nuclear 
apocalypse and the European holocaust is significant, given that she has 
functioned for many decades as the most potent embodiment of a potentiality 
that never had the opportunity to be fulfilled; a haunting symbol for the 
twentieth century's destruction of natality. And Gee seems to place Angela in a 
similar position when she writes that the latter “couldn’t stay young (though she 
wouldn’t ever grow very old)” (244).  
Of course, images of youth have frequently been deployed in anti-nuclear 
propaganda to symbolise the death of futurity—we might say natality—that 
would be a consequence of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, should 
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the latter’s preventative qualities prove to be catastrophically overestimated.123 
Even so, Gee’s novel is chillingly effective in demonstrating the sheer totality of 
nuclear apocalypse. In the last chapter, “The Chapter of Burning”, her narrative 
begins to fragment as a multitude of other voices and texts intrude and 
interrupt: newspaper headlines describing a tense standoff between the US and 
USSR; the signs that Lorna and Henry, her husband, read during a visit to Kew 
Gardens; and above all the voices of the Hibakusha—those who survived the 
firestorms of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but bore the irradiated legacy within their 
bodies—which haunt The Burning Book from its earliest pages. Finally the 
bombs fall and Gee’s whole cast of characters—her entire narrative world, 
including every insignificant creature and every record of it ever having 
existed—is destroyed: 
 
Some died instantly, some took time. Bags of skinned organs, 
spilling, crawling. A thing called lethality, a thing called time. Time 
was a measure of terror and pain [...] The last light shone with no 
one to see it. The final photograph made its print. Everything was 
on it, nothing escaped. The pattern had an unearthly clarity. 
Melted eyeballs, shattering bone. Miracles of form became 
crackling bacon, miracles of feeling flashed to hot fat. Bleeding and 
terrified things pushed blindly against the pain which pushed out 
the light. Some died instantly, most took time. Nothing was too little 
for poison to reach it. Mice and sparrows found nowhere to hide. 
Black burst crusts that were rainbow fishes. Balls of burnt feathers 
on the black burnt ground. Flakes of ash were once soft moths 
quivering. Books in their charred skins feel less pain [...] All was as 
if it had never been. Blackened paper, the last leaves burning. 
                                                 
123 Most notorious among these is Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Daisy Girl” campaign advertisement during 
the 1964 US campaign presidential election, in which a girl plucks the petals off a daisy while 
counting to ten. On reaching it, a voice  counts down back to zero as we zoom in on the girl’s eye 
and a mushroom cloud ignites the screen. “These are the stakes”, a voice intones. “To make a world 
in which all of God’s children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we 
must die” (“Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Campaign”). 
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(297-98, emphases in original) 
 
As if the totality of this end were not clear enough, Gee then forces her readers 
to confront the ensuing nothingness by including three blacked-out pages. This 
arresting technique—which is only one among many textual experiments that 
would strike the reader as playful were the novel’s subject matter not so 
sobering—reflects an important characteristic of fictions of nuclear disaster 
written in the wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As David Dowling writes: “The 
memory of the Japanese holocaust acts both as a brake and a stimulus to the 
apocalyptic imagination” because “the attempt to write about that experience 
commands us to be faithful to the dead and the living survivors, and also 
exposes the limits of our language and our imaginations” (Dowling 47, emphasis 
in original). The memory of past destruction raises the prospect of a more total 
apocalypse in the future, which confronts us with the unimaginable nature of 
our own extinction; in turn, this failure to imagine demands that we remember 
earlier moments in which the possibility of world-destruction was rehearsed. In 
this way the need simultaneously to remember and to imagine (or rather, fail to 
imagine) becomes a moral and epistemological tautology that contains within it 
an urgent lesson about the preciousness of the world and the need to protect it. 
And perhaps this is why Gee ends The Burning Book with an epilogue entitled 
“Against Ending”, which serves as an impassioned plea for us to recognise our 
human potential to begin and to guarantee that it will last into the future. She 
laments that her “characters died in formations, nearsighted, their eyes on the 
ground. I loved them all but they died. I had thought that such things could not 
happen” (Gee Burning 303). However, in stepping out of her narrative world and 
addressing the reader directly she also reminds us that we have not died, and 
presents us with a final image, at once haunting and redeeming: a pictorial 
representation of seven birds ascending the page, wings spread from edge to 
crease, bearing the message “Words beat on against death... Always beginning 
again, beginning against ending” (304). 
 Although Gee clearly retained an interest in world-destruction over the 
course of the 1980s and 90s, none of the novels she produced in this period—
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including Where Are the Snows? and The Ice People—reaches the apocalyptic 
intensity of The Burning Book. As the author herself has implied, it was not until 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 that she was reminded of the fragility of the 
world in such a haunting way that she was prompted to revisit the terrain with 
similar urgency.124 However, when she did the result was, as one reviewer put it, 
“her most apocalyptic vision to date” (Hidding par. 2). The Flood is set in an 
unnamed city-state that forms “part of the satellite lands of the Hespirican 
empire, in its final decades”, and which is ruled by an ingratiating but superficial 
president named Mr Bliss who is only too happy to collude with Hesperica’s 
endless wars against other cities (Gee Flood 54). It quite plainly reflects anxiety 
over Britain’s post-9/11 relationship with the US—as well as its involvement 
with the “War on Terror”—and, as such, might be said to engage with similar 
concerns to Saturday, which also ruminates over the so-called “special 
relationship”. However, it is far more inclusive than McEwan’s novel and much 
more innovative; indeed, of all the texts we have discussed it is, formally 
speaking, the most unusual. There is a narrator (who remains unnamed) but no 
one protagonist; instead, the novel is dizzyingly polyvocal and multifaceted, 
featuring a huge cast of characters who range from male to female, black to 
white, gay to straight, old to young and even human to non-human.125 And while 
it possesses palpable narrative impetus there is nothing in it that could be 
described as a discrete and singular plot: in the simplest terms, Gee achieves 
little else over the course of three hundred pages except to provide her readers 
with an insight into the diverse lives of her ensemble while building a sense of 
impending disaster, and then to wipe out her entire narrative world in one final 
deluge. Indeed, if The Burning Book augments its broadly realist aesthetic with a 
handful of experiments designed to draw attention to its textual status, The 
Flood discards virtually every formal constraint of the realist novel except 
                                                 
124 In interview with Gee has said: “The Flood was the first book I’d written since September 11, and 
there was this feeling of fragility, that London would be destroyed. I suppose some unconscious 
part of me thought it could be my last book” (qtd. in Judith Palmer par. 11). 
125 Sarah Dillon writes that since the is “infested by animals, by microbes, snails, worms, birds, foxes, 
rats, mice, pigeons […] there is no reason why the narrator of The Flood need even be human” 
(Dillon 390). 
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psychological verisimilitude, offering its readers a vision of contemporary 
Britain which, though easily recognisable, is allegorised to the point of parody. 
On the one hand, this means that Gee is able to engage with the 
cotemporary milieu in a robustly satirical fashion: “Bliss”, for instance, 
transparently functions as a kind of portmanteau of “Blair” and “Bush”, and 
satirises the cosy relationship between the two leaders by turning them into a 
gestalt. At the same time, though Gee’s characters never appear to doubt the 
integrity of the narrative world in which they are situated, the psychological 
realism with which they are drawn enables her to complicate and even 
undermine her own satirical technique, thereby rendering the novel’s use of 
irony far less stable. One instance of this is when she describes a group of 
characters going to see Madame Butterfly. After the performance one of these 
characters praises the opera’s allegorical power: “So good on imperialism […] 
The way they used the American flag […] It was just like the way Mr Bliss and Mr 
Bare make use of the flag of the Hesperican empire. The director was very 
strong on satire”. But not all the others agree: while sat in the theatre, one leans 
across to another and says, “America is really Hesperica, of course”, and the 
latter—a respectable publisher dismayed by the parlous state of the cultural 
industries—hisses back, “That’s obvious” (Gee 140-141). By mapping Puccini’s 
opera onto The Flood’s narrative world, and then having one of her characters—
an academic, no less—acknowledge the capabilities of allegory, Gee foregrounds 
and affirms her own rhetorical technique; however, she simultaneously uses 
another character to satirise it, self-consciously drawing attention to where her 
own narrative discourse “devolves” into caricature. The result is a text that 
hybridises culturally legitimate mimetic forms (allegory, opera, narrative 
realism) with their “baser” and more overt counterparts (caricature, burlesque, 
the fantastical) in such a way that their collective relationship with the world 
they represent—our world—is simultaneously earnest without being po-faced 
and parodic without being reductive. Sarah Dillon describes the novel’s 
aesthetics as “cartoonesque” and argues that Gee “savage[s] the world she is 
representing in and by the method of that representation—a method more subtle 
and powerful, and definitely more unsettling, than that of direct narrative 
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realism” (Dillon 385, 386 emphasis added). This strategy has the added benefit 
of allowing the novel to remain formally playful without ever becoming arch or 
self-indulgent. Dowling dismisses many of the textual experiments that Gee 
conducts early on in The Burning Book as “obvious and tedious […] 
postmodernist exercises in exposing the fictionality of the text in order to create 
a genuine sense of crisis” (Dowling 186). The Flood, by contrast, could never be 
accused of this because its rhetorical technique allows it to be formally 
innovative while maintaining a ruthless focus on the world it is satirising. 
Consequently, despite the fact that the narrative world of The Flood is 
(superficially) further removed from our own world when compared to that of 
The Burning Book, it feels politically engaged throughout. 
One way in which this engagement manifests itself is in Gee’s 
representation of the contemporary urban experience. A little like The Black 
Album, The Flood is deeply concerned with how urban development reifies 
exclusionary logics operating at social, cultural and economic levels. Its 
disaggregated setting represents the division that is observable everywhere in 
modern British cities. Its wealthiest residents live in “cavernous house[s]” in 
leafy suburbs on higher ground where they have access to “better services: 
trichologists, reflexologists, manicurists, chiropodists, naturopaths, osteopaths, 
homeopaths, and chic small shops” (Gee Flood 51, 14). By contrast, its poorer, 
non-white population are confined to the Towers—decrepit blocks in low-lying 
areas, separated from the city and each other by the rising floodwater—and 
must commute to their menial jobs on waterbuses full of “[g]rey-faced people, 
packed together, slumped by pathetic small hills of possessions” (174). In the 
Towers it is a battle to obtain even the most basic goods: “We couldn’t get milk, 
or papers, or nothing”, one resident complains, “We, you know, bartered, some 
days, for food […] The government did fuck all for us” (170). And while the city’s 
more privileged residents furnish their homes with paintings by fashionable 
artists, the walls here are scrawled with the eschatological ravings of a religious 
cult known as the Last Days. When the flood comes, the reader doesn’t doubt 
that the poorest will be first to drown. 
We have, of course, encountered this landscape before. The Towers are 
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more than a little redolent of Winterson’s Venice, and symbolise everything the 
Thatcherite press lamented in the British inner cities during the 1980s: failed 
experiments in modernist urban planning that house the multitudinous 
excluded and seem ready to ignite in violence at any moment. Among Gee’s huge 
cast of characters, they are home to a self-hating homosexual ex-convict, a 
dysfunctional black family and an interracial lesbian couple, and frequently play 
host to violent demonstrations while suffering the contempt and weary anxiety 
of the city’s (white) suburbanites. Waking up one morning, one of the latter 
turns on the news to find “more of the same […] another distant city was 
resisting liberation; nearer home, more riots had erupted in the Towers, in a 
block which had had no power for seven days” (85). Gee’s mention here of 
Hesperican attempts to impose freedom through occupation is plainly intended 
to satirise the US-led incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq, but they are also 
redolent of Imperial France’s frustrated attempts to dominate Venice in The 
Passion, and to some extent echo Thatcherite urban policies of the 1980s, when 
the idea of freedom was used to justify the invasive process of gentrification. 
There is also an implicit connection in this passage between the kind of violence 
engaged in abroad and that delivered upon the excluded at home; however, 
where the former is represented as a highly mediatised series of spectacular 
events, the latter has more in common with what Rob Nixon calls “slow 
violence”. This kind of violence, Nixon writes, is “deficient in the recognizable 
special effects that fill movie seats and flat screen TVs with the pyrotechnics of 
Shock and Awe” and instead takes place over great lengths of time, obscuring 
accountability by being “driven inward, [and] somatised into cellular dramas of 
mutation” (Rob Nixon 445).126 It finds a correlative in the morbidities suffered 
                                                 
126 Nixon outlines this concept in an essay on Indra Sinha’s 2007 novel Animal’s People, in which he 
argues that the latter “gives focus to three of the defining characteristics of the contemporary 
neoliberal order: first, the widening chasm—within and between nations—that separates the 
mega-rich from the destitute; second, the attendant burden of unsustainable ecological 
degradation that impacts the health and livelihood of the poor most directly; and third, the way, 
under cover of a free market ideology, powerful transnational corporations exploit the lopsided 
universe of deregulation, whereby laws and loopholes are selectively applied in a marketplace a 
lot freer for some societies and classes than for others” (Rob Nixon 444). Though Sinha’s novel 
concerns itself far more explicitly with these subjects than The Flood, Gee’s novel might be said to 
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by those who fall into contact with the floodwater: as Gee writes, the latter is 
considered “dangerous […] there’s talk about some virus”; soon after falling into 
a murky pool of the stuff one child begins to show “the strange red buboes […] 
the sharp stigmata of flood sickness” on his body (Gee Flood 224, 281). Given 
their physical proximity to the floodwater and systematic neglect by the health 
authorities, the residents of the Towers are likely to suffer the kind of somatic 
violence Nixon describes—indeed, this is perhaps why Gee characterises the 
waterbuses as “floating hospitals” (174). And to this extent we might read the 
Towers, like Winterson’s Venice, as a watery zone of morbidity existing in a 
politically and spatially ambiguous relation to the rest of the city; home to a 
ragtag bunch of homines sacri.  
However, rather than trying to give narrative expression to the slow 
violence that is likely to be suffered by these figures as a consequence of their 
excluded status, Gee opts once more to depict an apocalypse. This approach 
might be deemed unsuitable, since it refuses to confront on a social or 
representational level the kind of violence that accompanies environmental 
change; Gee could be accused of forsaking a potentially original take on the 
intersection of morbidity with political and spatial exclusion in the UK in favour 
of a narrative strategy that reasserts the primacy of the spectacular event.127 
                                                                                                                                          
achieve much the same thing. 
127 The violence that arises out of environmental degradation differs from nuclear apocalypse in that 
where the latter is usually imagined as immediate, total and blind to social distinctions, the former 
often takes place over long periods of time and overwhelmingly affects the already excluded. 
Nixon argues that “[f]rom a narrative perspective” the “invisible, mutagenic theatre” of slow 
violence “is slow-paced but open-ended, eluding the tidy closure, the narrative containment, 
imposed by […] orthodoxies of victory and defeat” (Rob Nixon 445). And Mike Davis points out 
that “global warming is not H.G. Wells’s War of the Worlds, where invading Martians 
democratically annihilate humanity without class or ethnic distinction. Climate change, instead, 
will produce dramatically unequal impacts across regions and social classes, inflicting the greatest 
damage upon poor countries with the fewest resources for meaningful adaptation” (Davis “Ark” 
37). Narratives that are sensitive to these processes are increasingly common in literature written 
in or about the global south—Animal’s People being a particularly good example. However, they 
are less common in contemporary British fiction, despite the established tendency to use 
morbidity and life expectancy as measures of social exclusion, and the relatively large disparities 
that these measures have demonstrated between the wealthier parts of southeast England and 
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Nonetheless, it does have the effect of locating The Flood on the same thematic 
continuum as her earlier work, and allows us to read it as one episode in an 
ongoing engagement with the concepts of newness and renewal, beginning and 
beginning again. As Dillon writes of Gee’s decision to indulge her apocalyptic 
imagination once more: 
 
Given that, in contemporary Western discourse apocalypse and its 
imagery are frequently applied to political and natural events in 
order to suggest their cataclysmic, disastrous, or catastrophic 
nature […] it may seem strange to suggest that apocalyptic 
narratives are a strategy for confronting and defeating the threat 
of remainderless destruction. But it does not seem so strange if 
one recalls that in the biblical tradition apocalyptic narratives 
predict both the end of the world and the coming of a new age […] 
Biblical apocalyptic narratives thus both confront and diffuse the 
threat of total destruction, since they describe, reveal or predict 
cataclysmic events but only and always with the guarantee of a 
postcataclysmic continuance, be it in this world or the next. 
(Dillon 375-76) 
 
To the extent that Dillon’s remarks on The Flood also apply to The Burning Book, 
we might read both novels as points in a singular narrative that uses the concept 
of “postcataclysmic continuance” inherent to apocalyptic discourse as a means 
of encouraging us to face our capacity to begin, and to continue to begin. Indeed, 
this reading only becomes more persuasive when we consider the number of 
characters from Gee’s earlier texts who reappear in the 2005 novel. Some of 
these, having already experienced one apocalypse, are resurrected solely in 
order to suffer another: for instance, Angela, Lorna and Henry are all alive and 
well despite the nuclear fire that supposedly killed them—along with everything 
else—at the end of The Burning Book. And they are not the only characters to 
have miraculously survived violent deaths: as Dillon points out, “[T]he writer 
                                                                                                                                          
those living in Scotland and the north.  
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Moira Penny is very much alive and kicking despite presumably falling to her 
death in Gee’s first novel Dying, in Other Words [1981]” and “Isaac, the 
homosexual art dealer who definitely died of AIDS in Where Are the Snows? is 
here resurrected” only to endure death by drowning (380).  
This is certainly an unusual strategy, but it is one that Dillon, drawing on 
the analyses of M.H. Abrams, argues to be wholly of a piece with the apocalyptic 
tradition, since its “recursive procedure […] replicates that of Revelation, which 
‘represents the present and future by replicating or alluding to passages in 
earlier biblical texts’” (381). Moreover, in the context of our own discussion, I 
think it serves to make Gee’s novel more urgent, since to some extent it divorces 
her preoccupation with apocalypse from atomic weapons and draws attention 
to the broader ways in which the world is being placed under threat. As Bowen-
Moore’s comments on “nuclearism” imply, while our capacity for world-
destruction might nowadays be measured in terms of emissions per capita 
rather than stockpiles and lethality, the menace to natality consists no more or 
less in the current ecological crisis than it did in the crisis that emerged when 
particularly invidious relations between two ideological belligerents coincided 
with the evolution of especially destructive weapons technologies. In fact, such 
moments are merely individual episodes in a much grander historical narrative 
with far graver political significance. And we might argue that Gee says 
something similar by resurrecting characters from her own work already 
associated with death and world-destruction and destroying them all over again 
using different means. For it enables her to import the concerns of The Burning 
Book into a new and more contemporary setting while suggesting that, though 
the specifics of the threat may have changed, the reasons behind it remain the 
same: contempt for the world, and a failure to recognise the importance of 
ensuring the possibility of the new both now and in the future.128 
                                                 
128 Apropos of this, it is worth noting that The Flood continues Gee’s concern with childrearing: 
Angela is now struggling with the demands of motherhood, inflicting the wounds that she 
received from Lorna upon her own daughter, Gerda. In an echo of The Burning Book that is so 
transparent it is must surely have been self-conscious, she shouts during an argument with her 
daughter, “Why can’t you just be normal?”, despite the fact that she was hardly a normal child 
herself, and was rebuked in similar terms by her own mother as a teenager (Gee Flood 210). 
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As in The Burning Book, the last chapter of The Food describes an 
apocalypse: “the white line of water mov[es] in” and crashes over Gee’s 
characters, who “suddenly see how puny they are” as the maelstrom pulls them 
in and under (Gee Flood 308, 318). However, once more, the end seems to 
contain within it the possibility of a new beginning: as the water subsides, Gee 
writes, “three thousand generations of humans stiff and damp from their spell 
underground / push […] up alive from the flood-washed catacombs / pulling 
themselves to their feet like apes” (320). In another epilogue that uses the 
representation of “post-cataclysmic continuance” to remind us of the 
preciousness of the world while warning that the threat of its destruction 
remains, Gee describes her characters emerging into a new city, a heavenly 
city—and one that she describes conspicuously without deploying the 
“cartoonesque” technique that marks her novel up to this point. After they have 
“burst up” out of the water the victims of the apocalypse find themselves “in a 
round house full of water-lilies” before running into the sunlight through “cast-
iron doors with their Victorian name-plate, ‘Kew Gardens, London’” (321, 322). 
And in the closing passages the narrator describes how, “stunned by the arc of 
the sun through the sky”, 
 
they come now, arm in arm, flowing like water into their future. 
They pass without seeing us, homing, home, here in the city whose 
name is time, glimpsed long ago, across the river, the ideal city 
which was always waiting […] Above the waters that have covered 
the earth, stained waters, bloody waters, water heaving with 
wreck and horror, pulling down papers, pictures, people […] See, 
here they come, where all are welcome […] Here we come, to lie 
down at last. (324-325) 
 
I think this is where we should end this study: with Gee’s profoundly ambivalent 
conclusion and the complex questions it begs of us. Do the heavenly implications 
of this scenario merely confirm the deaths described in the novel’s last chapter? 
Or does the prelapsarian bliss Gee’s characters now enjoy suggest that the 
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experience of death cannot be all bad? What is the significance of her Edenic 
representation of Kew Gardens? This is where Gee placed her readers before the 
apocalypse of The Burning Book: does The Flood’s conclusion mark a return to 
the narrative world of that novel? Or does it represent the return of the “real”? 
We are, after all, in an actual place, in an actual city: is Gee trying to locate utopia 
in the real world? Or does the final sentence, which describes us lying down, link 
“reality” with quietism? What exactly is the nature of this post-apocalyptic 
world? It is textual, obviously, but is it political? We see people living together, 
happily: “No one is mad here”, Gee writes, “no one is angry” (323). Does this 
speak of the demise of agonism, the demise of politics? Or does it speak of a 
revival of amor mundi and the imperative volo ut sis? Is this world something we 
have now? Something me might eventually possess? Or is it something that will 
never be ours, but which inspires us to reach for it nonetheless?  
These are the questions that The Flood’s conclusion asks us, and for the 
time being I think it best to leave them unanswered. Because to the extent that 
they leave us not with failure, not with capitulation, but with a vision of 
beginning anew—and a challenge—they also represent a modicum of hope. 
Insubstantial as it might be, this scrap of optimism may be the best we can 
expect. 
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